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Drawing on the concept of transnationalism, this thesis explores the integration and 
transnational practices of New Zealand migrants in Australia. The Trans-Tasman Travel 
Arrangement (TTTA) that was implemented in 1973, allows New Zealand citizens to live, work 
and travel to Australia with few restrictions. Since then, the TTTA has only undergone one 
major change. In 2001, New Zealanders’ access to social security services was revoked, 
requiring those who have moved since then to obtain permanent residency. Before 2017, 
pathways to permanent residency required New Zealanders to meet the same requirements 
applied to migrants from other countries, which included having a job on the Skilled 
Occupation List. Yet the open nature of the TTTA means any New Zealander regardless of their 
occupation can move to Australia, leaving many unable to apply through the pathways 
available. In 2017, an income-tested permanent residency pathway specifically for New 
Zealanders came into effect with this pathway drawing criticism for excluding those in low-
income jobs, those who work part-time or have taken time off work.  
This mixed-methods study was conducted through an online survey (n=2040) distributed 
through social media platforms and 21 semi-structured interviews. The survey and interviews 
allowed New Zealanders in Australia to detail how they maintained ties to New Zealand, their 
integration into Australia, and their views on obtaining Australian citizenship. Analysis of 
secondary data, including census data and immigration statistics, provides the context for the 
research.  
The results show respondents maintained strong socio-cultural ties to New Zealand but weak 
political and economic ties. Unlike migrants from other countries, respondents primarily 
moved to Australia to better their financial circumstances rather than to send remittances. 
Existing social ties in Australia also contributed to their decision to migrate. Respondents were 
generally well integrated at the micro- and meso- scales and experienced similar challenges 
to migrants from other countries, despite the language and cultural similarities between the 
two countries. Structural changes in Australia over the last thirty years affected their 
economic, social, and political integration. In particular, the casualisation of labour and the 
occupations respondents worked in affected their ability to apply for permanent residency 
and citizenship. The results found many respondents worked in occupations that were not on 
the Skilled Occupation List and/or had unpredictable work hours meaning their yearly income 
was not consistent, preventing them from applying for the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 
viii 
 
189) New Zealand stream and the other permanent residency visas available. This structural 
exclusion has affected the political integration of respondents as being ineligible for these 
visas leaves them feeling disenfranchised as they cannot secure their status in Australia. 
Security of status has become increasingly important amid the deportations of New 
Zealanders from Australia since 2014.  
Theoretically, this thesis contributes to our knowledge of how transnationalism operates 
between two Global-North countries that have the same national language and are culturally 
similar. It shows how the country and cultural contexts play a role in shaping transnationalism 
and integration. As even though there are similarities between New Zealand and Australia, 
policies and structures not aimed directly at migrants affect the degree of integration possible. 
From a policy perspective, it highlights the limitations of open migration pathways amid 
changing immigration policies as it disadvantages those who cannot change their status in 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The year 2021 will mark twenty years since the rights New Zealand citizens have in Australia 
changed. During these twenty years, the New-Zealand-born population in Australia grew from 
355,765 in 2001 to 518,462 in 2016, yet it is estimated that the number is closer to 570,000 
(ABS, 2001, 2016; Love & Klapdor, 2020). The migration of New Zealanders1 to Australia is 
unique in the Australian migration context as it is facilitated by the Trans-Tasman Travel 
Arrangement (TTTA) rather than Australia’s Migration Program. Before 2001, New Zealanders 
who moved to Australia were granted automatic permanent residency, which was revoked in 
2001 over concerns too many New Zealanders were moving to Australia to claim social 
security benefits. This has meant any New Zealander who has moved to Australia since 2001 
has no access to social security benefits, is denoted with an ‘indefinitely temporary’ status, 
and granted a New Zealand Special Category (subclass 444) visa (SCV 444) on arrival.  
In 2017, the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) New Zealand stream (189 visa) was 
introduced, which is an income rather than occupation-based permanent residency pathway. 
This visa has provided some New Zealanders the opportunity to get permanent residency, but 
the income threshold of AUD$53,900 for the previous four tax years, has been criticised for 
being too high, excluding those in low-income and part-time jobs leaving them unable to 
secure their status in Australia. For New Zealanders, the need to obtain permanent residency 
and citizenship has become more pertinent since amendments were made to the Migration 
Act 1958 in 2014. These amendments expanded the grounds for the deportation of non-
citizens from Australia and have resulted in the deportation of 1,909 New Zealanders from 
Australia (DHA, 2019c). The implications of this policy change has meant New Zealanders who 
moved to Australia in 2001 and did not meet the eligibility requirements for permanent 
residency are not entitled to any additional rights in Australia, based on their length of 
residence.  
During this twenty-year period, the nature of migration has changed in response to advances 
in technology and the expansion of visa categories in a range of countries across the globe, 
 




including Australia. As a result, how migrants maintain ties to their home country and become 
integrated into the destination country has been of interest to researchers. Although first 
theorised in the 1990s, the concept of transnationalism is of relevance to this research as it 
considers how migrants maintain social, political, economic, and cultural ties to their home 
country (Basch et al., 1994). The second concept, integration, consider how migrants become 
socially, politically, economically, and culturally integrated into the destination country and 
how integration is influenced by micro-, meso-, and macro-scale factors (Erdal, 2013; 
Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Together these two theoretical concepts are used to examine how 
the policy changes mentioned above affect the integration of New Zealanders into Australia 
and their transnational practices. 
In focussing on New Zealanders, this thesis will provide more insight into a migrant group 
whose experiences in Australia have remained absent in political and media discussion about 
immigration to Australia. This is because many New Zealanders are invisible migrants as they 
are not necessarily discernible based on their skin colour, language, or cultural stereotypes 
like the Italians and Greeks who migrated after World War II or more recent migrants, 
including those from India, China, and the Philippines (Nolan, 2015). Three-quarters (74.6 per 
cent) of the New Zealand-born population in Australia are of British, Irish, or New Zealand 
European ancestry with 9.2 per cent identifying as Māori, 5.8 per cent Polynesian, and 1.4 per 
cent Chinese (ABS, 2016). The open and relatively unrestricted nature of the TTTA compared 
to Australia’s Migration Program has meant it has not received the same degree of media and 
political scrutiny as the conditions of the TTTA are not constantly changing. However, since 
2014, the deportation of New Zealanders from Australia has received media and political 
attention on both sides of the Tasman. This has raised questions regarding the rights New 
Zealanders have in Australia and revealed how at the macro-scale the historical ties as Anzacs, 
and the ‘mateship’2 it symbolises, no longer bears the same weight in Australia. 
This thesis will explore the role policy changes have on the integration and transnational 
practices of New Zealanders living in Australia. This study looks at the motivations for moving 
 
2 Mateship broadly refers to the bonds of loyalty, and feelings of solidarity and fraternity that men typically 
exhibit. The notion of mateship in the trans-Tasman context was established during World War I when Australia 
and New Zealand fought together as ANZACs. An extensive discussion of the masculinist conceptualisation of this 




to Australia and their return migration intentions and considers how integration and 
transnational practices are multi-layered and multi-scalar. It also pays particular attention to 
occupation and views of obtaining Australian citizenship, given the permanent residency 
pathways available. The findings presented in this thesis contribute to the transnationalism 
and integration literature and deepen our understanding of the migration experiences of 
middling migrants in a North-North migration context. The next sections detail the global 
migration rhetoric and how this has influenced research and Australia’s response to migration. 
This chapter ends with an overview of New Zealand-Australia relations and the existing 
research on New Zealanders living in Australia.  
1.2 Shifting global attitude towards migration 
Migration is a global phenomenon, with an estimated 272 million people or 3.5 per cent of 
the global population living outside their country of origin (International Organization for 
Migration, 2019). Of these migrants, two-thirds can be classified as labour migrants of which 
68 per cent live in high-income level countries which include countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), Canada, Japan, and 
Singapore (International Organization for Migration, 2019). Australia, in particular, has 
become a destination country for migrants with 29.7 per cent of the population born overseas 
(ABS, 2020a). Migration to Australia has become highly regulated and controlled, with 
prospective migrants needing to get a visa before being able to enter. This control and 
regulation of migration are not unique to Australia, with many countries such as those listed 
above, implementing a range of visa schemes that dictate the condition of entry and 
residence.  
Arguably, the categorisation of migrants has resulted from the neoliberal restructuring of 
many nation-states, including Australia, and as a response to globalisation. In Australia, this 
neoliberal restructuring began in the 1980s, where large parts of the economy were 
privatised, and significant financial cuts made to government-funded social services (Walsh, 
2011). At the same time, nation-states were becoming increasingly linked by international 
trade and finance and sought alternative ways to maximise their profits and global 
competitiveness, with migration viewed as a strategy to achieving this goal (Hollifield, 2004; 
Smith, 2019). To do so, immigration countries such as Australia, Canada, and New Zealand 




prospective skilled migrants were granted entry if they achieved a certain number of points 
(Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; Ongley & Pearson, 1995). Migrants who were exempt from this 
system included family migrants and refugees.  
The points-based system meant nation-states could select individuals they believed had the 
skills to help facilitate market expansion and capital accumulation while limiting the social 
costs of migration (Walsh, 2011). In doing so, this has allowed nation-states to categorise 
migrants based on their perceived economic contributions and exclude or limit the migration 
of those who are deemed to be a financial burden on the nation-state, including family 
migrants, asylum seekers and refugees (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; Hugo, 2014; Khoo et al., 
2008).  
This categorisation of migrants into Economic, Family, and Humanitarian has resulted in the 
increasing control and regulation of migration by nation-states. Non-economic migrants who 
are viewed as unproductive, dependent, and a fiscal liability undermine the efforts made by 
nation-states to ensure only those who enter the country are autonomous (Walsh, 2011). 
Nation-states have therefore implemented a range of different measures to deter or prevent 
the migration of those who are not economically desirable or threaten these carefully curated 
migration systems. Measures taken by nation-states to deter undesirable migrants occurred 
at the beginning of the 21st century in response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
persecution of Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Syrian refugee crisis, and a series of Islamic extremist 
terrorist attacks. 
In Australia, the events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka led to a surge in the number of 
people coming to Australia by boat to seek asylum. In 2008-2009, 23 boats (1033 people) 
arrived in Australia increasing to 110 boats (7983 people) in 2011-2012 before peaking at 402 
boats (25,173 people) in 2012-2013 (Janet Phillips & Spinks, 2013). Before these boats arrived, 
Australia had implemented a series of policies during the 1990s, and early 2000s that meant 
any asylum seekers coming to Australia by boat would be put in mandatory detention and 
processed offshore on neighbouring islands, including Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean 
and Nauru in the Pacific Ocean (Phillips & Spinks, 2013). During this same period, Australia 
had become increasingly concerned about the threat non-citizens posed to Australia’s 
national security (Hon. S. Morrison, 2014). In 2014, changes made to Sections 501 and 116 of 
the Migration Act 1958, have meant non-citizens associated with a criminal group, involved in 




character can have their visa cancelled and deported from Australia (Coombs, 2014). The 
amendments also meant the Minister in charge of the Department for Home Affairs has the 
power to cancel an individual’s visa.  
Around the same time, continental Europe began experiencing an increase in the number of 
refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea from countries such as Eritrea, Syria, and Libya. The 
scale of this refugee crisis increased dramatically from 225,455 refugees in 2014 to over 1 
million in 2015 before decreasing to 375,652 in 2016 (UNHCR, 2020). This increase in the 
number of refugees arriving in continental Europe was a concern amongst right-wing 
politicians in the UK, which led to a referendum on whether the UK should withdraw from the 
European Union (EU), referred to as Brexit. Those campaigning for the UK to leave leveraged 
the anti-immigrant populist sentiment that had been growing within the country. It capitalised 
on the underlying xenophobia and racism towards Muslims and black others, using images of 
the migrant crisis in continental Europe to exacerbate fears (Isakjee & Lorne, 2019). Some 
migrants of South Asian descent also campaigned to ‘leave’ as they argued it would increase 
migration from South Asia and facilitate family reunification (Pickard, 2016). The referendum 
took place on 23 June 2016, with 52 per cent voting to leave the EU.  
During this same period, Donald Trump announced he was running for President of the USA 
in the 2016 election. Like the pro-Brexit campaigners, Trump used immigration to attract 
voters, particularly middle-class and working-class whites in rural and semi-rural counties, 
who had been affected by a decline in manufacturing jobs because to offshore processing and 
technological changes (Nagel, 2019). Trump’s views and claims legitimised and amplified 
existing attitudes towards minority groups, particularly Mexicans, claiming that Mexico 
exported criminals, rapists, and drug dealers to the USA (Gravelle, 2018). To address these 
fears and attract voters, Trump said he would continue to build the wall along the Mexico-
USA border. Construction of the wall began in 1990 under President George H. W. Bush in 
1990 (Grandin, 2019). Following his election in 2016, Trump implemented an Executive Order 
that placed a 90-day suspension on people entering the USA from seven predominately 
Muslim countries and a 120-day suspension on all refugee settlements (Nagel, 2019). These 
decisions were in response to terrorist attacks in Paris (November 2015) and Brussels (March 
2016) by a Muslim extremist group and the growing refugee crisis in Europe.  
To address the implications of these migrant crises and the growing anti-immigration rhetoric, 




Migrants on 19 September 2016. All 193 member states reaffirmed their obligation to respect 
the human rights of refugees and migrants and that protecting refugees was a shared 
international responsibility (UNHCR, 2018). The adoption of this compact provided the 
groundwork for two new non-binding compacts in 2018. First, a global compact on refugees 
and second, a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration. In December 2018, 164 
of the 193 member states signed the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration 
(GCM) (Sherrell, 2019). States who did not sign this compact included the USA and Australia. 
Australia’s stance on this compact was made known in August that year with Peter Dutton, 
head of the Department of Home Affairs, saying Australia signing the compact would involve 
sacrificing our border protection policies and impact our sovereignty (Sherrell, 2019). Prime 
Minister Scott Morrison, on 21 November 2018, formally announced Australia would not sign 
the compact saying it would ‘compromise our successful way of doing things’ (Sherrell, 2019).  
1.3 Permanent to temporary migration in Australia  
Before the Federation of Australia in 1901, each colony managed the entry of overseas 
migrants. This saw some colonies enact policies that restricted the entry of Chinese migrants, 
while other colonies introduced a written test to limit non-white migration (Cooper, 2012). 
Following Federation, Australia’s first migration policy, the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 
was passed. Referred to as the White Australia policy, it sought to restrict the entry of all non-
European migrants into Australia (DIBP, 2017a). During this time, New Zealanders, including 
Māori, could enter Australia because they were classified as British subjects (Hamer, 2014). 
Following World War II, the economic and population growth of Australia had become a 
concern because of significant labour shortages and a declining fertility rate (Hugo, 2006). To 
address this, the Assisted Passage Migration Scheme was implemented in 1945, which 
facilitated large-scale migration from Britain to Australia. Under this scheme, over 460,000 
British migrated to Australia between 1947 and 1971 (Jupp, 1998). While migrants primarily 
came from Britain during this period, the impact of World War II saw the assisted passage 
scheme expanded to include countries such as Italy, the Netherlands, West Germany and 
Turkey, migrants whose first language was not English (Colic-Peisker, 2011a, DIMA, 2001). The 
Assisted Passage Migration Scheme formally ended in 1981.  
During the 1970s, three major immigration policy changes were made. First was the abolition 




2016). Second, the Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement (TTTA) was signed between Australia and 
New Zealand. Third, was the implementation of the ‘Numerical Multifactor Assessment 
System’ (NUMAS), a points-based system in 1979 (DIBP, 2017a). The introduction of NUMAS 
signified a shift in the government’s attitude towards immigration. Migration was no longer 
about nation-building but the targeted filling of labour shortages to meet labour market 
demands. 
By the 1990s, Australia was facing another demographic transition with an ageing population, 
declining fertility rates, and rural-to-urban migration affecting economic development. To 
address the growing labour shortages, two migration pathways were introduced. First was the 
State Specific Regional Migration scheme in 1995-1996, which sought to address the labour 
market shortages created by youth migration from rural and regional areas to cities (Hugo, 
2008b). Second was the Skilled Temporary visa in 1996, which allowed business owners to 
bring skilled workers to Australia for up to four years. Introducing this visa signalled a shift 
from migration being viewed as permanent to temporary. In 2017, the Skilled Temporary visa 
was overhauled and renamed the Temporary Skill Shortage Visa (TSS). This visa aimed to fill 
short- and medium-term occupation shortages in order to build a suitable skills base and 
ensure Australian workers are put first (CEDA, 2019). 
Alongside the Temporary Skill Shortage Visa (TSS), there is a range of temporary visas which 
include the Student Visa, Temporary Graduate Work Visa, and the Working Holiday Maker 
(WHM). Since 1985, international students have made up a large proportion of the temporary 
migrants in Australia, contributing to university funding and the Australian economy. In 2018 
there were over 398,563 international students enrolled in higher education, contributing 
AUD$32.4 billion to the Australian economy in 2017-2018 (Ferguson & Sherrell, 2019). The 
retention of these international students has become increasingly important for Australia to 
remain globally economically competitive. In 2007, the Temporary Graduate (subclass 485) 
visa was introduced, which allows those who have completed a bachelor’s degree with a 
minimum of two years of study, to work in Australia between two and four years depending 
on their level of qualification. Whereas the WHM allows those aged 18-30 from 42 countries 
regardless of their skill or education level to live, work, and travel in Australia for one to three 
years (CEDA, 2019).  
Currently, Australia’s Migration Program is composed of permanent and temporary migration. 




Family, or Refugee-Humanitarian Streams with caps placed on the number of people granted 
each visa. Those applying to stay in Australia through the Skilled Stream need to achieve a 
certain number of points, based on a range of attributes, including recognised skills, 
occupation, and English competency. Whereas the temporary visas, which include WHM, 
Student Visas, and the Temporary Graduate, are all uncapped, meaning there is no limit on 
the number of people who hold these visas. Figure 1.1 displays the number of visas approved 
under each of these different visa streams. The Skilled Stream remained relatively constant 
from 2009-2010 to 2017-2018, while in the same period, the number of Student Visas 
approved increased significantly from 250,483 to 378,292. 
 
Figure 1.1: Number of visas granted by visa stream 
Source: DHA (2019a) 
The immigration policy changes discussed in this section have resulted in a shift in the source 
country of migrants. Figure 1.2 shows that during this time, the number of post-war migrants 
from Italy and Greece has steadily declined as these populations age. Since 1996, the number 
of migrants born in India, China, and the Philippines has continued to increase. The increase 
in these populations has resulted from rapid population growth in each of these countries, the 
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Figure 1.2: Top countries of birth, overseas-born population in Australia 
Source: compiled using ABS data 
1.4 Trans-Tasman migration and relations 
Figure 1.2 above shows that since 1996 New Zealand has been the second major source 
country of migrants. The migration of New Zealanders, as mentioned above, is facilitated by 
the TTTA, which is not a part of Australia’s Migration Program. Unlike Australia’s Migration 
Program, which has continued to evolve over the last fifty years in response to labour market 
demands and demographic changes, the TTTA has remained largely unchanged. Since its 
implementation, there has only been one significant change that occurred in 2001. Explained 
in more detail in Chapter 2, during the 1980s and 1990s, Australia had become increasingly 
concerned about the number of New Zealanders claiming welfare in Australia (Nolan, 2015). 
The Australian government wanted the New Zealand government to cover the cost of the 
welfare that was being claimed but refused to do so. New Zealanders migrating to Australia 
before 2001 were granted automatic permanent residency and had access to all social security 
services, with these privileges revoked in 2001.  
From 26 February 2001, New Zealanders moving to Australia would no longer have access to 
social security services, including unemployment benefits but kept the right to live, work and 
travel to Australia as per the TTTA. To access social security, New Zealanders who have moved 
to Australia since 2001 need to apply for permanent residency through one of the visas a part 
of Australia’s Migration Program, which requires meeting the eligibility requirements based 
























requirements because of the open nature of the TTTA, the Australian government introduced 
a visa pathway specifically for New Zealanders in 2017, the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 
189) New Zealand stream (189 visa). From 1 July 2017 to 30 September 2018, 12,817 
applications were lodged, with 2,467 visas granted to primary applicants and 3,043 visas 
granted to secondary applicants (DHA, 2018a). This income rather than occupation-based visa 
has made permanent residency and hence citizenship a possibility for many New Zealanders, 
but the income threshold has been criticised for excluding those in low-income jobs, those 
who work part-time, women who have taken time off work to raise children, and retirees 
(Mares, 2016).  
Any New Zealander who has not obtained Australian citizenship is classed as a non-citizen by 
the Australian government, which leaves them vulnerable to policy changes that affect non-
citizens. The changes to Sections 501 and 116 to the Migration Act 1958 mentioned above has 
resulted in the deportation of 1,909 New Zealanders between 2014-2015 and 2018-2019 
(DHA, 2019c). In 2018-2019, 435 New Zealanders had their visa cancelled under Section 501 
compared to 93 from the UK, 44 from Vietnam, 29 from China, and 342 from all other 
countries (DHA, 2019e). This disproportionate number of New Zealanders being deported 
compared to those from other countries has affected the relationship between the two 
countries. A relationship that has been shaped by the shared British colonial histories and 
fighting together in World War I as ANZACS, which came to symbolise mateship and having 
each other’s back.  
The New Zealand government has readily criticised the deportation of New Zealanders. In the 
year following the changes, then New Zealand Prime Minister John Key said that the 
deportations challenged the special relationship between New Zealand and Australia, the 
Anzac bond, and the Anzac spirit as this policy allowed Australia to pick and choose which New 
Zealanders can stay (Conifer, 2015). Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop responded by 
saying that there is no closer relationship than Australia and New Zealand and that his 
comments would be considered (Conifer, 2015). In the same year, the Green Parties of New 
Zealand and Australia jointly called on the Australian government to stop the indiscriminate 
deportation of New Zealanders as the deportations do not consider individual circumstances 




The election of New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern in 2017 has seen the deportation 
of New Zealanders become a political issue, with it continually brought up during meetings 
with the Australian Prime Minister. Ardern has continued to argue those who had genuine 
links to New Zealand should be deported as without an established support network, and 
deportees were likely to re-offend (Williams, 2017). In Ardern’s most recent meeting with 
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison at the beginning of 2020, she continued to reinforce 
her concerns about the impact the deportations were having not only on individuals and their 
family but on New Zealand:  
‘Australia is well within its rights to deport individuals who break your laws. 
New Zealand does the same. But we have a simple request. Send back kiwis, 
genuine kiwis - do not deport your people, and your problems. 
I have heard countless cases of individuals who, on any common sense test, 
identify as Australians. 
Just a few weeks ago I met a women [sic] who moved to Australia not much 
older than 1 year old. She told me that she had no connection to our country, 
but she had three children in Australia. She was in a crisis centre, having 
returned to a country she did not feel was her own. I have heard from those 
who work in our judiciary that they are seeing cases before our courts of 
individuals who are failing attempts to reintegrate and rehabilitate because 
the success of these programs is reliant on at least some network. These 
deportees have none.’ (Ardern, 2020) 
Morrison responded saying,  
‘The Australian government’s policy is very clear. We deport non-citizens 
who have committed crimes in Australia against our community. This policy 
is applied not specific to one country, but to any country whose citizens are 
here. You commit a crime here, if convicted, once you have done your time, 
we send you home.’ (Remeikis, 2020) 
In response, Ardern said,  
‘The prime minister used a keyword in his reference just now – he said that 
after they have served their time he sends them ‘home.’ The example I used 
demonstrates that we have countless who have no home in New Zealand, 
they have no network, they have grown up in Australia. That is their home. 




1.5 Theorising migration 
As migration is a global phenomenon, scholars have sought to theorise and understand the 
impact visa categorisation and the non-citizen/citizen dichotomy has on the nation-state, 
communities, and individuals in both the origin and destination country (Basch et al., 1994; 
Bloemraad, 2004; Brubaker, 2010; Erdal, 2013; Levitt & Jaworsky, 2007; Massey et al., 1993; 
Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Research at the beginning of the twentieth 
century viewed migration as a one-way linear process where, over time, migrants would lose 
their culture and assimilate into the host society. This view of migration was based on the 
migration of Europeans to the USA and their assimilation into Anglo-American society (Park et 
al., 1925). Following World War II, increasing globalisation and advances in technology saw 
migration channels open-up, and the origin countries of migrants shifted from Europe to this 
Global-South (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003). This new flow of migrants from the Global-
South to the Global-North meant earlier theories such as assimilation no longer adequately 
explained these migration patterns. Portes and colleagues (Portes & Jensen, 1989; Portes & 
Stepick, 1985; Portes & Zhou, 1993) adapted assimilation to explain the settlement 
experiences of Latin American migrants in the USA. Researchers also theorised the drivers of 
migration in terms of macroeconomics where wage differentials between countries influence 
migration (Massey et al., 1993) or, microeconomic and the new economics of labour migration 
(NELM) where migration is an individual or familial decision and in specific contexts used as a 
risk diversification strategy to send remittances (Sjaastad, 1962; Stark & Bloom, 1985; Todaro, 
1969; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987).  
Towards the end of the twentieth century, with the rise of temporary visas and increasing 
global connectivity, the concept of transnationalism was introduced to explain the changing 
migration patterns and migrant experiences in the destination country. Basch et al. (1994, p. 
6) first introduced the concept of transnationalism, defining it ‘as the process by which 
immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies 
of origin and settlement.’ This concept recognised migrants maintained social, political, 
economic, and cultural ties with their home country while becoming integrated into the 
destination country (Erdal, 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). As migrants became integrated 
into the destination country, they sought to affirm their sense of belonging and legal status 
through the attainment of citizenship. This challenged how nation-states conceived 




and the nation-state (Bloemraad et al., 2008; Brubaker, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 1999). Increasing 
trade and global connectivity have meant many nation-states have permitted dual-citizenship 
as it allows them to not only remain economically competitive but benefit from the 
transnational ties migrants have.  
While research in the USA focussed on the assimilation of migrants in Europe, research has 
focussed on the integration of migrants into the destination country. Integration has been 
theorised into two broad categories, socio-cultural and structural, which seeks to understand 
the experiences of migrants in the destination country (Erdal, 2013; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; 
Snel et al., 2006). To assess how migrants become integrated, a range of indicators such as 
education level, occupation, labour force participation, naturalisation rates, language ability, 
engagement with host-society, and sense of belonging have been used (Favell, 2003; 
Schneider & Crul, 2010). However, the integration of migrants is affected by three things: 1) 
the immigration policies in place and the visa conditions; 2) the strength of a migrant’s 
transnational ties, and 3) how receptive the destination country is to migrants.  
Theorising migration from a transnational perspective and examining the ways a migrant 
becomes integrated into the destination country has revealed the complexity of the migrant 
process. A limitation of this research is that it focuses on South-North migration, where often 
the migration systems in countries such as Australia, Singapore, and the USA dictate the 
conditions of entry and facilitate seasonal, temporary migration. As a result, these policies 
have categorised migrants into low and high-skilled, which consequently has been the focus 
of much of the migration research (Parrenas, 2005; Rajendran et al., 2017; Ryan & Mulholland, 
2014b). This has meant little attention has been paid to North-North migration and the 
transnational practices and integration of ‘middling migrants’ who disrupt this dichotomy and 
will be addressed in this thesis.  
1.5.1 Migration research in Australia  
The proliferation of temporary visas and the diversification of the source countries of migrants 
has influenced and shaped how migration has been researched in Australia. Before 2000, 
research looked at European migrants such as Greeks and Germans (Seitz & Foster, 1985; 
Smolicz, 1985), refugee labour market experiences (Wooden, 1991), occupational mobility 
and employment success of migrants (Hawthorne, 1997; Miller, 1987), migrants from the 




& Liu, 1998; Shu & Hawthorne, 1996). Since 2000, research on migration has continued to 
reflect the changing nature of migration to Australia and the increasing complexity of 
Australia’s Migration Program. This body of research has included a focus on skilled migrants 
(Hawthorne, 2005; Hugo, 2008c, 2014; Rajendran et al., 2020; Weller, 2017), refugees and 
their settlement and labour market experiences ((Colic-Peisker, 2005; Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 
2007; Fozdar, 2012), migrants’ settlement experiences and integration into Australia (Hugo, 
2008a; McMillan, 2017; Osbaldiston et al., 2020). Research has also examined the 
transnational practices of Filipino migrants (Siar, 2014), Indian migrants (Voigt-Graf, 2004, 
2005), and Italian migrants (Baldassar, 2007a, 2007b, 2008).  
The increased number of temporary visas available and the changing immigration policies 
have continued to be an area of focus with authors such as Hawthorne (Hawthorne, 2005, 
2010, 2014) examining the nexus between student migration and immigration and Khoo 
(2002, 2014) and Khoo et al. (2008, 2009) looking at the increase of temporary migration and 
which temporary migrants transition to permanent residency. Research has also continued to 
analyse the impact temporary migration has on the labour market (Birrell et al., 2007; Tan & 
Lester, 2012). Other authors have looked at the impact immigration policy changes have on 
international students, temporary graduate visa holders, and WHMs and their experiences 
living in Australia (Clarke, 2005; Robertson, 2011a, 2011b, 2014; Robertson & Runganaikaloo, 
2014). The increased number of Chinese and Indian international students and skilled 
migrants has also been a focus (Baas, 2014, 2017; Dunn et al., 2011; Hugo, 2008c; Sardana et 
al., 2016; Tan & Hugo, 2017). 
While the research discussed above has evolved in response to the changing immigration 
policies, visas, and source countries of migrants, one group of migrants that has been under-
researched is New Zealanders. As mentioned above, New Zealanders are the second largest 
migrant group in Australia whose entry and work rights are not governed by Australia’s 
Migration Program. This unique visa arrangement in the context of Australian migration and 
the cultural and political similarities between the two countries may explain the lack of 
interest in New Zealand migrants compared to migrants from other countries with more 




1.5.2 Research on New Zealand migrants in Australia 
The existing research on New Zealand migrants in Australia has primarily utilised secondary 
data sources. Using census data and immigration arrivals and departures data, the research 
has examined the demographic characteristics of the New Zealand population in Australia and 
the migration flows between the two countries (Bedford et al., 2003; Birrell & Rapson, 2001; 
Forrest et al., 2009; Hamer, 2008, 2017, 2019; Hugo, 2004b; Poot, 2010; Poot & Sanderson, 
2007; Sanderson, 2009). Carmichael’s (ed.) (1993) book comprehensively detailed and 
analysed migration between New Zealand and Australia from the 1800s to the late 1980s. In 
response to the 2001 policy change, researchers used arrivals and departures data and 
Australian citizenship attainment data to see what impact this policy change had (Bedford et 
al., 2003; Birrell & Rapson, 2001; Hugo, 2004b, 2004b). Birrell and Rapson (2001) examined 
the migration flows data to ascertain the scale of third-country migration from New Zealand 
to Australia, as this has been one argument used by the Australian government for changing 
New Zealanders’ access to social security. While Hugo (2004a, 2004b) found there was an 
increase in the number of New Zealanders who obtained Australian citizenship because of this 
policy change, increasing from 11,007 in 2000-2001 to 17,334 in 2001-2002. Sanderson (2009) 
and Poot (2010) utilised Australian arrivals and departures data of New Zealanders who 
arrived in Australia between 1 August 1999 and 31 July 2002 and their moves in and out of 
Australia until July 2005. Poot (2010) found that one-third re-migrated within four years, but 
the proportion was similar to those from the UK. In contrast, Sanderson (2009) revealed that 
after the 2001 policy change, New Zealand-born migrants were more likely to return to New 
Zealand compared to non-native-born New Zealand citizens.  
Census data has also been used to provide a richer understanding of the New Zealand 
population in Australia. For example, Hamer (2008) used responses to the ancestry question 
to determine the size of the Māori population in Australia. He found that those who identified 
as Māori went from one in 17 in 1986 to one in six in 2006. Hamer (2017) also used census 
data to discuss the electoral participation of Māori in Australia in relation to their uptake of 
Australian citizenship. He found that many are politically disenfranchised because they have 
a low uptake of citizenship because of the eligibility requirements for permanent residency. 
Forrest et al. (2009) used census data to examine the economic and spatial assimilation of 
Māori in Sydney. They found that Māori in blue-collar, manual occupations are in general only 




Nolan (2015) provides a comprehensive overview of the growing tensions between Australia 
and New Zealand since the implementation of the TTTA and the events and policy changes 
that occurred in the lead up to the 2001 policy change. Other researchers have situated New 
Zealand to Australia migration in the global migration context. Hamer (2014) has argued that 
immigration policy changes since 1901 that have affected New Zealanders were done to 
reduce third-country Pacific migration to Australia. Whereas McMillan (2014) compares the 
TTTA to EU citizenship looking at the political and social rights second country nationals have 
in each of these contexts. Hugo (2015) discusses the features of migration corridors globally 
before discussing trans-Tasman migration in the context of escalator migration theory and 
relay migration. Hugo et al. (2016) compared key immigration policy changes in Australia and 
New Zealand and how these have affected migration flows within and between each country. 
There have only been a few empirical studies conducted over the last twenty years. Green and 
Power (2006) and Green et al. (2008) conducted 31 interviews and got 633 written survey 
responses in South East Queensland and Northern New South Wales to explore in the previous 
paper how New Zealanders construct their transnational identity. While Green et al. (2008) 
looked at New Zealanders’ motivations for moving to Australia and the effect, factors such as 
age and length of residence had on transnational practices. Hamer (2007), using data collected 
through an online and postal survey targeting Māori living in Australia it explored their iwi 
affiliations, reasons for moving to Australia, employment experiences and views on Australian 
citizenship, and identity. The most recent study by McMillan (2017) examined the ‘affective 
integration’ of New Zealanders who moved post-2001 living in Australia. She found that 
although respondents had a high degree of structural, social, and cultural integration, they felt 
discriminated against and excluded by the Australian government as they could not access 
social security. Both Hamer (2007) and McMillan (2017) discuss the low-uptake of Australian 
citizenship by New Zealanders, but neither author provides an extensive discussion on why 
New Zealanders do not obtain it. Hamer (2007), for example, found that 48.3 per cent did not 
want Australian citizenship with 29.7 per cent feeling no need to naturalise. McMillan (2017) 
mentioned briefly that respondents in her research would be keen to take out Australian 
citizenship, with reasons given ranging from patriotic to instrumental.  
In the last couple of years, in response to the amendments of Sections 501 and 116 of the 
Migration Act 1958, the deportation of New Zealanders from Australia has been explored. In 




Migration Act 1958, the deportation of New Zealanders from Australia has been explored. 
Stanley (2018) found that many of those who had been deported on character grounds had 
never committed a crime. This they argue, sees New Zealanders shift from ‘mate’ to 
precarious ‘other’ as the border become present in everyday interactions as fears of 
deportation are exacerbated (Stanley, 2018). Billings (2019) examines the motivation for these 
amendments and how New Zealanders have been disproportionately affected compared to 
migrants from other countries.  
A few gaps emerge from the empirical studies conducted. First, these studies were primarily 
conducted in South East Queensland, Northern New South Wales, and Sydney, where there is 
a high proportion of New Zealanders (Green et al., 2008; Green & Power, 2006; Hamer, 2007; 
McMillan, 2017). This thesis includes Melbourne and Adelaide in addition to the Brisbane-
Gold Coast area as study sites, as each of these locations may attract New Zealanders for 
different reasons. Second, the low uptake of Australian citizenship mentioned by Hamer 
(2007) and McMillan (2017) is not explored in depth by either author. This thesis will expand 
on this by exploring why New Zealanders do not obtain Australian citizenship, especially as 
the need for citizenship has become more important because of the deportation of New 
Zealanders since 2014 and the pathway to permanent residency introduced in 2017. Third, 
while transnationalism has been a focus on the literature of migrants from other countries in 
Australia, Green and Power (2006) and Green et al. (2008) loosely engage with this theory. 
The previous article focuses on how New Zealanders maintain their national identity and how 
they develop a transnational identity. The latter article primarily used push and pull theory to 
explore the motivations for moving to Australia and how links are maintained with New 
Zealand. The authors found New Zealanders exhibit a form of transnationalism as they feel at 
home in both countries. Green et al. (2008) suggest that further study should look at the 
contributions New Zealanders make to Australian society. Through engaging with the 
transnationalism literature, this thesis will explore how New Zealanders maintain social, 
political, economic, and cultural ties with New Zealand. This thesis will also expand on the 
existing research on the integration of New Zealanders through exploring challenges they face 




1.6 Research aim and objectives 
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore the role immigration policy changes have on the 
integration and transnational practices of New Zealanders living in Australia. Using the 
theoretical conceptions of transnationalism and integration, this thesis seeks to consider how 
micro-, meso- and macro-scale factors intersect with and affect their socio-cultural and 
structural integration and transnational practices. The aim of the thesis will be met by the 
following objectives:  
1. To examine migrants motivations for moving to Australia and the strength of their 
social, political, economic, and cultural ties to New Zealand 
2. To investigate the settlement experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia 
through examining their socio-cultural and structural integration into Australia 
3. To examine how immigration policy changes intersect with the socio-cultural and 
structural integration of migrants and their return migration intentions 
4. To explore the implications for policy and theory and put forward recommendations 
for future research based on the findings of the study 
1.7 Thesis outline 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The present chapter details the research topic situates 
it within the current global migration rhetoric. It outlines previous research on New Zealanders 
in Australia and the knowledge gaps that exist. The aim and objectives of the research are 
detailed.  
Chapter Two begins by discussing New Zealand migration in the global context, then detailing 
migration flows between New Zealand and Australia since each country was colonised. The 
evolution of Australia’s immigration and citizenship policies and how they relate to trans-
Tasman migration is then discussed. It finishes by providing a demographic overview of the 
New Zealand-born population using the 2016 Australian census data. 
Chapter Three reviews the relevant migration literature, detailing how the concepts of 
transnationalism and integration emerged and how they have been applied in migration 
studies. It also examines how migrant occupation has been researched in relation to these 
two theoretical concepts. This chapter provides the theoretical framework for this research 




multi-layered. The framework takes into account how micro-scale factors intersect with actors 
at the meso- and macro-scales and the language, culture, and political, economic, and social 
structures in the origin and destination country. Existing research on New Zealanders in 
Australia concerning transnationalism and integration is also outlined. The chapter concludes 
by outlining the gaps this research aims to fill.  
Chapter Four details the methodology and methods used in this study. The chapter explains 
the rationale for using a sequential mixed-methods design and details how the online survey 
and semi-structured interviews were implemented and conducted. It discusses the limitations 
of the data collection methods used with the final section providing a demographic overview 
of the 2040 survey responses and the 21 interviewees. 
Chapters Five to Seven present and discuss the results of the primary data collected for this 
research. Chapter Five addresses objectives 1 and 3 and begins by detailing respondents’ 
motivation to move to Australia. Using transnationalism as the theoretical framework, 
respondents’ economic, political, cultural, and social transnational practices are explored, 
revealing how these practices differ from migrants from other countries. Respondents’ return 
intentions are also discussed. Chapters Six and Seven address objectives 2 and 3. Chapter Six 
examines the economic, social, and overall integration of respondents into Australia, paying 
particular attention to the occupation of respondents. At the micro-scale, respondents felt 
well-integrated, yet at the macro-scale felt disenfranchised because of how they felt New 
Zealanders have been treated by the Australian government. Chapter Seven looks into the 
political integration of respondents and their ability to obtain permanent residency and 
citizenship. The results presented show that for those who arrived after the 2001 policy 
change, the introduction of the 189 visa in 2017 made them feel taken advantage of by the 
Australian government as they could not secure their status in Australia. Respondents wanted 
to secure their status in Australia in response to the deportation of New Zealanders.  
Chapter Eight concludes this thesis by summarising the key findings in relation to the aim and 
objectives of the research. It discusses the implications and contributions of these findings to 




CHAPTER 2: TRENDS IN THE MIGRATION OF NEW ZEALANDERS TO 
AUSTRALIA 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with an overview of New Zealand and a discussion of the migration of New 
Zealanders globally and to Australia. This is followed by a summary of Australia’s Migration 
Program, Australian citizenship, and changes to the Migration Act 1958 in 2014. The 
immigration policy changes that affect New Zealanders are then discussed. The last section 
provides an overview of the New Zealand population in Australia using the 2016 Australian 
census data.  
2.2 Overview of New Zealand 
New Zealand is a small nation of islands between the Tasman Sea and the South Pacific Ocean 
and was named Aotearoa by Polynesian voyagers, who first settled the islands from 
approximately 1300. These people came to be known as Māori and are recognised as the 
indigenous people or tangata whenua; they met European voyagers following the arrival of 
James Cook in 1769. The early arrivals to New Zealand from Europe and the USA in the early 
1800s were missionaries, traders, sealers, and whalers, followed by French Catholic 
missionaries in 1838. By the 1830s, some Māori and British missionaries sought formal 
intervention from the British government to offset the impact European contact was having 
on Māori. Ultimately, the British used a treaty to assume formal control of the nation as a 
colony of their empire. The first signings of the Treaty of Waitangi began on 6 February 1840 
by the British Crown and about 540 Māori rangatira (chiefs) (Orange, 2012). The British 
declared sovereignty over New Zealand, and waves of migrants mostly from Britain began 
arriving, which saw the Māori population decline both in real and proportional terms. In 1840 
the European population was around 2000, rapidly growing to 488,000 in 1881, and by 1901 
it reached 770,000 (Orange, 2012). Whereas the Māori population steadily declined from 
80,000 in 1840 to 46,000 in 1901 (Orange, 2012).  
In the 180 years since the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, New Zealand’s population has grown 
to 4.7 million (Stats NZ, 2019a). While those of European descent make up nearly three-




than Māori (13.9 per cent) (Stats NZ, 2019a). Just over three-quarters (76.5 per cent) of the 
resident population live in North Island, concentrated in the cities of Auckland, Wellington, 
and Hamilton, which have populations of 1,590,261, 163,440, and 209,172 respectively (Stats 
NZ, 2019a), Figure 2.1. In the South Island, Christchurch (378,480) and Dunedin (130,194) are 
the largest cities (Stats NZ, 2019a).  
The main exports are milk powder, butter, and cheese (NZD$16.15 billion), meat and edible 
offal (NZD$8.3 billion), wood products (NZD$4.68 billion), fruit (NZD$3.52 billion), and wine 
(NZD$1.91 billion) (Stats NZ, 2020d). While dairy is the biggest export industry, only 1.3 per 
cent (31,845) of employed persons work in dairy cattle farming (Stats NZ, 2019b). The top five 
industries of employment are: cafes and restaurants (67,608); supermarkets and grocery 
stores (57,609); primary education (55,779); hospitals (52,887); and house construction 
(51,804) (Stats NZ, 2019b). Amongst those who are employed, Sales Assistant is the top 
occupation (108,702) followed by Office Managers (65,907), Chief Executives or Managing 
Director (54,480), Sales Representative not elsewhere classified (nec) (51,747) and Labourers 
nec (43,971) (Stats NZ, 2019b). In September 2019, the national unemployment rate was 4.2 
per cent, with Taranaki (6.0 per cent), Gisborne/Hawke’s Bay (5.2 per cent), Manawatu-
Wanganui (5.2 per cent), and Northland (5.0 per cent) the regions with the highest 
unemployment rates (MBIE, 2019). From 2009 to 2019, the median weekly income increased 
from NZD$760 to NZD$1016 (before tax) (Stats NZ, 2020b). 
In New Zealand, the main societal issues are housing affordability, child poverty, and the cost 
of living. Housing affordability and the number of houses available have become one of the 
most significant issues, particularly in Auckland, where there is a shortage of 45,000 houses 
(Johnson et al., 2018). In the last five years, house price inflation increased 30 per cent while 
incomes rose about half this, with house prices in Auckland increasing 60 per cent (Johnson et 
al., 2018). This increase has seen the waitlist for public housing increase from 5,844 in 
September 2017 to 13,966 in September 2019 (MSD, 2020). In 2020, house prices were seven 






Figure 2.1: Map of New Zealand showing the main cities and regions 









The high cost of housing has seen child poverty become a significant issue. Currently, 254,000 
children live in low-income households, with over 30 per cent of the lowest income 
households spending more than half their income on housing costs (Child Poverty, 2019). 
Access to healthy food is also an issue as 56 per cent of children whose parents receive 
government benefits do not eat enough healthy food (Child Poverty, 2019). Living costs are 
also an issue. In 2019 house rental prices increased 3.1 per cent, the largest increase since 
2008, with meat, poultry, and fish prices increasing 6 per cent and fruit and vegetables 
increased by 2.7 per cent (Stats NZ, 2020a, 2020c). A survey by Consumer NZ found that in 
2018 respondents were primarily concerned about the cost of petrol, which had increased 19 
per cent during the year and also food and groceries (Consumer NZ, 2019).  
2.3 Migration of New Zealanders in the global context 
New Zealand is a country with high levels of immigration and emigration. While the resident 
New Zealand population reached 4,699,755 in 2018 (Stats NZ, 2019a) it is estimated that an 
additional 777,300 thousand were living abroad in 2019 (Migration Data Portal, 2020). In 
2018, 27.4 per cent of the New Zealand population was born outside New Zealand (Stats NZ, 
2019a). 
For many New Zealanders, moving abroad for an overseas experience ‘OE’ is part of the 
national psyche. The primary destinations are Australia because of its geographic proximity 
and the UK because of the historical ties. To move to the UK, New Zealanders aged 18-30 are 
eligible for a two-year working holiday visa or, for others, an Ancestry visa with 6,000 to 12,000 
moving each year (OECD, 2020). In 2018, it was estimated that around 72,000 New Zealanders 
were living in the UK, with about 80 per cent indicating they had British ancestry (Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, 2010; OECD, 2020). Flows to Australia are much larger, peaking at 
44,656 in 2011-2012 (see Figure 2.4), and will be discussed in more detail in the following 
section. The migration of New Zealanders to the next top eight destinations is significantly 
smaller than those to Australia and the UK, with Figure 2.2 showing a peak of 1,293 moving to 





Figure 2.2: Flows of New Zealand migrants to the next eight destinations after Australia 
and the UK 
Source: OECD (2020) 
To understand New Zealanders motivations for moving abroad, KEA, a New Zealand expatriate 
network association, conducted three surveys on New Zealand expatriates in 2011, 2013, and 
2015 (Kea New Zealand, 2011, 2013, 2015). The results from these surveys provide insight into 
where New Zealanders migrate, how much they earn, and how expatriates differ from 
resident New Zealanders, with a summary given in Table 2.1. In each of the surveys, Australia 
has remained the primary country of residence of expatriate New Zealanders, with the 
percentage increasing from 35 per cent in 2011 to 43 per cent in 2015. Interestingly, the 
percentage living in the UK decreased from 27 per cent to 10 per cent while the percentage 
living in Europe increased from 7 per cent to 25 per cent. The main reasons for moving abroad 
in 2013 were for job opportunities (32 per cent) followed by family connections (25 per cent). 
The surveys also showed that nearly half earned over NZD$100k per year, whereas only 5.9 
per cent of those over the age of 15 earned over NZD$100k in New Zealand in 2013 (Stats NZ, 
2013). Respondents were also highly educated, with 35 per cent holding postgraduate level 
qualifications in 2011 and 2013. In 2015, over half (55 per cent) had a university education, 
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was also noted in an OECD report, which found that 44.6 per cent have a tertiary qualification, 
while 22.5 per cent have an upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education 
(Dumont & Lemaître, 2005). However, when compared to the resident New Zealand 
population, only 20.0 per cent have a bachelor’s degree or higher (Stats NZ, 2013). 
Table 2.1: Summary of KEA expatriate surveys 2011, 2013 and 2015 
 2011 2013 2015 
Number of respondents 15,297 12,433 13,729 
Country of 
residence (%) 
Australia 35 37 43 
The UK 27 23 10 
North America 18 20 15 
Europe 7 8 25 
Ethnic identity 
(%) 
NZ European 89.7 89 88 
Māori 8.6 13 9 
Chinese 2.4 2 3 




Job/economic reasons 33 32 - 
Family connections/obligations 23 25 - 
Different lifestyle/overseas 
experience 
19 17 - 
Highest level of 
education (%) 
Postgraduate 35 35 
55 
Bachelors 31 28 
Other tertiary diploma or 
certificate 
19 21 - 
Secondary School 15 16 - 
Income (%) Earn above NZD$100k 47 50 42 
Return to NZ 
(%) 
Returned in the last 12 months 
61 55 - 
Source: KEA Every Kiwi Counts report (2011, 2013, 2015) 
2.4 Migration between New Zealand and Australia  
The movement of people between Australia and New Zealand began in the late 1700s, soon 
after Europeans and Americans came to investigate the opportunities. This included Māori 
who were travellers, short-term residents, and traders. Before this, it is believed that 
Australian Aborigines and New Zealand Māori were unaware of each other. Following the 
signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, Europeans and Māori migrated between the two countries 
based on where the economic prospects were, with the establishment of trade routes and 
gold rushes in Otago, New Zealand (1861-1864) and Victoria, Australia (1851- the late 1860s) 
influential (Phillips & Hearn, 2008). The gold rush in Victoria resulted in higher wages and more 
job opportunities attracting migrants from New Zealand. In 1887, assisted migration from 




people left New Zealand (Phillips & Hearn, 2008). Between 1891 and 1915, many migrants 
moved from Australia to New Zealand as Australia experienced its first economic depression 
in the 1890s and drought. New Zealand reintroduced assisted migration in 1904, resulting in 
large numbers of migrants arriving from the UK.  
Migration sped up between the 1920s and 1980s. One of the main factors was that sea travel 
was replaced by air travel with the formation of Tasman Empire Airways in 1940, which was a 
joint venture between the Australian, New Zealand, and British governments and Union 
Airways of New Zealand (Carmichael, 1993). In the 1960s, the New Zealand economy 
depended on access to the British market and their demand for New Zealand wool. By 1967 
the export price of wool fell by 30 per cent leading to unemployment and inflation (Ministry 
for Culture and Heritage, 2018), and Britain was about to join the European Economic 
Community. This led to a recession in New Zealand and saw long-term arrivals in Australia 
increase from 13,000 in 1966-1967 to an average of 21,000 each of the subsequent four years. 
By the 1970s, Australia’s average real wage had risen from 30-40 per cent above New 
Zealand’s in 1972-1974 to 60 per cent in 1979 (Wood, 1980 as cited in Carmichael, 1993). This 
period of substantial wage growth saw the annual permanent long-term arrivals from New 
Zealand increase from 13,200 in 1975 to 35,900 in 1979 (Carmichael, 1993). Many of the New 
Zealanders who moved to Australia during this period did so with a ‘let’s test the waters’ 
attitude (Carmichael, 1993). During this decade, the New Zealand population in Australia more 
than doubled from 80,466 in 1971 to 176,713 in 1981 (ABS, 1971, 1981) see Figure 2.3.  
Between 1980 and 1989, 83 per cent of settler arrivals from New Zealand into Australia were 
New Zealand-born, with just under half of the rest born in the British Isles (Carmichael, 1993, 
p.73). As migration flows continued to grow between the two countries and economic trade 
expanded, the Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (CER) was signed in 1983, 
facilitating the free trade of goods between the two countries (Carmichael, 1993). In 1983 
recession hit Australia leading to high unemployment, and permanent arrivals to Australia had 
fallen to a low of 2,900 in the September quarter of 1983, remaining depressed for the next 
15 months (Carmichael, 1993). In New Zealand, Prime Minister Robert Muldoon introduced a 





Figure 2.3: Growth of New Zealand born population in Australia 
Source: Australian census 1947-2016 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the number of New Zealanders moving to Australia had 
increased as unemployment and home loan rates rose in New Zealand. Each quarter between 
January 1988 and March 1989, there were over 10,000 permanent long-term arrivals from 
New Zealand (Carmichael, 1993). By the late 1980s, approximately 1 in 7 New Zealand 
residents were travelling to Australia each year compared to 1 in 55 Australian residents 
visiting New Zealand (Carmichael, 1993). Many of those who migrated to Australia in the 
1970s and 1980s were post-war baby boomers going on their overseas experience (Poot, 
2010). Australia was a convenient destination for many because it was affordable and did not 
require applying for a visa before arrival or permanent residence (Baird & Smith, 2016).  
Overall, during the 1990s, the New Zealand population in Australia continued to grow. In the 
early 1990s, Australia suffered its worst recession since the Great Depression, and this saw 
the number of New Zealanders who moved to Australia drop to just over 8,000 in 1991-1992. 
By 1995-1996, for the first time, more New Zealanders were migrating permanently to 
Australia (12,300) than those from the UK (11,300), accounting for 12 per cent of permanent 
arrivals in that year (DIBP, 2016). In 1996 the New Zealand population in Australia reached 
291,388, with the Australian population in New Zealand just over 54,700 (ABS, 1996; Birrell & 
Rapson, 2001). 1999-2000 saw 31,610 New Zealanders move to Australia permanently, an 
increase of 28 per cent on the previous year (Khoo, 2002). This represented 34.3 per cent of 





















In the twenty-first century, the flow of New Zealanders to Australia has continued. Favourable 
economic conditions in Australia during the 2000s saw the number of settler arrivals into 
Australia increase from 22,379 in 2004-2005 to a peak of 44,656 in 2011-2012 (DIBP, 2014a, 
2014b). The mining boom in Australia during this period contributed to some of this increase, 
with the number employed in the mining industry increasing from 5,417 in 2006 to 10,340 in 
2011 (ABS, 2006, 2011). Also, a major earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand on 22 February 
2011 saw 4,320 people move from Christchurch to Australia in the year to March 2012, up 
from 1,892 in the year ending March 2010 (Stuff, 2012). Since the peak in 2011-2012, the 
number of settler arrivals to Australia has steadily declined, reaching a low of 12,555 in 2016-
2017 (DIBP, 2017b). In 2015, New Zealand had its first net gain of migrants from Australia for 
the first time since 1991, with 800 moving to New Zealand (Stats NZ, 2016). This change in 
flows may have been influenced by the end of the mining boom in Australia, economic growth 
in New Zealand, the stability of the New Zealand government compared to Australia and the 
New Zealand and Australian dollars reaching near parity (Hunter, 2016; Stewart, 2015). From 
2001 to 2016, the New Zealand population in Australia grew from 355,765 to 518,462 (ABS, 
2001, 2016). While the Australia population in New Zealand was 56,259 in 2001, increasing to 
75,696 in 2018, currently accounting for 1.6 per cent of the population (Stats NZ, 2002, 2019a).  
Besides migration, economic trade and tourism are also important dimensions of the flows 
between the two countries. Since the signing of the CER in 1983, trade has increased between 
the two countries resulting in the development of a Single Economic Market, which has 
enhanced economic integration. In 2018 two-way merchandise totalled AUD$17.6 billion, 
with two-way services trade totalling AUD$11.7 billion (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, n.d.). In the same year, Australian investment in New Zealand was AUD$96.7 billion, 
while New Zealand invested AUD$47 billion in Australia in the same period (Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.). Regarding tourism, in the year ending March 2020, there were 
1,372,100 arrivals into Australia, while this number includes those intending to settle 
permanently, it equates to a visitor spend of AUD$2.5 billion (Tourism Australia, 2020). The 
availability of flights contributes to the mobility between the two countries, with 446 flights 
per week compared to 132 flights per week between Australia and China and seven flights per 





Because of the geographic proximity and economic, familial, and cultural ties, Hugo (2004b, 
2015) has said this migration corridor is more reflective of long-distance internal migration. 
Bell and Hugo (2000) found New Zealanders settle in locations that are also the main 
destinations for internal migrants within Australia. New Zealanders also have a high rate of 
internal migration in Australia compared to Australian born and migrants from the UK, India, 
China, Philippines, and Vietnam (Raymer & Baffour, 2018). Amongst these migrant groups, 
New Zealanders primarily went to Brisbane, whereas those from the UK moved to Perth 
(Raymer & Baffour, 2018). Hugo (2004b) notes that another characteristic of the flows from 
New Zealand to Australia is its circularity. The flexibility the TTTA provides means an 
individual’s length of residence in Australia can range from a working holiday of a year, a work 
assignment for a couple of years, or spending their whole working life in Australia before 
returning to New Zealand to retire (Hugo, 2004b). An individual may have several periods of 
residence in Australia throughout their lives.  
Figure 2.4 displays the number of New Zealand citizens who indicated they intended to settle 
permanently in Australia, with the long-term resident departures also displayed. The number 
of New Zealanders departing Australia permanently remained relatively constant from 2007-
2008 to 2012-2013 and has since gradually increased, going from 4,679 in 2012-2013 to 7,054 
in 2017-2018.  
Figure 2.5 shows the number of Australian citizens who have moved permanently to New 
Zealand. Between 2004 and 2012, there was a gradual decline in the number of Australians 
moving to New Zealand, going from 5,274 to 3,470. From 2012 to 2018, the number of arrivals 
nearly doubled, reaching a peak of 6,566. While the number of Australians moving to New 
Zealand increased, Figure 2.4 above shows that there was a significant decrease in the number 






Figure 2.4: Settler arrivals and long-term resident departures Australia by New Zealand 
citizens 
Source: DHA, various years, Arrivals and Departures data 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Permanent arrivals into New Zealand by Australian citizens (annual-June) 


































To gain a nuanced understanding of the flows between the two countries, Figure 2.6 displays 
the permanent arrivals into New Zealand by looking at those who are Australian born and 
living in Australia but have New Zealand citizenship. Although this data cannot be analysed by 
age, many of these individuals are likely to be children of New Zealand citizens. This is because 
even if you are born in Australia, having parents who are migrant’s means you are not 
automatically granted Australian citizenship and can only apply once you reach the age of 10. 
The child has to obtain citizenship by descent, in this context, New Zealand citizenship, to 
travel out of Australia.  
 
Figure 2.6: Permanent arrivals into New Zealand by those who were previously resident in 
Australia, are Australian-born and have New Zealand citizenship 
Source: Stats NZ (2020f) 
2.5 Australia’s immigration policy 
Australia’s immigration policy has evolved over the last century. As a British colony, migrants 
who came to Australia during the late 1700s and 1800s were primarily from the UK and 
Ireland. Migration during this period aimed to build and establish the new colony and was 
viewed as permanent given the vast distances individuals needed to travel (Akbari & 
MacDonald, 2014; Khoo et al., 2008). While most migrants came from the UK and Ireland, and 
other European countries, gold rushes in Victoria and New South Wales in the 1850s and 1850 
attracted international migrants from China. There was a strong public anti-Chinese 



















Soon after the Federation of Australia, 1 January 1901, they passed the Immigration 
Restriction Act of 1901. Commonly referred to as the White Australia policy, this Act slowed 
down non-European migration to Australia. Indigenous Australians were also expected to 
adopt British culture and practices in order to assimilate. Following the bombing of Darwin in 
1942 and the end of World War II, the Chifley government believed that Australia urgently 
needed a larger population for defence and development, which could be achieved through 
immigration. In addition, there were significant labour shortages, and the fertility rate had 
declined (Hugo, 2006). This led to the establishment of the Department of Immigration in 1945 
to facilitate migration to Australia, with the slogan ‘populate or perish.’ The Assisted Passage 
Migration Scheme was established in 1945, which enabled British who were under the age of 
45 and in good health to migrate to Australia for ten pounds, with their children getting free 
passage (Jupp, 1998). In the early years of the scheme, preference was given to skilled 
tradesmen, and in 1957 and anyone who could pass the medical exam could migrate (Jupp, 
1998). Between 1947 and 1971, over 460,000 British had migrated to Australia with the 
scheme ending in 1981(Jupp, 1998).  
During the post-war period, Australia experienced rapid economic growth due to 
industrialisation and expansion and intensification of primary industries. Following this 
sustained growth, the 1970s saw a decrease in manufacturing employment due to increased 
automation and offshore processing. Baby boomers were also entering the labour market, 
reducing the labour shortages in primary and secondary industries (Hugo et al., 2016). As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, during the 1970s, three significant changes were made to Australia’s 
immigration policy. First, was the abolition of the White Australia Policy in 1973 by Gough 
Whitlam. This ended race-based immigration and resulted in increased migration from non-
European countries. Second, the TTTA was signed with New Zealand, facilitating the migration 
of New Zealanders to Australia. The third change was the implementation of the NUMAS in 
1979, a points-based system, similar to the ‘Norms of Assessment’ that had been introduced 
in Canada in 1967. Individual migrants wishing to come to Australia could apply through 
NUMAS, scoring points based on ‘recognised skills, occupational demand, economic viability, 
transferable assets, English competence, sponsorship within Australia, preparedness, 
initiative, and adaptability and personal appearance’ (Walsh, 2011, p. 876). To be granted 
entry, they needed a score of at least 50 out of the possible 100 points (Walsh, 2011). Shortly 




attract those who wanted to start a business in Australia, provided they had at least 
AUD$500,000 in assets (Walsh, 2011). 
The points test has since become the basis for Australia’s permanent migration scheme, 
bringing with it a shift from family to targeted skills-based migration. Permanent migration is 
capped, with the quotas changing each year in response to labour shortages. Skilled migrants 
wanting to remain permanently in Australia need to have an occupation on the Skilled 
Occupation List (SOL) and obtain the requisite number of points. The first iteration of the SOL 
was introduced in 1999, with occupations added or removed based on labour shortages. In 
2019-20, 160,000 permanent visas were available, with 108,682 available under the Skill 
Stream, 47,732 in the Family Stream, 236 special eligibility, and at least 3,350 child visas (DHA, 
2019d). The Skill Stream is composed of: Points Tested Skilled Migration, Employer-
Sponsored, Business Innovation and Investment, and Distinguished Talent. While the Family 
Stream, which is a sponsored stream, allows the immediate family members of an Australian 
citizen, permanent resident, or eligible New Zealand citizen to migrate to Australia. Immediate 
family members include partners or fiancés, dependent children, parents, orphan relatives, 
aged dependent relatives, and carers. Those applying through the Family Stream do not need 
to have an occupation on the SOL or meet the language requirements. Permanent residency 
grants individuals access to all social security services after a four-year stand-down period, 
with some services accessible one or two years after obtaining permanent residency. Table 
2.2 summarises some of the permanent visas available under the Skilled and Family Streams 
with the associated general eligibility requirements. Applicants also need to be of good health 




Table 2.2: Summary of selected permanent residency visas, Australia 2019 
   








Subclass 186 Nominated by an Employer 
Have eligible occupation and at least 3 
years of relevant work experience 








Have an occupation on SOL 
Score at least 65 points 




Subclass 190 Nominated by an Australian state or 
territory government agency 
Score at least 65 points 




Subclass 887 Must apply online 
Have been living and working in a specified 
regional area 









You must have been prominent in your field 
during the past 2 years. 
You must be nominated by an Australian 
citizen, Australian permanent resident, 
eligible NZ citizen, or Australian 













Partner Visa  Temporary  
Subclass 820 
Apply for the temporary and permanent 
visa at the same time 
Must be in Australia when you apply 
Partner or spouse of Australian citizen, 
Australian permanent resident or eligible 
New Zealand citizen 
 













Sponsored by an eligible relative or 
relative’s partner 
Be dependent on a relative in Australia for 
basic needs for at least 3 years before you 
apply 
Have no partner and old enough to receive 















Australia’s current permanent migration program emphasises skilled migration, in part to 
ensure migrants who are granted permanent residency will not be a financial burden on the 
nation-state. As individuals on the SOL are required to have a job or an employer sponsoring 
them, it ensures they will have ongoing employment in Australia and will be self-reliant. The 
purpose of the SOL is to mitigate migrants needing to claim social security, such as 
unemployment benefits. While at the same time, by portraying a controlled immigration 
regime, the government has been able to address concerns the domestic population has in 
relation to immigration, such as the ethnocultural structure being altered and labour market 
displacement (Walsh, 2011). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, another component of Australia’s immigration system is temporary 
migration. Temporary migration to Australia includes visitors, International Students, WHMs, 
Temporary Resident (skilled) visa holders, New Zealand citizens (SCV 444), and a range of 
other temporary visas. Between 2008-2009 and 2017-2018, the number of people entering 
Australia temporarily increased from 5,705,148 to 8,694,048 (DHA, 2019a). In 2017-2018, of 
these temporary entrants, 68.8 per cent were visitors, 21.4 per cent SCV 444 holders, 4.4 per 
cent International students, 2.4 per cent WHMs and the rest on other temporary visas (DHA, 
2019a). Temporary migrants who have work rights in Australia are presented in Figure 2.7. 
The numbers for SCV 444 holders include those entering Australia as a tourist and those 
intending to settle permanently.  
The WHM allows those aged 18-30 from 42 countries regardless of their skill or education 
level to live, work, and travel in Australia for one to three years (CEDA, 2019). This visa has 
allowed the government to fill regional labour shortages by requiring those wanting to extend 
their visa from 12 to 24 months to complete three months of regional work. Those who 
complete an additional six months of regional work during their second year are eligible for a 





Figure 2.7: Numbers of temporary entrants in selected categories 
Source: DHA (2019a) 
International students have not only become an important component of Australia’s 
temporary migration program but have become vital to university funding. Before 1985, 
international students primarily from South and Southeast-Asia came to Australia under the 
Colombo plan, where education was used as aid development. Following a review of the 
Australian Overseas Aid Program in 1984, it was argued that education should become an 
export industry so that students not accommodated by the aid program could be enrolled 
provided they met the entry requirements and paid the full cost of fees (Adams et al., 2011). 
Following this change, universities actively recruited international students because of the 
income they could provide. Between 1989 and 1998-1999, the number of international 
students grew from 21,000 to 110,894 (Adams et al., 2011; Spinks, 2016). 
To encourage international students to stay in Australia post-study, the Temporary Graduate 
(subclass 485) visa was introduced in 2007. Before the introduction of this visa, graduates had 
to apply under the General Skilled Migration points system, which required having a job on 
the SOL (previously Migration Occupations in Demand List). Prospective migrants were 
awarded extra points for having an occupation on the list or had received an Australian 
qualification for an occupation on the list (Hawthorne, 2010). The introduction of the 
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degree with a minimum of two years of study were granted a work visa between two and four 
years depending on their level of qualification without needing to get a job on the SOL or 
employer sponsorship. 
For WHMs, Temporary Residents (skilled) visa holders, and Temporary Graduate visa holders, 
their visa allows them to stay in Australia for a set period. If they want to stay in Australia 
longer, they need to switch between visas provided they have an occupation on the SOL or 
find an employer willing to sponsor them. For some of these migrants, applying for a 
partnership visa may also be an option. Through this visa switching, these temporary migrants 
may then be eligible to apply for permanent residency and citizenship.  
2.5.1 Australian citizenship 
The notion of Australian citizen was enacted in 1948 with the Nationality and Citizenship Act 
1948. Before this, those born in Australia or who had migrated to Australia from the UK or 
New Zealand were British subjects. Under the Naturalisation Act 1903, ‘aliens’ could be 
naturalised by the Commonwealth and obtain the status of a British subject, with those from 
Asia, Africa, and the Pacific Islands prohibited from applying (Hamer, 2014). Amendments 
were made to the Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948 in 1955 to make it easier for migrants 
to obtain citizenship. Applicants no longer had to declare their intention to apply two years 
before they submitted the application and instead could make the declaration six months 
before the end of the five-year residency qualifying period (Klapdor et al., 2009). The 
Citizenship Act 1969 made it easier for non-British migrants to obtain Australian citizenship, 
and the residency requirement was reduced to two years provided they had a proficient level 
of English. During this period, the term British subject also referred to an Australian citizen. 
Under the Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1984, the definition of British subject was 
removed, so the Act would reflect the national identity of all Australians with applicants no 
longer discriminated based on their sex, marital status, and present or past nationality 
(Klapdor et al., 2009).  
Before 1986, Australian-born children automatically obtained Australian citizenship. The 
Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1986 revoked this right so children born to illegal 
immigrants, visitors, or others temporarily in Australia would not automatically get citizenship 
(Rubenstein, 2002). One parent had to be an Australian citizen or permanent resident when 




Australia for 10 years after their birth before being granted citizenship (Hurford, 1986). The 
Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 1993 introduced a Pledge of Commitment, which 
replaced the old oath, so those naturalising pledged commitment to Australia instead of the 
Monarch (Rubenstein, 2002). In 2002, Australians could now get dual-citizenship. Citizenship 
by descent provisions were also extended, so those born overseas to Australian parents had 
until the age of 25 to apply for Australian citizenship by descent. The Australian Citizenship 
Act 2007 completely overhauled the 1948 Act. First, the period of residence increased from 
two to four years, with applicants required to be a permanent resident for the 12 months 
before application. Second, a citizenship test was introduced to assess the applicant’s English 
language ability and knowledge of Australian history, culture, and values. The argument for 
introducing the test was that it would equip migrants with the knowledge necessary to 
integrate into Australia successfully (Klapdor et al., 2009). 
In 2017, the Australian Citizenship Legislation Amendment (Strengthening the Requirements 
for Australian Citizenship and Other Measures) Bill 2017 was proposed. This Bill sought to 
tighten the eligibility requirements for citizenship, including a more stringent English language 
threshold, extending the minimum permanent residency period from 12 months to four years, 
and that applicants have integrated into the Australian community (Petrie, n.d.). The 
Australian government argued these changes would promote integration and enhance 
national security but were criticised by the opposition and multicultural groups for 
undermining integration and making it harder for individuals to apply for citizenship (Askola, 
2020; Petrie, n.d.). In 2018, the government introduced the Australian Citizenship Amendment 
(Strengthening the Citizenship Loss Provisions) Bill 2018. This Bill was proposed as a counter-
terrorism tool to protect the Australian community as it would have allowed the Minister to 
strip those who have been convicted of terrorism of their Australian citizenship, provided the 
person would not become stateless (Petrie, n.d.). The Bill lapsed at the 2019 Federal election. 
Naturalising to become an Australian citizen provides instrumental benefits as it offers 
security from deportation, an Australian passport, and the ability to apply for permanent 
government employment, including the armed services. Being an Australian citizen has certain 
responsibilities, including obeying Australian laws, enrolling to vote federally and at a 
state/territory level, vote in elections, and do jury service if required (Klapdor et al., 2009). 
Alongside the instrumental benefits, citizenship is symbolic, as it formally establishes 




Since 1948, over 5 million individuals have naturalised (DHA, 2020a). In the last 15 years, there 
has been a shift amongst the migrants who choose to naturalise. Figure 2.8 presents the 
uptake of citizenship by the top four migrant populations in Australia. Citizens of the UK and 
New Zealand can hold dual-citizenship, while those from China need to renounce their Chinese 
citizenship. Indians cannot hold dual-citizenship but can hold Overseas Citizenship of India, 
which allows them to live and work indefinitely in India, but they are unable to vote in Indian 
elections. Those from the UK have traditionally had the highest naturalisation rates. However, 
since 2012-2013 more Indians have naturalised with 27,827 Indians obtaining citizenship in 
2013-2014 compared to those from the UK (25,883). In 2003-2004, 13,052 New Zealand 
citizens obtained Australian citizenship, whereas in 2017-2018 only 1,842 naturalised. The 
2016 census shows that only 30.7 per cent of the New Zealand-born population have 
naturalised compared to 48.0 per cent of the Indian-born population and 36.3 per cent of the 
Chinese-born population.  
  
Figure 2.8: Attainment of Australian citizenship by various migrant groups 

































2.5.2 Changes to Section 501 and Section 116 of the Migration Act 1958  
In 2014, the Migration Amendment (Character and General Visa Cancellation) Bill 2014 was 
passed, changing Sections 501 and 166 of the Migration Act 1958. These amendments were 
made as the Minister sought to strengthen the integrity of Australia’s Migration Program and 
address the risks posed to the community by non-citizens of possible character concern. This 
meant non-citizens who do not pass the character test can be deported from Australia. Non-
citizens include those who have permanent residency, including PSCV and SCV 444 holders. 
The following changes were made to Section 501 Character test:  
- ‘Provide mandatory cancellation of the visa of a person who is serving a prison 
sentence  
- Amend the definition of ‘substantial criminal record’ so that a person sentenced to 
terms of imprisonment totalling 12 months or more (rather than the current two 
years) will not pass the character test 
- Allow the Minister to set aside decisions by a delegate or a Tribunal and cancel a visa 
if the Minister thinks it is in the national interest and 
- Enable the Minister to require heads of state or territory agencies to disclose 
personal information’ (Coombs, 2014, p. 3). 
Section 116 General visa cancellations to: 
- ‘Expand the grounds on which a visa may be cancelled under the general visa 
cancellation power 
- Expand the Minister’s personal powers to cancel a visa on Section 109 or 116 
grounds 
- Allow the Minister to substitute their own decision for a decision of a Tribunal or a 
delegate’ (Coombs, 2014, p. 3). 
In addition, ‘if the Minister reasonably suspects that a visa applicant or holder has been or is 
a member of a group or organisation, or has an association with a group, organisation or 
person, that the Minister reasonably suspects has been involved in criminal conduct, then the 
visa applicant or holder will not pass the character test’ (Coombs, 2014, p. 8). Scott Morrison, 
then the Immigration and Border Protection Minister, argued that the rationale for these 
changes was that the character provisions had been in place since 1999, and the general visa 
cancellation provisions had remained unchanged since 1994. Since then, there had been an 
increase in temporary visa holders, and that the integrity of Australia’s Migration Program 
needed to be strengthened to protect Australians from harm by non-citizens (Hon. S. 




Concerns were raised about the severity of these amendments, as it would now be easier for 
non-citizens to fail the character test. Some argued that these changes would affect the lives 
of hundreds of long-term resident non-citizens and would impact not only an individual’s 
immediate family but the broader community they were a part of (ANU College of Law, 2014; 
Australian Human Rights Commission, 2014). Many were also worried about the expanded 
powers of the Minister under this bill, given they could overrule decisions made by a Tribunal 
or delegate (Asylum Seeker Resource Centre, 2014; Australian Human Rights Commission, 
2014).  
Since these changes were made between 2014-2015 and 2018-2019, 4,690 visas have been 
cancelled under Section 501 (DHA, 2019e). As previously noted in Chapter 1, during this same 
period, 1,909 New Zealand nationals had their visa cancelled under Section 116 or Section 501 
(DHA, 2019c). From 1 July 2018 to 20 June 2019, 435 New Zealanders had their visa cancelled 
under Section 501, followed by 93 from the UK, 44 from Vietnam, 29 from China, and 342 
from all other countries (DHA, 2019e). Many of those who have their visa cancelled are sent 
to an immigration detention facility while they wait for the decision to be reviewed or travel 
documents to be arranged. In 2017 and 2018, there were 160 New Zealanders detained on 
Christmas Island (DHA, 2019b), Australia’s offshore detention processing centre, which closed 
in October 2018.  
2.5.3 Policy changes affecting New Zealanders 
The TTTA has facilitated the movement of people between Australia and New Zealand. This 
arrangement allows citizens of the respective countries and Australian permanent residents 
to travel, live, and work in the other country without needing to apply for a visa. In the years 
following the implementation of the TTTA, Australian media and unions made claims that New 
Zealanders were moving to Australia to abuse the social security system (Carmichael, 1993). 
Following these claims, a reciprocal trans-Tasman agreement was signed in 1987 that stated 
migrants now faced a six-month stand-down period before they could receive unemployment 
benefits upon moving from New Zealand to Australia or vice versa (Carmichael, 1993). In 1994 
Australia introduced a compulsory visa system, where a temporary Special Category Visa (SCV) 
was introduced for New Zealand citizens, which was granted on arrival in Australia.  
The most significant change affecting New Zealanders in Australia occurred in 2001. During 




obtaining New Zealand citizenship to gain entry into Australia (Birrell & Rapson, 2001). This 
third-country migration was possible because New Zealand had less stringent immigration 
laws compared to Australia. Migrants who did not meet Australia’s immigration requirements 
could move to New Zealand, get citizenship, and move to Australia because of the TTTA. The 
Australian government was still worried about the number of New Zealanders claiming 
welfare benefits in Australia (Birrell & Rapson, 2001). This led to talks between the two 
governments to renegotiate the existing Social Security Agreement where Australia wanted 
the New Zealand government to shoulder the welfare costs that were being paid to New 
Zealanders in Australia, with the amount close to AUD$1 billion (Nolan, 2015). New Zealand 
refused, citing that Australia failed to recognise the economic contributions the New 
Zealanders were making to Australia (Nolan, 2015). Growing tensions between the two 
countries resulted in the Australian government announcing that from the 26 February 2001 
that New Zealanders would no longer be granted automatic permanent residency in Australia 
and would have reduced access to a wide range of social security services (Birrell & Rapson, 
2001).  
Those who moved to Australia before this date were granted automatic permanent residency 
and are referred to as Protected Special Category Visa holders (PSCV). New Zealanders who 
moved after this date could no longer access unemployment benefits, youth allowance, and 
sickness benefits. However, they are eligible for a one-off payment for a maximum duration 
of six months after living in Australia for ten years. They still have access to child-related social 
security and family assistance payments, concession cards, and Medicare. New Zealanders are 
eligible for Medicare under the Health Benefits (Reciprocity with Australia) Act 1999, which 
allows them to receive the same health care services that are provided to Australian citizens. 
New Zealanders need to live in Australia for at least six months before applying for Medicare. 
Although not an immigration policy change, the introduction of the National Disability 
Insurance Scheme (NDIS) in 2013, which is taxpayer funded, excludes SCV 444 holders from 
accessing the services provided under this scheme. This means SCV 444 holders who have a 
disability are unable to receive funding for support services such as transport, mobility 
equipment, or help with household tasks. For SCV 444 holders to gain access to all social 
security and disability services, they need to apply to become a permanent resident.  
Until 2007, New Zealanders who had moved to Australia post the 2001 policy change could 




Citizen Visa, the Skilled (862)-Onshore Australian-sponsored New Zealand Citizen Visa, and the 
Skilled (863)-Onshore Designated Area-sponsored New Zealand Citizen which was not points 
tested. The 861 visa required applicants to have a pass mark of 120 points with the 862 visa 
at 110 points out of a possible 175. In 2002-2003 only 33 persons were approved under the 
861 visa (Birrell et al., 2004). On 1 September 2007, these New Zealand specific visa streams 
were abolished and folded into the wider General Skilled Migration Program. These visas were 
replaced by the Skilled-Independent (subclass 175) Visa, Skilled-Sponsored (subclass 176) Visa, 
which were point-tested visas that allowed individuals to stay permanently in Australia. The 
863 visa was replaced by the Skilled Regional-Sponsored (subclass 475) Visa, which was a 
temporary visa valid for three years. For the 175 and 176 visas, they remained point-tested 
with a national cap on the number of visas approved each year. 
On 1 July 2012, the Skilled-Independent (subclass 175) Visa became the Skilled Independent 
Visa Subclass (189). As noted above in Table 2.2, this is a point-based visa for those not 
sponsored by an employer, state or territory, or family member. Individuals need to have an 
occupation on Australia’s SOL and be aged between 18 and 50. The Skilled-Sponsored 
(subclass 176) visa became the Skilled-Nominated (subclass 190) visa. To apply for this visa, 
skilled workers are nominated by an Australian state or territory, have an occupation on 
Australia’s SOL, score at least 60 points, and are 18-50 years of age (DHA, 2020d). For both 
visas, before completing the application, individuals are required to submit an Expression of 
Interest and are then invited to apply for the visa. However, for New Zealanders, one of the 
barriers to applying for these visas is being required to have a job on the SOL.  
In 2016, the Australian government announced a pathway for permanent residency 
specifically for New Zealanders, the Skilled Independent visa (subclass 189) New Zealand 
stream, which came into effect 1 July 2017. To apply for this visa, applicants need to hold an 
SCV 444 visa, have lived in Australia between 26 February 2001 and 19 February 2016, been 
resident in Australia for five years, and have earned a taxable income of at least AUD$53,900 
for each of those years and be of good character (Love & Klapdor, 2020). Unlike the Skilled 
Independent visa (subclass 189) points-tested stream, applicants do not need to submit an 
Expression of Interest nor have an occupation on the SOL and can apply if they are over the 
age of 45. As noted in Chapter 1, from 1 July 2017 to 30 September 2018, 12,817 applications 
were lodged, with 2,467 visas granted to primary applicants and 3,043 visas granted to 





2.6 Data on New Zealanders from the 2016 Australian census 
In the 2016 Australian census, the New-Zealand born population in Australia was 518,462 (2.2 
per cent of the population), making them the second-largest migrant group in Australia, 
behind those born in the UK (1,087,759) and ahead of those from China (509,558) and India 
(455,385) (ABS, 2016). Just under half (42.6) arrived in Australia between 2002 and 2016. Table 
2.3 shows the state of residence of the New Zealand-born and Australian-born populations. 
Between 2006 and 2016, there was an increase in the proportion of New Zealanders living in 
Western Australia from 12.1 per cent to 15.3 per cent and a decrease in the proportion living 
in New South Wales from 27.4 per cent to 22.6 per cent (ABS, 2006, 2016). In 2016 a higher 
proportion (38.8 per cent) of the New Zealand population lived in Queensland compared to 
the Australian-born population (21.4 per cent). 






Source: ABS (2006, 2016) 
Table 2.4 summarises the demographic characteristics of the New Zealand and Australian born 
populations. The median age is 41.7 years, which is higher than the Australian median age of 
33.3 years. In terms of gender balance, the percentages are reversed with more New Zealand 
males than females. New Zealanders are also more likely to be married, with a higher 




born 2006 (%) 
New Zealand-
born 2016 (%) 
Australian born-
2016 (%) 
NSW 27.4 22.6 31.4% 
VIC 16.4 18.0 24.6% 
QLD 38.2 38.8 21.4% 
SA 2.9 2.5 7.6% 
WA 12.1 15.3 9.6% 
TAS 1.1 1.0 2.6% 
NT 0.9 0.9 1.0% 




Table 2.4: Demographic characteristics of New Zealand-born and Australian-born 







Male 50.4 49.5 
Female 49.6 50.5 
Age Median age (years) 41.7 33.3 
Marital status 
Percentage of population over 15 
never married 
35.6 30.2 
Percentage married 39.6 33.0 
Religious affiliation (%) 
Christianity 47.0 58.0 
Secular Beliefs and Other Spiritual 
Beliefs and No Religious Affiliation 
44.0 33.8 
Number of children 
ever born (%) 
No children 13.8 13.0 
One child 5.8 4.1 
Two children 11.8 10.2 
Three children 7.2 6.4 
Four or more children 5.4 3.9 
Source: ABS (2016) 
Amongst New Zealanders who are employed, 39.5 per cent had a highest level of education 
of secondary, at year 10 or above, with 19.8 per cent having obtained Certificate III & IV Level. 
47.4 per cent work full-time and 18.5 per cent part-time, see Table 2.5. The main occupations 
of those who work full-time are Professionals (17.9 per cent), Managers (15.8 per cent) and 
Technicians and Trade Workers (15.4 per cent) whereas those employed part-time were 
primarily Community and Personal Service Workers (17.6 per cent), Professionals (16.6 per 
cent) and Labourers (16.1 per cent). Fewer New Zealanders are not in the labour force 
compared to Australians, 24.5 per cent versus 33.1 per cent. This lower percentage may be 
because New Zealanders who arrived after 2001 are not entitled to unemployment benefits. 
New Zealanders also have a higher median weekly income than the Australian-born 
population. 
The main industry of employment for New Zealanders and Australians was Health Care and 
Social Assistance, 11.4 per cent and 11.8 per cent, respectively. Compared to Australians, 
more New Zealanders worked in Manufacturing (7.5 per cent) and Transport, Postal and 
Warehousing (7.0 per cent). Amongst Australians, Education and Training is one of the main 
industries of employment (9.4 per cent) while only 5.7 per cent of New Zealanders are 




Table 2.5: Employment characteristics New Zealand-born and Australian-born populations 








Median weekly income 840 688 
Education 
level (%) 
Postgraduate Degree Level 3.4 3.3 
Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate 
Level 1.9 2.2 
Bachelor Degree Level 12.3 14.0 
Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level 10.0 9.1 
Certificate III & IV Level 19.8 19.1 
Secondary Education - Years 10 and above 39.5 35.6 
Certificate I & II Level 0.1 0.1 
Secondary Education - Years 9 and below 4.0 8.7 
Employment 
status (%) 
Employed, worked full-time 47.4 37.9 
Employed, worked part-time 18.5 20.5 
Unemployed 5.0 4.2 
Not in the labour force 24.5 33.1 
Occupation 
(%) 
Professionals 17.4 21.0 
Clerical and Administrative Workers 13.9 14.2 
Technicians and Trades Workers 13.3 14.0 
Managers 12.6 13.3 
Labourers 11.7 8.7 
Machinery Operators and Drivers 11.5 6.1 
Community and Personal Service Workers 10.0 10.8 




Health Care and Social Assistance 11.4 11.8 
Construction 10.6 9.3 
Retail Trade 8.5 10.6 
Manufacturing 7.5 5.9 
Transport, Postal and Warehousing 7.0 4.4 
Source: ABS (2016) 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed how the implementation of the TTTA and favourable economic 
conditions in Australia has contributed to the growth of the New Zealand population in 
Australia. The open nature of the TTTA has provided New Zealanders with unrestricted access 
to Australia, provided they have no criminal history and has seen the population grow from 
80,640 in 1971 to 518,462 in 2016 (ABS, 1971, 2016). This is despite the Australian government 
revoking New Zealanders’ access to social security services, including unemployment, 




can move to Australia, the 2016 census data showed more New Zealanders worked as 
Labourers, and Machinery Operators and Drivers compared to Australians. This chapter also 
detailed the pathways to permanent residency available to New Zealanders who arrived after 
2001 and their ability to get Australian citizenship given New Zealanders had the lowest 
uptake of Australian citizenship compared to those from the UK, India, and China. Having 
provided the context for this research, the following chapter situates this research in the 




CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
The movement of people across the globe has changed rapidly over the last century, and with 
this, so has migration scholarship. Scholars have sought to explain why people migrate and 
what affect migration has on the home and destination countries. Early scholarship focused 
on the effect migrants had on the host society where to common assumption being that 
migrants would assimilate. From this viewpoint migration was assumed to be permanent and 
that migrants would not return to their home country. By the mid-1900s, scholars became 
interested in finding out why people choose to migrate and what the key drivers of migration 
were. A common strategy was through examining labour migration, leading to the dominant 
migration theory of the time, neoclassical economics. Towards the latter half of the 1900s, as 
countries continued to develop, and technology advanced migration began to shift from a 
permanent to temporary phenomena. With this came the recognition that for migrants 
maintaining ties with their home country was increasingly important with Basch et al. (1994) 
introducing the concept of transnationalism in the 1990s. This concept examines the social, 
political, economic, and cultural ties migrants maintain with their home country and how 
these ties affect the integration of people into the destination country. 
3.2 Evolution of migration theory 
In the early 1900s, migration scholarship sought to explain what impact migration would have 
on the destination society and/or country. Park et al. (1925) from the Chicago School 
introduced the concentric zone model that explained how migrants adapted to a city over 
time. First-generation migrants lived closest to the central business district (CBD), with 
second-generation migrants living further away from the city (Park et al., 1925). Here it was 
assumed that over subsequent generations, migrants would live further away from the CBD 
and have assimilated into the host society (Park et al., 1925). Through assimilation, migrants 
would experience a reduction in their own identity and become indistinguishable from 
mainstream society (Hoernig & Walton-Roberts, 2009; Waters, 2009). A key dimension of 
migration during this period was that it was permanent, making assimilation into the 




During the post-World War II period, scholars began to conceptualise migration informed by 
neoclassical economics. From a macroeconomic viewpoint, migration is driven by economics 
where wage differentials between the country of origin and the destination country cause 
individuals to migrate (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lewis, 1954). Once wages are equal, migration 
will cease. Massey et al. (1993) note the influence the government has on the labour market 
affects labour flows between countries. Conversely, microeconomics views migration as a 
result of individual decision making where the perceived costs, benefits and investments are 
weighed up (Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987). Sjaastad (1962) points 
out these investments are the private costs of migration, which can be monetary or non-
monetary. Financial costs are the expenses incurred while moving, such as transportation, 
while the non-monetary costs are the loss of social networks, the time taken to find a new 
job, and adapting to a new country or culture (Massey et al., 1993; Sjaastad, 1962). The 
government here controls migration through policies that affect the wages in the home or 
destination country (Massey et al., 1993). Both perspectives attribute migration to changes in 
economic conditions; however, in doing so, it neglects other factors such as social networks 
or politics that contribute to migration and suggests the need for a more holistic way of 
explaining migration.  
Challenging neoclassical economics, Stark and Bloom (1985) introduced the new economics 
of labour migration (NELM). Like neoclassical theory, NELM recognises that migrants often 
move to a country that is seen to have an economic advantage. The advancement that Stark 
and Bloom (1985) made was identifying the role families have on migration decisions, rather 
than migration being an individual decision. Here families use migration as a diversification 
strategy. The migrant sends remittances, which act as a safeguard against changes to the 
economic conditions in the home country and poverty because of natural disasters, 
unemployment, or low crop yield (Massey et al., 1993). While remittances are primarily used 
to support the family, they can contribute to the development of the home country through 
the starting of businesses or the building of schools or hospitals in the local community 
(Orozco & Lapointe, 2004).  
A limitation of neoclassical economics and NELM is that they are based on migration flows 
from the Global-South to the Global-North. In this context, migration is driven by the prospect 
of sending remittances back to the origin country to aid economic development. While these 




context, the drivers of migration between two Global-North countries need to be considered, 
such as between New Zealand and Australia. Migration, in this instance, does not neatly fit 
neoclassical economics or NELM as development is not the main goal, yet some elements 
apply. Green et al. (2008) found that migrants weigh up the potential costs and benefits of 
migrating, with favourable economic conditions contributing to migration decisions. However, 
pre-existing social ties and similar cultures also influenced the decision to move (Green et al., 
2008). Thus, economics is not the only driver of migration, and other factors, therefore, need 
to be considered.  
Towards the end of the 1900s, there had been a shift from permanent migration to temporary 
forms of migration. This brought a change in how people lived across the globe, as migration 
was becoming increasingly circular, and economics were not the primary reason to migrate. 
To capture the changing migration patterns, Basch et al. (1994, p. 6) introduced the concept 
of transnationalism, which is defined ‘as the process by which immigrants forge and sustain 
multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement.’ The 
concept drew criticism from scholars such as Portes et al. (1999), who argued that the 
definition needed to be refined, as not all practices made a migrant transnational. For Portes 
et al. (1999), migrants considered as transnational made regular trips to their home country, 
whether it for business multiple times a year or delivering supplies to their family monthly. 
Whereas occasionally gifting money or purchasing a property in the home country was not 
indicative of being transnational because of the irregularity of these actions (Portes et al., 
1999). While they called for the definition to be refined, they also argued that the strength of 
transnationalism was it could capture the economic, political, and socio-cultural activities that 
took place (Portes et al., 1999).  
Drawing on Guarnizo’s (1997) refinement of transnationalism as either from above (global 
capital, transnational companies, and states) and from below (grassroots activity and 
individuals), Portes et al. (1999) demonstrated how examining transnationalism from these 
two perspectives reveals different types of cross-border activities. Grassroots transnational 
activities include fundraising for political candidates in the home country, folk musicians 
playing at cultural centres and informal trade (Portes et al., 1999). Whereas at the level of the 
nation-state or a transnational company, activities include large-scale cultural events, home 
countries granting dual citizenship, and the expansion of home country banks into destination 




this had not acknowledged the interconnections between different scales nor the complexity 
of the economic, political, or socio-cultural transnational activities that took place.  
Although scholars such as Portes et al. (1999), Itzigsohn et al. (1999), and Østergaard-Nielsen 
(2003) embraced the concept of transnationalism, others were more critical. Foner (1997) 
questioned the originality of the concept as she argued that the processes being claimed as 
transnational had occurred in the past, as migrants have always maintained ties with their 
home country. She did, however, acknowledge that what was distinctive about contemporary 
transnationalism was the intensity of cross-border ties (Foner, 1997). Technology 
advancements have made regular contact with those abroad more accessible and altered how 
business, trade, and politics is conducted (Foner, 1997). Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) 
offered harsher critiques of the concept. An issue they had with the research conducted was 
they viewed it as translocal rather than transnational, as it focused on looking at the 
connections between a village in one country and communities in another, findings they did 
not see as novel (Waldinger & Fitzgerald, 2004). Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004, p. 1183, 
emphasis in original) also argued that ‘population movements across state boundaries is 
inherently a political matter’, as nation-states dictate who can enter a country, who can 
become a citizen of the nation-state and which migrants can, therefore, be transnational. 
While the nation-state influences the conditions of migration and residence in the destination 
country, their assertion it is the only factor influencing migration has been criticised by Glick 
Schiller and Levitt (2006). Glick Schiller and Levitt (2006) found Waldinger and Fitzgerald’s 
(2004) claims problematic as they ignored the foundation of transnationalism, which 
acknowledges that economic and socio-cultural networks, in addition to the political, affect 
transnational practices.  
3.3 Transnational practices 
Even though the concept of transnationalism has been criticised over its novelty, it is a useful 
framework for examining how migrants maintain ties between their origin and destination 
countries. While Portes et al. (1999) have been critical of transnationalism, they proposed a 
framework for distinguishing between the different forms of transnationalism and what 
activities can be considered as being transnational. As mentioned above, for Portes et al. 
(1999) for practices to be transnational they need to be regular and sustained, with Table 3.1 




and the level of institutionalisation. Portes et al. (1999) pay particular attention to the 
transnational practices at the meso- and macro-scales with an emphasis on political and socio-
cultural activities that offer transnational economic opportunities such as amateur sports 
matches or major home country artists performing abroad.  
Table 3.1: Transnationalism and its types 
Sector 
  Economic Political Socio-cultural 
Level of 
institutionalisation 
Low -Informal cross-country 
traders 
-Small business created by 




-Home town civic 
committees created by 
immigrants 
-Alliances of immigrant 
committee with home 
country political 
association 





-Folk music groups 
making presentations in 
immigrant centres 
-Priests from home town 
visit and organise their 
parishioners abroad 
High -Multinational investment 
in Third World countries 
-Development of tourist 
market of locations abroad 
-Agencies of home country 
banks in immigrant centres 
-Consular officials and 
representatives of 
national political parties 
abroad 
-Dual nationality granted 
by home country 
governments 




expositions of national 
arts 
-Home country major 
artists perform abroad 
-Regular cultural events 
organised by foreign 
embassies  
Source: adapted from Portes et al. (1999, p. 222) 
Faist (2000) expands on Portes et al.’s (1999) framework by distinguishing between three 
types of transnational social spaces that represent the different scales of transnationalism. 
Faist (2000) focuses on the socio-cultural dimension of transnationalism and the role this plays 
in building and sustaining transnational kinship groups, circuits, and communities, Table 3.2. 
Primary resources refer to the economic, human, and social capital used by migrants to sustain 
and form transnational ties. For example, migrants can use their social capital to find work 
through established migrants in the destination country, or there may be solidarity amongst 









Primary resource in ties Main characteristic Typical examples 
Transnational kinship 
groups 
Reciprocity: what one party 
received from the other 
requires some return 






obligations and expectations 
of the actors; the outcome 
of the instrumental activity 
Exploitation of insiders 
advantages: language; 
strong and weak social 




Solidarity: shared ideas, 
beliefs, evaluations and 
symbols; expressed in some 
sort of collective identity 
Mobilisation of collective 
representations within 





frontier regions e.g. 
Mexico-US 
Source: adapted from Faist (2000, p. 195) 
Rather than looking at transnational networks or practices as economic, political, or socio-
cultural, Erdal and Oeppen (2013) propose that practices can be grouped under the broad 
categories of structural and socio-cultural. Socio-cultural transnationalism encompasses the 
emotional, cultural, religious, and social dimensions of transnational networks (Erdal & 
Oeppen, 2013). The emotional dimension of transnational migration looks at the attachments 
people have to particular places, their sense of belonging, and the meanings attached to 
citizenship (Blunt, 2007). Justyna Bell’s (2016) findings show for Polish migrants in Northern 
Ireland, being transnational took an emotional and social toll. Migrants found they had to 
choose how they split their time, either forging new friendships in Ireland or maintaining those 
at home (J. Bell, 2016). They were also selective with the information they shared with family 
or friends in Poland as they did not want to worry them, such as neglecting to discuss the 
difficulties of finding a job or running out of money (J. Bell, 2016). Therefore, even though 
individuals have support networks in the home country, they are not always utilised as they 
cannot actively help the individual when issues arise in the destination country. Meaning 
individuals select when they choose to use their transnational networks for support.  
Structural transnationalism covers the economic, political, and legal dimensions (Erdal & 
Oeppen, 2013). Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) observes that political transnationalism includes a 
wide range of practices such as transnational election campaigns, cross-border voting, 
lobbying on behalf of the home country, and involvement in hometown associations (HTAs). 




possible. Some nation-states seek to engage with their overseas populations by encouraging 
them to contribute to the economic, social, and political development of the country (Ho & 
Boyle, 2015; Koh, 2015; Margheritis, 2007; Smith, 2003). Smith’s (2003) research on Mexico 
found it was advantageous for the Mexican government to engage with migrants in the USA, 
as there are an estimated 22 million Mexican’s living there. Many of these migrants send 
remittances, which led the nation-state to implement policies that sought to educate women 
on the potential community benefits of saving and investing their remittances rather than 
spending them (Smith, 2003). Similarly, the Argentinian government implemented policies to 
encourage return migration from Spain (Margheritis, 2007). This included subsidies to 
promote return migration and the establishment of tax exemptions for those who send their 
personal belongings home (Margheritis, 2007). These incentives seek to promote return 
migration and the subsequent development of the home country, yet they may not produce 
the desired effects. This is because initiatives put in place may not be what is best for the 
individuals and disregard the conditions in the home and destination countries that contribute 
to migration decisions.  
Collyer (2014) examines the countries that allow extra-territorial voting. He found some 
countries allow migrants to vote only if they return to the country to do so, whereas others 
implemented legislative barriers to prevent migrants from voting (Collyer, 2014). Turkey and 
Malaysia represent examples where individuals have to return to vote, while New Zealanders 
can vote while overseas. Mügge (2012) observed that for Turkish in the Netherlands, less than 
half the respondents indicated they would return home to vote, while others may vote if they 
happened to be visiting Turkey. Even though the cost of returning home can act as a barrier 
to engaging with homeland politics, public demonstrations can lead to policy changes. Koh 
(2015) found this was the case for Malaysian migrants who felt as citizens it was their right to 
vote yet were not allowed to do so. To have their political voices heard, public protests were 
held globally, which forced the Malaysian government to allow those overseas to register as 
absentee voters (Koh, 2015). Those who vote overseas can affect election results. Gamlen’s 
(2015) analysis of New Zealand elections from 1914 to 2011 found extra-territorial voting can 
cause a swing in election results, affect coalition discussions, or have feedback effects, which 
result from overseas campaigns encouraging people to vote. For example, in the 2011 
election, the Green Party implemented an online campaign to encourage those overseas to 




Levy, 2011). The New Zealand example highlights the effect extra-territorial voting can have 
on country politics, especially when there is a large overseas population. Yet even if individuals 
cannot vote themselves, in an age of transnationalism, they can influence how family and 
friends in the home country vote. This demonstrates that despite a country’s best efforts, 
migrants can still play a role in home country politics.  
The economic dimension of transnationalism primarily focuses on the sending of remittances 
and the ability to invest overseas (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). This dimension of transnationalism 
is linked to the neoclassical and NELM explanations for migration, where migration 
contributes to the development of the home country. Remittances are primarily sent to 
countries in the Global-South, with US$450 billion sent in 2018 (The World Bank, 2020) with 
this money used by a migrant’s immediate family and the wider community. Zontini’s (2004) 
research highlighted earning higher wages abroad provides individuals with the opportunity 
to provide and care for their families in a way that would not have been possible if they had 
not migrated. For example, being able to improve living standards through building a new 
house or being able to pay off unexpected medical bills (Zontini, 2004). Faist (2008) observed 
that HTAs contribute to the development of the wider community through allocating 
resources to the improvement of infrastructure and education and health services. Many 
migrants also invest in businesses in the home country (de Haas et al., 2015). Portes et al.’s 
(1999) research on economic entrepreneurs showed the establishment of transnational 
enterprises by migrants with higher qualifications and more experience helped them to adapt 
to the destination country. Through remittances and investments, migrants can contribute to 
the economic and socio-cultural development of the home country as the money is used at 
the micro- and meso-scales.  
The socio-cultural and structural dimensions of transnationalism have been used to examine 
transnational practices globally. Studies on transnationalism have been dominated by 
research conducted in the Global-North. This body of research focuses on the transnational 
practices of those who have moved from countries in the Global-South to those in the Global-
North. For example, Colombian, Dominican, and Salvadorian migrants in the USA (Itzigsohn & 
Saucedo, 2002; Portes et al., 2002), Pakistani’s in Norway (Erdal, 2013), Chinese in Canada 
(Hiebert & Ley, 2003; Ho, 2014), Moroccan and Filipino migrants in Spain (Zontini, 2004) and 
Polish in England and Ireland (J. Bell, 2016; Ryan et al., 2008). Similarly, research in Australia 




2004, 2005), Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China (Dunn & Ip, 2008), China 
(Colic-Peisker & Deng, 2019; Tan & Hugo, 2017), Vietnam (Baldassar et al., 2017) and the 
Philippines (Siar, 2014). Less research has looked at migration between countries in the Global 
North; examples include Irish in England (Ryan, 2015), English in France (Scott, 2004), 
Australian’s in the USA (Parker, 2012) and New Zealanders in Australia and England 
(Conradson & Latham, 2005; Green et al., 2008; McMillan, 2017; Wiles, 2008). This study seeks 
to provide a novel perspective on the migration of New Zealanders to Australia through 
focussing on how macro-scale structural and socio-cultural factors affect the decisions and 
behaviour of the migrants–their practices at the micro-scale.  
3.4 Transnationalism and integration  
The assimilation and/or integration of migrants into the destination country has interested 
researchers and the government over the last century. The concept of assimilation was 
developed by the Chicago School in 1925 to explain how minorities became a part of 
mainstream society (Park et al., 1925). Over time migrants would lose their language and 
culture and become indistinguishable from the host society. This concept was particularly 
applicable to European migrants who came to the USA as they were considered to be 
culturally and racially similar to the dominant White-Anglo population at the time (Alba & Nee, 
1997). While assimilation became the dominant concept in the USA, in Western Europe, 
integration was the primary way through which the settlement experiences of migrants were 
researched. The concept of integration originated as a policy discourse, where governments 
detailed a set of measures migrants needed to meet to maintain a minimum degree of cultural 
homogeneity (Schneider & Crul, 2010). These measures include and are not limited to: 
minimum language requirements; basic legal and social protection; policies and laws 
tolerating social practices; formal naturalisation and citizenship or residency-based rights; and 
cultural funding for ethnic associations (Favell, 2003; Schneider & Crul, 2010). Both concepts 
have evolved in each geographic area in response to changes in the immigration rhetoric and 
to how the migration process and settlement experiences have been conceptualised.  
Since introduced by the Chicago School, how assimilation has been theorised has evolved in 
response to changes in the source countries of migrants. Milton Gordon (1964) was one of the 
first scholars to expand on the work by the Chicago School in which he detailed the seven 




identification assimilation, attitude, behaviour, and civic assimilation. Like the Chicago School, 
Gordon’s work also emphasised that assimilation is a one-way process with the expectation 
migrants conform to the White-Anglo majority. However, during the 1970s and 1980s, the 
source countries of migrants began to change, leading Alejandro Portes and colleagues to look 
at how Cuban and Haitians assimilated into the USA. Portes and Jensen (1989) argued that for 
Cuban Mariel refugees, unilinear assimilation was not possible and that instead, different 
adaptation strategies were utilised. For these migrants, existing migrant communities helped 
them to become assimilated into the city in different ways (Portes & Jensen, 1989). Through 
studying these migrant groups, Portes and Zhou (1993) questioned what assimilation meant 
for second-generation migrants and observed that there were several paths to assimilation, 
which they called segmented assimilation. The segmented assimilation framework consists of 
three paths: 1) growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle class; 2) 
permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass, and 3) rapid economic advancement 
with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s values and tight solidarity. Portes 
and Zhou (1993) point out that the path an immigrant group takes is influenced by the policies 
of the host government, the values and prejudices of the receiving society, and the 
characteristics of the co-ethnic community.  
The use of assimilation to study migrants in the USA drew criticism towards the end of the 
1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century. Alba and Nee (1997) argued that while 
assimilation had become an overused theory in the social sciences as it imposed and 
reinforced ethnocentrism, it still provided the best way for examining and explaining the 
integration of migrants. While they recognised the usefulness of the concept, they proposed 
a new definition of assimilation which instead of assimilation being viewed as the end-state 
of migration they defined assimilation as a ‘social process that occurs spontaneously and often 
unintendedly in the course of interaction between majority and minority groups’ (Alba & Nee, 
1997, p. 827). This shift from viewing assimilation as an end-state to a process, Brubaker 
(2001) explained, related to how the word assimilation had been interpreted by different 
researchers. He explains that assimilation has two meanings: 1) to become similar when used 
intransitively; 2) to make similar when used transitively. The first interpretation views 
assimilation as a process, whereas in meaning two, assimilation is an end-state and implies 
complete absorption (Brubaker, 2001). These two interpretations hence reflect how 




and Zhou (1993) and Alba and Nee (1997). Crul (2016) argues that although the work by Portes 
and Zhou (1993), and Alba and Nee (1993) has made significant contributions to 
understanding how ethnic groups adapted to the mainstream and the patterns of social 
mobility of ethnic groups compared to other ethnic groups and the mainstream, they still 
viewed assimilation as a linear process at the group level and into a white majority population.  
While these debates around assimilation dominated migration research between the 1970s 
and 1990s, Berry (1980) in the 1980s introduced a four-state model of acculturation to 
understand how different groups and individuals live together. The processes of acculturation 
could result in assimilation (relinquishment of one’s cultural identity), integration (engaging 
with both cultures), segregation or separation (no substantial ties with the larger society) or 
marginalisation (engagement with neither culture). Berry (1980) notes that for an individual, 
acculturation is not a linear process as it is influenced by micro (individuals initial health, age, 
education, and social support) and macro factors (political context, the society of origin, 
economic situation, and broader demographic factors) and changes over time. While Berry’s 
acculturation model is not the focus of this thesis, it shows that assimilation and integration 
are not the only acculturation strategies and that the process of acculturation is shaped by 
different factors that contribute to and shape how migrants experience the destination 
country.  
Integration with its origins in public policy has shaped how the integration of migrants into 
Western Europe has been researched. Joppke and Morawska (2003) explain that integration’s 
grounding in policy has meant that although nation-states set the parameters for integration, 
the integration of migrants is not guaranteed as migrants are viewed as subjects who have the 
free will to integrate. Integration then, as Favell (2003) discusses, focuses on how the 
government seeks to unify the nation-state amid growing cultural diversity. These measures 
of integration mentioned above (see Favell, 2003; Schneider & Crul, 2010), have subsequently 
been used to research and analyse the integration of migrants into the destination country. 
Engbersen (2003) argues when researching integration, there has been the tendency to 
emphasise the dichotomy of structural and socio-cultural integration. He instead uses three 
dimensions of social integration, which are inherently linked: the functional dimension (extent 
migrants can participate in work and education), moral dimension (participate fully and 
equally in society, citizenship), and the expressive dimension (develop their individual and 




structural/socio-cultural integration dichotomy, this has continued to be the dominant way in 
which the integration of migrants has been researched. 
Snel et al.’s (2006) paper on transnationalism and social integration provides definitions of 
structural and socio-cultural integration, which have been widely adopted by researchers in 
this area (see Becker, 2019; de Haas et al., 2015; Erdal, 2013; Fokkema & de Haas, 2015). 
Structural integration is defined as the social position of migrants in the host society in relation 
to their education level and labour market position, and social-cultural integration as the 
engagement with the host society and the embracing of cultural practices and values (Snel et 
al., 2006). While this distinction between structural and socio-cultural integration has 
provided a useful framework for researching the integration of migrants, its simplistic 
categorisation ignores the complexity of the integration process. Table 3.3 draws together the 
integration frameworks developed by Ager and Strang (2008) and Erdal and Oeppen (2013). 
In their conceptualisation of integration, Ager and Strang (2008) consider how structures and 
relationships at the micro-, meso-, and macro-scales can facilitate or impede integration. This 
includes different types of social connections, cultural practices, language ability, and the 
migration and citizenship policies implemented in the nation-state that affect the degree of 
integration possible. Erdal and Oeppen (2013), on the other hand, focus on integration at the 
micro-scale detailing different markers that can be used when examining the structural and 
socio-cultural integration of migrants. They argue that by examining the micro-scale, it allows 






Table 3.3: Dimensions, markers and, structures that facilitate or impede integration 
Dimensions of integration Markers of integration 
Structures facilitating or 
impeding integration 
Socio-cultural 
Emotional Degree of belonging 
Social bridges, bonds, 
and links 
Language and cultural 
knowledge 
Visa status, rights, and 
citizenship 
Cultural and religious Practice of culture and religion 
Social Ability to develop new social 
networks/capital 
Structural 




Political Opportunities for political 
participation 
Legal Possibility of (dual) citizenship 
and regularised status 
Perceived measures taken 
again discrimination  
Source: adapted from Ager and Strang (2008, p. 170) and Erdal and Oeppen (2013, p. 876) 
Erdal’s (2013) research on Pakistani migrants in Norway found these migrants viewed 
structural integration as a requirement of living in society and as something they adapted to 
overtime. In contrast, socio-cultural integration was viewed as a choice and would not impede 
on their ability to continue living in Norway (Erdal, 2013). Justyna Bell (2016) found that for 
Polish migrants in Belfast, even though they had gained employment, they struggled to make 
friends outside the workplace, limiting their degree of socio-cultural integration. In the 
Australian context, Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2007) and Rajendran et al. (2017) have looked 
at the workplace integration of migrants. Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2007) examined the 
language proficiency, the experience of discrimination, and education in relation to the 
employment success of refugees. They found that lack of Australian work experience and 
inability to provide Australian work references were the most significant barriers to economic 
integration. While a study by Rajendran et al. (2017) on highly skilled migrants found that 
learning about Australian culture helped to facilitate workplace integration, yet engagement 
with work colleagues did not happen outside the workplace.  
Research on integration at the meso-scale has looked at the role of employers and/or 
companies, and community groups play in facilitating integration. In the USA, the role of 
hometown associations (HTAs) or ethnic associations play in facilitating integration has been 
readily examined (King & Skeldon, 2010; Lamba-Nieves, 2018; Smyth, 2017; Strunk, 2014). 




migrants can speak their native language, exchange news of home, and maintain ties to their 
home country. Strunk (2014) finds that Bolivian HTAs in Washington DC help to keep Bolivian 
folklore and cultural traditions alive through performing folkloric dances at religious festivals 
and local civic parades. This helps foster a sense of solidarity amongst this migrant group and 
simultaneously aid integration into the destination city (Strunk, 2014). While HTAs or ethnic 
associations are based on a shared ethnic identity, integration facilitated by the employer 
seeks to facilitate a migrant’s integration into the workplace. van Riemsdijk et al. (2016) found 
that for managers in Norway, the interview process allowed them to see if potential 
employees would be a good cultural fit. HR companies also offered Norwegian language 
lessons to help migrants improve their language ability, which would enable them to 
communicate more easily with colleagues. Föbker et al.’s (2016) research on transnational 
companies found that lower language barriers helped to facilitate integration into the 
company. However, for migrants on a short-term contract, this hindered their broader 
integration as they did not have time to establish themselves in the host society (Föbker et al., 
2016).  
While the concepts of assimilation and integration have been useful for understanding how 
migrants adapt to and become integrated into the destination country, they have been 
critiqued for their tendency to re-emphasise the nation-state and overlook structural barriers 
that can impede integration (Erdal, 2013; Mügge, 2016; Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003). 
Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) have been critical of the tendency of researchers to use the 
nation-state or macro-scale and, by extension ethnicity, as the natural unit of analysis, which 
they call methodological nationalism. Under this assumption, migrants are viewed as a threat 
to the nation-state which is frequently conceptualised as a bounded and nationally distinct 
social unit, which is the principal organising unit of society (Favell, 2003; Wimmer & Glick 
Schiller, 2003). Dahiden (2016) expands on the critique by Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003), 
arguing that a focus on ethnicity is not always the most practical unit of analysis as it cannot 
explain how social process and peoples social practices intersect with other categories such 
as gender, class, and age. The focus on ethnicity also ignores how pre-existing political, social, 
and economic issues in the destination country affect the integration of migrants (Korteweg, 
2017). Mügge (2016) and Schinkel (2018) have also argued that integration is framed as a 
matter of individual responsibility and hence viewed as a one-way process. This ignores how 




(Mügge, 2016). Föbker et al. (2016) point out that immigration policies dictate the 
characteristics of a migrant, such as the age, language, education, and skill requirements, to 
ensure they can integrate economically into the destination country.  
To address the shortcoming of these concepts, researchers have proposed alternative ways in 
which the integration of migrants can be examined. For example, Dahinden (2016) suggests 
using theories that have been developed outside of migration studies can reduce the 
emphasis on ethnicity such as ‘mobility studies’ (see Urry, 2007), which views mobility as a 
fundamental part of everyday life and considers how mobility is facilitated or constrained by 
material and immaterial infrastructure. Alternatively, social network analysis considers whole 
networks, rather than just kinship and family networks, and the role migration and ethnicity 
play within these networks (Dahinden, 2016). Korteweg (2017) points out that public and 
policy discourses need to recognise the fact that immigrants are already full members of 
society in terms of their participation and belonging, and that hence do not need to ‘integrate’ 
into society. In moving away from this end-state view of integration, Klarenbeek (2019) and 
Penninx (2019) both argue that integration needs to be viewed as a two-way process as 
societies change in response to the integration of immigrants and reduce the emphasis on the 
nation-state as being homogenous and already integrated. Viewing integration as a two-way 
process reduces the previous emphasis on using socioeconomic indicators to assess the 
position of migrants in relation to the host population and whether ‘equality’ and hence 
integration had been achieved (Klarenbeek, 2019). Considering these critiques and the 
proposed alternative ways of research integration, by using the theoretical framework 
detailed in Section 3.8, this research seeks to consider how the structural and socio-cultural 
integration of New Zealanders into Australia is influenced and shaped by actors at the micro-
, meso-, and macro-scales and the intersections that exist between these. 
3.5 Transnationalism and citizenship 
The migration of people across the globe has challenged how nation-states view and 
conceptualise citizenship. Citizenship in its most fundamental understanding is viewed as the 
exclusive connection between an individual and the nation-state, corresponding to legal 
status, rights, and belonging (Bauböck, 2006; Bloemraad, 2004; Bloemraad et al., 2008). 
Before World War I, the movement of people was relatively fluid, and nation-state borders 




their borders, population, and national identity at the macro-scale, requiring migrants to get 
entry permits (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2003). During this period, it was also assumed that 
the nation-state was internally homogenous, and a bounded political, legal, social, cultural, 
and economic space (Brubaker, 2010). This re-defining of the nation-state led to theorists such 
as Marshall (1950), who conceptualised what a citizen of a nation-state meant. Marshall 
defined being a citizen as ‘a claim to be accepted as a full member of society’ in which 
everyone has equal rights regardless of their social class. For Marshall, equality was important 
for facilitating a sense of belonging and social cohesion.  
While Marshall’s theorisation of citizenship has provided a useful starting point for being able 
to understand what being a citizen of a nation-state should mean, Yuval-Davis (1999) argues 
that his conceptualisation of citizenship is too simplistic as it ignores how individual subjective 
and cultural differences intersect with citizenship. Instead, Yuval-Davis (1999) proposes the 
concept of the ‘multi-layered’ citizen in which one’s citizenship is the collective of different 
layers and that in addition to class differences, citizenship is gendered, racialised, and 
heterosexualised, which affects how people participate within a nation-state. Bauböck (2001) 
also points out that by basing his claims on the British native-born working-class population, 
Marshall ignores the cultural dimension of citizenship. For Bauböck (2001), this dimension 
includes the rights of indigenous minorities who have not always received equal rights, and 
the role language plays in establishing and maintaining a cohesive society. These omissions 
identified by Yuval-Davis (1999) and Bauböck (2001) highlight how on the one hand, 
citizenship represents the relationship between an individual and the nation-state, and how 
markers of difference can constrain full-citizenship. 
Despite the limitations of Marshall’s theorisation of citizenship if using his interpretation as 
citizenship as being equal rights, this notion of equal rights becomes disrupted through 
migration. Brubaker (2010) notes that migration has challenged the assumption that the 
nation-states internally homogenous and externally bounded political, legal, social, cultural, 
and economic space. This disruption has forced nation-states to think about not only how 
citizenship is constructed and framed but who can obtain citizenship and its associated rights 
(Bloemraad, 2018; Joppke, 2007). Bloemraad et al. (2008) explain this is shaped by how 
nation-states view the attainment of citizenship and hence the requirements migrants need 
to meet to get citizenship. Ethnicity-based citizenship, jus sanguinis, is based on obtaining 




Greece, and Switzerland (Bloemraad et al., 2008). Civic citizenship, jus soli, is gained through 
birth right and includes countries such as Australia, USA, Canada, and France (Bloemraad et 
al., 2008). 
For migrants, obtaining citizenship in the destination country is through the process of 
naturalisation in which migrants apply to become a citizen. Bloemraad and Sheares (2017) 
detail that the naturalisation process involves paying the associated fee, providing proof of 
residence, criminal background check, and in many countries, completing a test to prove they 
are familiar with the local language, government, history, and social norms. This process 
allows nation-states to demarcate belongs while simultaneously seeking to ensure the social 
cohesion of society through language and residency requirements (Joppke, 2007). Ellermann 
(2020) points out that these naturalisation requirements reflect the shift towards 
neoliberalism by nation-states since the 1970s in which citizens are viewed as bearers of 
human capital. This has, therefore, shaped how nation-states view and categorise migrants as 
those with the most human capital, high-skilled migrants, who can meet the language 
requirements (Ellermann, 2020). Leaving low-skilled migrants unable to meet these 
requirements despite contributing economically in addition to socially and culturally to the 
destination country.  
Through demarcating between high- and low-skilled migrants, nation-states can dictate who 
is eligible to obtain citizenship. For migrants, in addition to their skill and the other markers of 
difference identified by Yuval-Davis (1999) that intersect with citizenship, their country of 
origin can influence their ability and decision to naturalise. Castles (2005) explains that there 
is a disparity between the relative power and rights individuals from particular countries have, 
which he refers to as the hierarchies of citizenship. In high-tier countries such as the USA, 
Australia, and countries in the EU, citizens in these countries have a high level of formal rights 
and international mobility (Castles, 2005; Harpaz, 2019). Whereas those from low-tier 
countries such as those in Asia, citizens often have less legal and social protections and greater 
political instability and corruption (Castles, 2005; Harpaz, 2019). Hence for migrants who 
move from a low-tier to a high-tier country, citizenship from a high-tier country may provide 
them with increased social security and enhance their mobility internationally (Conway et al., 
2008; Erdal, 2016). Leuchter (2014), for example, found that for Israeli migrants, the decision 
to get a European passport was for enhanced international mobility. Whereas for some 




they may be unable to do so because of the citizenship rules in their origin country (Spiro, 
2019; Yanasmayan, 2015). Countries such as China, Iran, and Austria do not permit dual-
citizenship. They require individuals to renounce their citizenship if they choose to naturalise 
while countries such as Spain, Pakistan, and Chile only allow the attainment of dual-citizenship 
with certain countries (Sejersen, 2008).  
The decision by many nation-states towards the end of the twentieth-century to permit dual-
citizenship was in response to the increasing number of migrants who wanted to affirm their 
commitment to the destination country while maintaining ties to their origin countries. As 
discussed above, citizenship has been understood as the exclusive connection between an 
individual and the nation-state, with migration challenging this (Bloemraad, 2004; Spiro, 
2016). The concern for many nation-states, as Leuchter (2014) explains, was that by allowing 
migrants to be members of two nation-states, it would erode national borders and impact the 
control the nation-state had over its citizens. However, Bloemraad (2004) and Faist et al. 
(2004) point out that before the introduction of dual-citizenship, those who renounced their 
original citizenship demonstrated to their new nation-state that they no longer had ties to 
their home country and were willing to adapt to a new political environment and be 
committed and loyal to their new nation-state. While dual-citizenship provides advantages for 
migrants, Sejersen (2008) observes that some nation-states have permitted dual-citizenship 
to allow them to better engage with their diaspora. This engagement includes extra-territorial 
voting rights, government subsidies to encourage return migration, development of quasi-
citizenship schemes and policies to facilitate business investments to aid in the country of 
origins development (Gamlen, 2015; Hickey, 2015; Ho et al., 2015; Margheritis, 2007). 
For migrants, the decision to naturalise is influenced by what being a citizen of a country 
means. Being a migrant denotes an individual with a non-citizen status in which the nation-
state dictates what rights that individual has. Brubaker (2010) explains that for migrants, the 
longer they spend living in the destination country, the more embedded they become, which 
increases their desire for full membership. Citizenship not only provides them with the 
security of legal status but recognises the contributions they have made to society and allows 
individuals to view themselves as equal members of society (Birkvad, 2019; Erdal et al., 2018). 
However, Leitner and Erkhamp (2006) argue while migrants may conceive citizenship as a 
prerequisite for economic, social, and political participation, citizenship does not guarantee 




still act as a marker of difference. Dunn and Ip (2008) found this was the case for Hong-Kong 
Chinese migrants in Australia who still experienced racism and cultural exclusion despite 
naturalising, and affected their sense of belonging in Australia.  
Citizenship is used by migrants to enhance their sense of belonging in the destination country. 
This dimension of citizenship, Ho (2009, p. 801) refers to ‘emotional citizenship’ which can be 
used as an ‘adjective that describes features of citizenship and as a tool of analysis for studying 
the emotional representations and subjectivities that give rise to the politics of citizenship.’ 
The emotional representations and subjectivities refer to how individuals experience the 
social world, in particular the meaning they attach to citizenship and the nation-state at the 
micro-scale including home, belonging, fear, and aversion (Ho, 2009; Jackson, 2016). For 
migrants developing a sense of belonging in the destination country is established through the 
micro-scale everyday practices such as knowing where to go shopping or being able to invite 
friends over, which help to embed a migrant into a particular locale (Erdal et al., 2018; Jackson, 
2016; Ralph & Staeheli, 2011). Through this process, migrants form an attachment to the 
destination country through the social networks they have developed. Liu (2014), for example, 
found that for Chinese migrants in New Zealand, feelings of home were intrinsically linked to 
where family and social networks were located as they helped migrants to develop an 
emotional attachment to a specific place. These emotional attachments contribute to a 
migrant’s decision to naturalise as citizenship can help strengthen feelings of home and 
belonging (Aptekar, 2016; Erdal et al., 2018). However, Erdal et al. (2018) also note that 
migrants can still experience feelings of home and belonging without obtaining citizenship.  
The legal status and rights citizenship offer also motivates migrants to obtain citizenship. Being 
a non-citizen means migrants do not have the same rights or protection of legal status as 
citizens. This difference in rights and legal status contributes to a migrant’s decision to 
naturalise as being a citizen protects them from future-policy changes and deportation 
(Aptekar, 2016). Seeking citizenship for the rights and legal status it offers Joppke (Joppke, 
2019) refers to as instrumental citizenship. Joppke (2019) identifies three forms of 
instrumental citizenship: 1) citizenship by investment where wealth allows migrants to 
circumvent the normal residency requirements; 2) obtaining citizenship of an external country 
through ethnic ties or previous renouncing of citizenship, and 3) EU citizenship which grants 
holders free mobility across the EU. This instrumental turn, Harpaz and Mateos (2019) also 




reinforced global inequalities. For those who can pursue a second citizenship, this citizenship 
has the potential to provide them with economic advantages, increased mobility, and in some 
instances a higher social status (Harpaz & Mateos, 2019). In nation-states, allowing migrants 
to gain citizenship through these means shows how citizenship has shifted from representing 
the exclusive connection between an individual and the nation-states to nation-states actively 
seeking migrants who have the human capital they desire to remain globally economically 
competitive (Ellermann, 2020). 
This research into citizenship and dual-citizenship has provided useful insights into why 
migrants choose to naturalise however, a dimension that has been overlooked is why migrants 
decided not to take up dual-citizenship. This gap in the literature was first highlighted by 
Bloemraad et al. (2008, p. 168), who stated, ‘we need to know more about who choose or 
reject dual citizenship to understand better the reasons for their choices.’ As those who are 
transnational should embrace dual citizenship (Bloemraad, 2004). Green’s (2006) research 
found that for New Zealanders in Australia, there was ambivalence towards gaining citizenship 
and that gaining citizenship would make them feel as though they were being disloyal to New 
Zealand. While Green (2006) provided some insight into this aspect of dual-citizenship, her 
research did not explicitly examine what factors prevented people from getting dual-
citizenship. Aptekar (2016, p. 1160, emphasis in original) observed that this gap remained in 
the literature, stating further research should look at ‘those who are eligible for citizenship 
but do not naturalise.’ 
3.6 Transnationalism and occupation  
Inherent to the discussions of transnationalism and migration is the skill or occupation a 
migrant has. The ‘skill’ a migrant has is used by the nation-state to regulate who may enter 
the country and under what conditions. Post-World War II, there were widespread labour 
shortages, an ageing population, and low fertility rates, which meant many countries, 
including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand altered their immigration policies to address 
these issues (Hugo, 2006). This meant policies such as White Australia (see Chapter 2) and 
New Zealand’s preference for ‘traditional source countries’ was abolished, leading to an 
increase in ethnic diversity as migrants were now coming from Asia (Khoo et al., 2009; Walsh, 
2011). By the end of the twentieth-century, many nation-states had implemented various visa 




working holiday maker visas to address growing labour shortages (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; 
Foster, 2012; Khoo et al., 2008). Hugo (2006) suggests that in addition to governments 
implementing temporary visas categories, cheapening international travel and increased 
accessibility to technology and information services has made the prospect of working 
overseas more attainable for many individuals. 
While working overseas is now an option for many individuals, the visa categories 
implemented attract specific types of migrants. Research on transnationalism and occupation 
has focussed on low-skilled (Elsheshtawy, 2008; Yeoh & Huang, 1998, 1999, 2000; Zontini, 
2004; Zuberi & Ptashnick, 2012) and high-skilled migrants (Föbker et al., 2016; Ho, 2011; 
Moore, 2016; Portes et al., 2002; Ren & Liu, 2015) and the experiences and opportunities they 
have in the destination country. Kobayashi (2015) observes that high-skilled migrants are 
viewed as desirable migrants as they contribute to the knowledge economy and the 
competitiveness of the country. Immigration policies seek to retain these high-skilled by 
making it easier for them to become permanent residents or citizens (Ho, 2011; Reilly, 2015; 
Robertson, 2014). This contrasts with low-skilled workers where becoming a permanent 
resident is generally not possible, as from the nation-state’s view, they do not have skills that 
contribute to the knowledge economy of the country. Khoo et al. (2009) observe that in 
Australia, a minimum salary is used to exclude low or unskilled workers, with these individuals 
often from Asia. Similarly, Kobayashi (2015) found in Singapore, domestic work is classified as 
‘non-proper’ informal work, meaning the Employment Act does not protect these workers. 
This differing treatment of low and high-skilled workers by the nation-state has implications 
on how migrants integrate into the destination country and how they live transnationally. 
For low-skilled workers, visa policies dictate which occupations are in demand. This has meant 
across the globe, there has been an increase in the number of migrants employed as health 
or care workers, domestic workers, hotel or hospitality workers, and construction workers 
(Elsheshtawy, 2008; Yeoh & Huang, 1998, 1999, 2000; Zontini, 2004). The nature of these jobs 
has gendered low-skilled migration. Large numbers of women migrate as care or domestic 
workers hoping to provide a better life for themselves and their children (Zuberi & Ptashnick, 
2012). However, these visas are often temporary with restrictive conditions, forcing women 
to leave their children and husband in the home country (Parreñas, 2001). Being separated 
from their children can make these women feel like bad mothers and question why they have 




families again (Zontini, 2004). Parreñas (2001) and Yeoh and Huang (2000) point out 
technology allows these women to mother from a distance and maintain contact with their 
families. These visa policies, therefore, force low-skilled workers to become transnational as 
they cannot bring their families with them and have to adapt to raising a family 
transnationally.  
Having a low-skilled occupation can affect the integration of migrants. Migrants often work 
long and irregular hours, and the temporality of their visa can make forming social networks 
challenging. This means migrants can become reliant on their transnational networks to 
provide support (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Saucedo, 2005). In addition to this, even though 
migrants earn high wages, they often experience occupational downgrading, which can affect 
their self-worth (Zuberi & Ptashnick, 2012). For example, Ponds et al. (2016) found that in 
cities across Europe it was common for taxi drivers to have a Ph.D. as this was the only form 
of employment they could get. Even though individuals may want to gain a higher-skilled job, 
their lack of English language proficiency acts as a barrier alongside not having time to retrain 
to learn new skills (Zuberi & Ptashnick, 2012). These factors work against low-skilled migrants 
as, without a high-skilled job, these individuals are unable to stay in the destination country 
permanently as visa requirements stipulate language and skill requirements, therefore 
actively excluding these workers.  
The migration of high-skilled migrants primarily occurs between developed countries. 
Research has focussed on movements between Europe, North America, and Asian countries 
such as Singapore (Föbker et al., 2016; Ho, 2011; Moore, 2016; Portes et al., 2002; Ren & Liu, 
2015), differing from the country flows of low-skilled migrants. In this body of research, 
economic entrepreneurs have been of particular focus, looking at cities such as New York 
(Portes et al., 2002) and Singapore (Ren & Liu, 2015). Portes et al. (2002) and Ren and Liu 
(2015) both emphasise the importance of transnational networks in strengthening business 
ties between the destination and home country. These ties were maintained through trips 
home, which involved seeing business contact and family and friends (Ren & Liu, 2015). Föbker 
et al. (2016) note that for high-skilled migrants trips home are made possible through higher 
incomes and increased mobility, which is contrary to the experiences of low-skilled migrants.  
The mobility of high-skilled migrants is facilitated by their ability to get a different visa once 
living in the destination country. This visa switching is possible in countries such as England 




migrants. Ho’s (2011) research on Singaporeans in London found individuals can capitalise on 
the opportunities provided by different visas. For example, one individual could transfer from 
a tourist to a work visa while another individual transferred from a student visa to a WHM and 
then a work visa (Ho, 2011). These two strategies show how high-skilled migrants can navigate 
the visa system to their advantage to extend their stay in the destination country. Providing 
these individuals with opportunities that are not available to low-skilled migrants.  
The mobility afforded to high-skilled migrants can affect their integration into the destination 
country. Föbker et al. (2016) found that for high-skilled migrants in Germany lack of 
proficiency in the local language made it difficult becoming friends with co-workers. In 
addition, many felt that they only integrated into a specific part of the city they were living in 
rather that the wider city and country (Föbker et al., 2016). To address language proficiency 
concerns, van Riemsdijk et al.’s (2016) research in Norway found some companies offered 
language classes to help migrants integrate into the work environment and the wider 
community. However, Föbker et al. (2016) found that even if an individual could speak the 
local language, many high-skilled migrants felt more comfortable becoming friends with other 
internationals or those of the same ethnic background. Beaverstock (2011) discusses how 
expatriate clubs can facilitate the integration of high-skilled migrants into the destination 
country by looking at British migrants in Singapore. These clubs not only offer reminders of 
British culture such as food and drink but provide social and recreational support and a setting 
where social networks with other internationals can be formed (Beaverstock, 2011). These 
examples demonstrate the multifaceted nature of the integration of high-skilled migrants into 
the destination country and how actors at the meso-level can play a role in facilitating this 
integration.  
Some scholars have questioned what is meant by high-skilled and who qualifies as high-skilled 
(Koser & Salt, 1997; Parutis, 2014). Parutis (2014, p. 37) argues that a short-coming of this field 
of research is ‘there is no unanimous and clear definition of what constitutes a highly skilled 
migrant worker.’ A commonly used definition is an individual who holds a university degree 
or has extensive/equivalent experience in a given field (Iredale, 2001). Koser and Salt (1997), 
however, contend that defining who is a highly skilled migrant is not as simple as using skill, 
qualification, or experience. Even though an individual may have a degree, they may be 
employed in ‘low’ skilled jobs (Koser & Salt, 1997). This broadness and ambiguity is clear in 




skill where: ‘Skill level is measured operationally by 1) the level or amount of formal education 
and training; 2) the amount of previous experience in a related occupation; and 3) the amount 
of on-the-job training required to competently perform the set of tasks required for that 
occupation’ (ABS, 2019). How skill is used in research is therefore subjective and changes 
between researchers. For example, Ryan et al.’s (2015) research participants happened to 
hold senior positions in financial institutions, which led her to classify them as high-skilled. In 
contrast, Föbker et al. (2016) looked at those who held a master’s degree, which reflects the 
European visa regulations. These two interpretations show how the term high-skilled needs 
to be used with caution, as it does not provide a robust way of examining the skills migrants 
have.  
Those with skilled or semi-skilled jobs have received little attention in migration research. 
Conradson and Latham (2005) refer to these individuals as ‘middling’ transnationals, those 
who are from a middle-class background, tertiary educated, and often work in lower-skilled 
jobs. This category addresses the shortcomings of using either low or high-skilled, as it 
acknowledges that not all migrants with degrees are high-skilled migrants. Conradson and 
Latham (2005) found that New Zealanders in the UK use migration not only to gain work 
experience but travel around Europe. The desire for career advancement is not the primary 
migration motive, like that of many high-skilled migrants, but to increase their cultural capital 
and life experiences (Parutis, 2014). This means individuals are willing to work in hospitality 
or as a skilled tradesman (Parutis, 2014). Ho and Ley (2014) found that for Chinese returnees 
from Canada, they were no longer viewed as high-skilled migrants, despite having the initial 
skills to migrate and the ability to navigate the visa regime. This meant these individuals were 
excluded from any state or company-sponsored entitlements (Ho & Ley, 2014), despite having 
a degree, which, as discussed above, is used as a marker of being highly skilled. Ryan et al. 
(2015) observed that within this group of people, there are considerable differences in 
disposable income, lifestyle, and life stage, and using the term ‘middling’ struggles to capture 
the diversity. Despite this limitation, looking at middling migrants acknowledges that migrants 
do not neatly fall into the binaries of low- and high-skilled and that new ways of researching 





3.7 Return migration 
Changing circumstances in the home and destination country can facilitate return migration. 
Cerase (1974) introduced the first typology of return migration, which was based on the 
observation that large numbers of European migrants who had intended to settle 
permanently in the USA were returning to their home countries. He identified four types of 
return migration. 1) Return of failure: migrants return because they cannot adapt to life in the 
destination country, often because they have families at home. 2) Return of conservatism: 
once migrants have earned enough money, they return home to buy land or build a house and 
increase their social standing. 3) Return of innovation: the exposure to new ideas in the 
destination country causes migrants to return with the belief they will cause social change. 4) 
Return of retirement: retirement reminds migrants of their emotional attachment to their 
home country and returning can provide them with greater social security. Expanding on 
Cerase’s (1974) work, King (1978) and Gmelch (1980) recognised migration was temporal and 
subject to the influence of outside factors that contributed to return migration. King (1978) 
pointed out that return migration could be forced, planned, or spontaneous. For example, 
migration may have intended to be permanent, but because of outside factors such as family 
illness or changes in economic conditions, migrants were forced to return home (Gmelch, 
1980). While this initial body of research explained why people returned home, it did not 
acknowledge the interactions between individuals and the wider conditions of the nation-
state and how this can influence return migration. Paparusso and Ambrosetti (2017) suggest 
that through looking at micro- and macro-scale influences can provide a holistic view of return 
migration and how an individual’s decisions can be viewed in relation to economic, social, and 
political conditions in the destination and home country. 
Views of return migration differ between migration theories. NELM views return migration as 
an indicator of successful migration (Paparusso & Ambrosetti, 2017). Constant and Massey 
(2002) point out that from this perspective, migration is generally temporary as migrants 
return once they have remitted enough earnings or gained sufficient capital. This differs from 
neoclassical micro- and macro-economic conceptualisations, which view migration as 
permanent with return migration as a failure to adapt to the destination country. From a 
microeconomic perspective, the decision to return is based on the migration experience, not 
producing the initial perceived benefits. (Constant & Massey, 2002). Here the inability to earn 




networks contribute to the decision to return home as life in the destination country did not 
turn out how the individual expected it to (Paparusso & Ambrosetti, 2017). Alternatively, 
macroeconomics considers return migration to be a result of changes in the GDP or economic 
conditions in the destination country (Paparusso & Ambrosetti, 2017), which Gmelch (1980) 
refers to as forced return migration. Unlike NELM and neoclassical economics, 
transnationalism views return migration as neither a success nor a failure but as part of an 
individual’s migration journey (Ley & Kobayashi, 2005), with friends, family, and transnational 
networks contributing to the decisions that individuals make.  
Using transnationalism to look at return migration highlights how micro- and macro-scale 
factors contribute to migration decisions. Research has looked at return migration intentions 
(Carling & Pettersen, 2014; de Haas & Fokkema, 2011; Flahaux, 2017) and the experiences of 
those who have returned (Ley & Kobayashi, 2005). Examining return intentions involves 
looking at what motivations may or may not result in actual return migration (de Haas & 
Fokkema, 2011). de Haas and Fokkema (2011) found that those who migrated to improve their 
living conditions or for relational reasons had a higher intention to return. Flahaux (2017) 
similarly observed those with family in the home country had higher return intentions. Using 
age to measure return intentions has had differing results. de Haas and Fokkema’s (2011) 
results showed that age had no effect, whereas Paparusso and Ambrosetti (2017) identified 
that older migrants were more likely to indicate an intention to return. Carling and Pettersen 
(2014) found there was an inverse relationship between integration and transnationalism on 
return intentions. Those who were weakly integrated with strong transnational ties had the 
highest return intention (Carling & Pettersen, 2014; de Haas & Fokkema, 2011). Flahaux (2017) 
looked at the effect immigration policies in the destination country have on return intentions. 
Restrictive policies that impeded future entry into the destination country discouraged return 
migration (Flahaux, 2017). Re-entry would only be possible if the individual became a 
permanent resident or citizen (Flahaux, 2017). These micro- and macro- factors show the 
complexity of looking at return intentions, as the possibility of return is influenced by an 
individual’s socio-cultural characteristics and the broader economic and political structures.  
Structural factors contribute to a migrant’s decision to return home. Challenges gaining 
employment in the destination country influence the decision to return home (Lee, 2011; Ley 
& Kobayashi, 2005). Ley and Kobayashi (2005) explain more employment opportunities, 




However, return work experiences do not always live up to expectations. Lee (2011) points 
out that having international experience can be an advantage or disadvantage for individuals. 
Being fluent in English and Korean aided those who work for international companies as it 
gave them an advantage over other co-workers (Lee, 2011). Whereas for others, being 
overseas meant they were out of touch with Korean cultural norms or were actively excluded 
in the workplace because they had not served in the Korean army (Lee, 2011). Visa policies in 
the destination country also contribute to return decisions. For many individuals, their time in 
the destination country is dictated by the length of their visa. Lidagrd’s (1994, 2001) research 
on New Zealand returnees from the UK highlighted that visa policies had a direct effect on 
return migration as the visa only granted them a two-year stay. Many individuals stated that 
if they had the opportunity to stay longer in the UK they would have (Lidgard, 1994, 2001). 
These structural factors leave migrants with limited options in the destination country, 
therefore in effect forcing the migrant to return home.  
Socio-cultural factors influence return decisions and experiences. Gmelch (1980) points out 
that previous trips home, the presence of family members, and a love for the home country 
contribute to the decision to return home. Being closer to family and not missing out on 
important events such as marriages, births, and deaths is one of the primary reasons 
individuals return (Lee, 2011; Lidgard, 1994, 2001; Ní Laoire, 2007). Ní Laoire’s (2007) research 
showed that for individuals realising their parents are getting older and wanting to see 
younger family members acted as powerful motivators to return. Associated with this was a 
desire to raise children in the home country as the culture and way of life was perceived to be 
better for children (Lidgard, 1994, 2001; Ní Laoire, 2007). While the family contributes to the 
decision to come home, some individuals can struggle to reintegrate. Ní Laoire’s (2007) 
observed that for Irish returnees, some had difficulty making friends and fitting into the 
community. In contrast, others found it overwhelming as people knew who you were, but you 
did not know who they were (Ní Laoire, 2007). Lidgard’s (1994, 2001) research also found that 
individuals had to come to terms with there being a disjuncture between the memories they 
had of New Zealand and what it was like now, which made reintegration harder than 
anticipated. These socio-cultural factors demonstrate the personal nature of return migration 




As touched on above, immigration policies play a role in return migration. Lidgard (1994, 2001) 
pointed out for New Zealanders in the UK, once their two-year work visa expired, they had to 
return home. Similarly, Flahaux (2017) highlighted that the restrictiveness of immigration 
policies affected return migration decisions. Bedford et al.’s (2003) research on the migration 
flows between Australia and New Zealand after the 2001 Australian policy found that after 
this policy change, there was an increase in the number of New Zealand citizens returning 
from Australia. Those born in the Pacific, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East may have been 
affected to a greater extent (Bedford et al., 2003). While looking at migration data provides 
insight into the number of individuals who return, research has not used qualitative data to 
examine the extent to which policy changes influenced return intentions or decisions, 
highlighting a gap in the return migration literature.  
3.8 Theoretical framework for research 
Drawing together the existing literature on transnationalism and integration that has been 
detailed in the previous sections, this research uses the proposed theoretical framework set 
out in Figure 3.1. To date, none of the existing research has proposed a framework that 
holistically examines the interlinkages between transnationalism and integration and the 
different scales and degrees with which they occur. Portes et al. (1999) and Faist (2000) 
provided frameworks for classifying transnational activities from an economic, political and/or 
sociocultural lens (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Table 3.3 drew together the conceptual models 
proposed by Ager and Strang (2008) and Erdal and Oeppen (2013). Ager and Strang (2008) 
detailed how each marker and means of integration is influenced by citizenship and rights, 
language and cultural knowledge, and nation-state structures and shapes the degree of 
integration possible. While Erdal and Oeppen (2013) look specifically at an individual’s 
integration through the socio-cultural and structural dimensions. The theoretical framework 
used here draws together elements of each of these frameworks to visualise the interlinkages 
that exist between the structural and socio-cultural dimensions of integration and 
transnationalism and how integration and transnationalism at the micro-scale are affected by 




Figure 3.1: Theoretical framework detailing the multi-scalar and multi-layered inter-











Source: constructed by author 
In Figure 3.1, the smaller circles within the destination country and origin country represent 
the micro-scale. Each of these circles signifies the social, political, economic, and cultural 
factors that influence the integration of an individual into the destination country, with these 
same factors in the origin country influencing how transnational ties are maintained. The 
larger circles represent the destination and origin country in which meso- and macro-factors 
influence a migrant’s integration and transnational practices. In the destination country, 
aspects such as the language, culture, and dominant ethnic identity influence the degree to 
which a migrant can become integrated into the destination country. The language, culture, 
and dominant ethnic identity of the origin country simultaneously influences integration 
experiences. Alongside these socio-cultural aspects are the social structures in place in the 
destination country. These include workplace practices and expectations that can differ 
between the origin and destination country, housing policies, schooling systems, and cultural 
norms. Overarching these social structures and socio-cultural norms are the immigration 
policies in place in the destination country. This is represented by the outer circle where at 
the macro-scale immigration policies and immigration rhetoric are shaped by politics in the 
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destination and origin countries, global events, and how other countries approach 
immigration. These broader influences shape the relationships that exist between countries, 
whether that be due to shared colonial histories or trade deals designed to improve the 
economies of each country. The arrow shows how integration and transnationalism influence 
each other.  
3.9 New Zealanders in Australia  
During the 1990s and early 2000s, research primarily focussed on the inflows and outflows of 
New Zealanders to and from Australia (Bedford et al., 2003; Birrell & Rapson, 2001; 
Carmichael, 1993; Hugo, 2004a, 2004b, 2015). Of particular focus was the effect of the 2001 
policy changes, in which the rights to social security services, disability, sickness, and 
unemployment benefits, and automatic permanent residency were revoked (Bedford et al., 
2003; Birrell & Rapson, 2001; Faulkner, 2013). Hugo (2004a, 2004b) examined the effect this 
change had on the number of New Zealanders who gained Australian citizenship, as dual-
citizenship is available, with 11,007 granted 2000-2001 increasing to 17,334 in 2001-2002. This 
indicating that the policy change had a direct effect on people’s behaviour. However, while 
there was an increase in the year after the policy changes, McMillan (2014) has argued that 
at least 60 per cent of New Zealanders who have arrived in Australia after 2001 are unlikely to 
meet permanent residency requirements. While citizenship may not be possible for many New 
Zealanders in Australia, Green (2006) and McMillan (2017) have found that New Zealanders 
have an ambivalence towards gaining Australian citizenship. This ambivalence has meant that 
New Zealanders have the lowest rate of citizenship applications of any non-Australian born 
group (Nolan, 2015), despite having reduced rights. 
Empirical studies have taken different approaches. Green et al. (2008) examined the 
transnational practices of New Zealanders, looking specifically at their motivations for moving 
to Australia and how the length of residence affected transnationalism. Forrest et al. (2009) 
looked at the residential behaviour of Māori in Sydney to see if they formed ethnic enclaves 
and also looked at intergenerational changes in occupation. McMillan (2017) has more 
recently examined the affective integration of New Zealanders into Australia and how even 
though they felt structurally integrated, they still felt excluded and exploited, wanting to be 




Research on the occupations of New Zealanders depends primarily on secondary data. Birrell 
and Rapson (2001) and Sanderson (2009) examined the Australian Department of 
Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) data. Birrell and Rapson (2001) 
provide an overview of the occupations of New Zealanders who intend to settle permanently 
in Australia from 1997 to 2000; however, this is not the focus of the research. Sanderson 
(2009) looked to see if there was a link between occupation and onward mobility, finding that 
those who were highly skilled made frequent trips. Haig (2010) provides an overview of the 
occupations of New Zealanders based on 2006 census data, with New Zealanders being 
overrepresented as Machinery Operators and Drivers, Technicians and Trade Workers, and 
underrepresented as Managers and Professionals. Empirical research on occupation has been 
scarce, Forrest et al. (2009) found evidence of an upward shift in occupational status between 
generations, with there being more skilled and white-collar workers. Green (2006) only used 
occupation as a way of ensuring that interview-participants came from a variety of socio-
economic backgrounds.  
3.10 Conclusion 
Migration theory over the last century has evolved to explain changing migration patterns. 
These theories based on the migration of individuals from the Global-South to the Global-
North have sought to explain a migrant’s integration into the destination country and how ties 
to the origin country are maintained. As discussed, integration is multifaceted and can be 
examined from an economic, political, or socio-cultural perspective and at different scales. 
While a migrant’s transnational practices are influenced by their visa, economic status, social 
ties, and political situation in the destination and origin countries. Research on integration and 
transnationalism has tended to focus on low-skilled, and high-skilled migrants as their ability 
to migrate are dictated by the visas available due to labour shortages in the destination 
country. This has meant that those who are considered middling migrants have often been 
overlooked in migration research. To address this gap, this research will use New Zealanders 
living in Australia as an example of middling migrants to explore their integration into Australia 
and transnational practices. It will also build on the existing literature on New Zealanders living 
in Australia through an examination of how visa status affects citizenship attainment and 




CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the research design and methods used in this research. To understand the 
migration experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia, a sequential mixed-methods 
approach is adopted through the implementation of an online survey and semi-structured 
interviews. The chapter begins by discussing the advantages and disadvantages of mixed-
methodology and what data collection methods have been used in migration research. 
Following this, the research methods and research design and sampling strategy are 
explained. The chapter then details how the survey and interviews were implemented and the 
data analysed. The last section provides a demographic overview of the survey respondents.  
4.2 Theoretical framework and mixed-methodology 
The production of knowledge and our understanding of reality can be understood from a 
positivist or realist perspective. Keat and Urry (1975, p. 3) explain that a positivist attempts to: 
‘Gain predictive and explanatory knowledge of the external world. To do this, 
one must construct theories which consist of highly general statements, 
expressing the regular relationships that are found to exist in the world.’  
This means empirical research is conducted to test, verify, or falsify established principles and 
theories (Danermark et al., 2001). Whereas for a realist: 
‘A scientific theory is a description of structures and mechanisms which 
causally generate the observable phenomena, a description which enables 
us to explain them.’ (Keat & Urry, 1975, p. 3) 
From this perspective, questions are asked about the underlying structures and mechanisms 
and involves questioning why something occurs in order to explain social events (Keat & Urry, 
1975). Extending the realist perspective is critical realism, which views reality as stratified into 
three levels: the empirical, actual, and real (Fletcher, 2017). The empirical is the everyday lived 
experience; the actual is the non-filtered human experience, while the real is the causal 
structures and mechanisms that construct the experiences at the empirical level (Fletcher, 
2017). For social scientists, the questions or problems being examined are guided by theory, 




a critical realist view is adopted as it utilises the theories detailed in Chapter 3 to understand 
the interactions between the structures in place and individuals’ lived experiences. 
This research uses a mixed-methods research design which: 
‘Involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and/or qualitative 
data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or 
sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at 
one or more stages in the process of research.’ (Creswell et al., 2003, p. 213) 
Mixed-methods research approaches are being encouraged by researchers as they ‘minimise 
the risk of generating erroneous findings… and allow a broader range of issues to be 
addressed’ (Philip, 1998, p. 271). Quantitative data seeks to obtain results that are reliable, 
valid, and generalisable if using accepted collection and analysis methods (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 1998). This data is often collected through questionnaires that commonly use close-
ended questions and ranking scales that can classify people and gather information on their 
behaviours, attitudes, and beliefs (Parfitt, 2005). Valentine (2005) argues that the rigid nature 
of questionnaires forces individuals to tick the box they feel best applies to them, meaning 
results obtained may not be truly representative of an individual’s beliefs. Qualitative data, on 
the other hand, seeks to gain insight into an individual’s feelings and attitudes (Flowerdew & 
Martin, 2005). Interviews, focus groups, and ethnographic studies allow researchers to 
consider the ‘meanings people attribute to their lives and the processes which operate in 
particular social contexts’ (Valentine, 2005, p. 111), providing detailed information on the 
topic of interest. Mixed-methods bridges the gap between research being exclusively viewed 
as quantitative or qualitative.  
Taking a mixed-methods approach addresses the limitations associated with qualitative and 
quantitative research methods (Greene & Caracelli, 1997). It allows the researcher to use 
different data sources and draw on diverse perspectives throughout the research (Valentine, 
2005). In population geography, McKendrick (1999) identified eight goals of multi-method 
research. Of particular relevance to this research are two goals that relate to the triangulation 
of data (McKendrick, 1999). Here mixed-methods are used to address different parts of the 
same research question and strengthen conclusions made (McKendrick, 1999). Denzin (1989) 
contends triangulation can occur with data, investigators, theories, and methods. Data 
triangulation through the use of different sources (Denzin, 1989) validates the findings by 




achieved using secondary data sources (quantitative) which provide the contextual 
understanding through which the primary data are investigated. Using multiple data sources 
facilitates the cross-referencing of data, which aids in ensuring the validity and quality of the 
primary data collected, which cannot be used to make generalisations about the wider 
population.  
Denzin (1989) identified that triangulation could occur ‘within-methods’ and ‘between-
methods.’ Within-method triangulation involves using one method and using multiple 
strategies to examine the data (Denzin, 1989). For example, including open-ended questions 
in a questionnaire (Creswell et al., 2003). Alternatively, between-method is the use of 
dissimilar research methods to overcome the limitations associated with using only one 
method (Denzin, 1989), producing comparable and in-depth data (Castles, 2012). The 
McKendrick (1999) multi-method models apply to this research use ‘between-data’ methods 
of triangulation. The first model uses multiple methods to, ‘strengthen a research conclusion 
with supporting evidence derived from an independent and different approach’ (McKendrick, 
1999, pp. 42–43). 
While the second model uses multiple methods to ‘address different aspects of the same 
research question’ (McKendrick, 1999, p. 43), for example conducting follow-up in-depth 
interviews after a questionnaire to gain a deeper insight into the experiences being addressed. 
In this research, within and between-methods of data triangulation are used to address the 
research aim and objectives. Using qualitative and quantitative primary data sources highlight 
the complex nature of migration experiences, which cannot be uncovered through the 
analysis of secondary data sources alone (Graham, 1999). Triangulating the data in this 
manner strengthens the conclusions that can be made in the research as per McKendrick’s 
(1999) first model. Within the current research, triangulation occurred in the survey where a 
mixture of closed and open-ended questionnaires was used. This was followed up by in-depth 
interviews reflecting McKendrick’s (1999) second model, which provided a setting through 




4.3 Methods in migration research 
Research on transnationalism, integration, and migration has primarily been conducted using 
quantitative data. Quantitative data collection has dominated this area of research through 
the use of large-scale surveys, including national censuses (Castles, 2012). However, Boccagni 
(2012) indicates that amongst surveys by Portes (2003), Snel et al. (2006), and Waldinger 
(2008), there is no consensus on appropriate indicators of transnationalism nor on how to 
operationalise them. For example, to examine socio-cultural transnationalism, Snel et al. 
(2006) ask questions relating to return visits to the home country, frequency of contact with 
family, and membership of social organisations in hometown, whereas Portes et al. (2002) ask 
questions on whether individuals give money to community organisations in their hometown 
or are members of hometown associations. The differences between what is asked in relation 
to not only socio-cultural but also economic and political transnational practices produce a 
vast array of findings that are not readily comparable. Similarly, the use of national data such 
as censuses or arrivals and departures data can be problematic because of different 
definitions and categories (Castles, 2012). Such as the Australian census categorising people 
by country of birth while arrivals and departures data use both citizenship and country of birth.  
Qualitative data collection through interviews and ethnographic research has increasingly 
been used in migration studies (Aptekar, 2016; J. Bell, 2016; Erdal, 2013; Koh, 2015). It 
provides insight into the processes of identity construction through understanding the 
relevance of connections to the home country for an individual (Boccagni, 2012). This 
dominance of single method studies in migration research has led to a call by researchers to 
employ mixed-methodology and methods (Boccagni, 2012; Castles, 2012; Philip, 1998). 
Castles (2012, p. 87) argues that:  
‘Quantitative research is important for obtaining comparative data to 
describe macro-social changes linked to migration. At the same time, 
‘qualitative approaches’ are needed to provide understanding both of 
individual and community- level social action, and of the history and cultures 
of sending, transit and receiving societies.’ 
Using mixed-methods allows researchers to place migration within the context of macro 





4.4 Research methods 
Traditionally surveys were completed over the phone, by mail, or face-to-face. Changes in 
technology have increasingly seen surveys become administered online. Online surveys are 
cost effective as they do not need to be mailed, nor does the researcher have to spend time 
on the street going from door to door to get responses (Wright, 2005). This makes them time-
efficient, as they can be easily administered and provides real-time responses. Using a 
platform such as SurveyMonkey means the data can be easily exported into Excel or SPSS with 
the responses pre-coded, which reduces the time spent cleaning and coding the data. Online 
surveys also provide potential respondents with the opportunity to complete the survey at a 
time convenient for them and in the privacy of their own homes (Rea & Parker, 2005).  
Another advantage of online surveys is that they provide the researcher with flexibility, 
especially when a non-probability sampling strategy is employed. As the survey is URL based, 
it means it can be easily distributed through a range of platforms and allows respondents to 
share it with their networks easily. This increases the potential reach of the survey and the 
diversity of survey respondents. Online surveys also provide flexibility as they allow for 
multiple-question formats, including multiple-choice, dichotomous ‘Yes/No’ questions, rank 
order, and open-ended questions. Functions such as skip-logic can also be employed where 
the response to one question will dictate which questions respondents should answer next. 
For example, if they indicate they are an Australian citizen, they then do not need to answer 
questions on their visa status in Australia. This provides respondents with a smoother user 
experience and ensures they only answer questions that apply to their situation and can 
reduce the time taken to complete the survey.  
A drawback of online surveys is that they rely on potential respondents having access to the 
internet. Access to the internet requires having a computer or, more recently a smartphone. 
In Australia, 91 per cent of Australians have a smartphone, with more people now using a 
smartphone to shop online than a desktop computer (Deloitte, 2019). This introduces bias as 
it privileges those who can afford a computer or smartphone and the internet. It also assumes 
that respondents have a minimum level of computer or smartphone literacy and hence are 
comfortable using it and completing a survey online. Social media has also changed how 
people engage and share information with an estimated 17.1 million Facebook users over the 




amongst the New Zealand born population in Australia, 86 per cent have access to the internet 
at home (ABS, 2016).  
Other disadvantages of online research include sampling and representativeness, impersonal 
contact, and, as mentioned, bias towards those who are computer literate. As the survey was 
distributed and shared through different social media platforms and pages targeting New 
Zealanders living in Australia, the researcher had limited control over who completed the 
survey and the response rate. This means respondents completed the survey based on their 
self-assessment on whether they met the eligibility requirements. The impersonal nature of 
an online survey meant respondents could not ask questions or have unclear questions 
explained to them (Rea & Parker, 2005). To minimise this, the researcher provided their email 
address, so respondents had the opportunity to ask questions they had, or in one instance, to 
seek clarification on the eligibility requirements. The last section of the survey asked those 
wanting to take part in a face-to-face interview to provide their contact details and provide 
respondents with the opportunity to put a face to the researcher.  
Semi-structured interviews provide qualitative data that complement the quantitative data 
collected in the questionnaires. This method of data collection involves having a list of 
questions or themes that will be covered throughout the interview. The interview is 
conducted in a conversational manner, which allows the researcher to listen to and respond 
to what the interview participants have said (Longhurst, 2009). It also allows interviewees to 
ask the researcher questions they may have (Philipp & Ho, 2010). Through this back-and-forth 
dialogue, it allows the researcher to maximise the information gained from the interview 
(Cloke, 2004). Valentine (2005) suggests a limitation of this conversational style is the order 
themes are discussed has the potential to change, meaning the researcher needs to ensure 
themes are not missed while maintaining the conversational nature of the interview.  
4.5 Research design 
As explained, to understand the migration experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia, 
a sequential mixed-methods approach was employed. This involved the quantitative data 
collection occurring first in the form of an online survey followed by qualitative semi-




The sections and questions in the New Zealanders living in Australia survey (attached as 
Appendix 1) were developed based on the theoretical framework detailed in Figure 3.1 and 
the literature reviewed in Chapter 3. Using this framework, the survey was structured into two 
sections to reflect the theoretical concepts of transnationalism and integration that underpin 
the thesis. The survey comprised of 22 sections and asked 103 questions. Respondents did not 
necessarily answer all questions as skip-logic functions were used, as detailed in Section 4.4. 
Alternatively, some questions may not have been relevant to their situation.  
The survey began by asking questions about where they lived in Australia and internal 
migration. Sections two to nine focussed on their social, cultural, political, and economic 
transnational practices, and their motivations for moving to Australia. Sections ten to 20 asked 
questions in relation to respondents socio-cultural and structural integration into Australia 
with questions relating to their labour market experiences, changes in housing status and 
situation since living in Australia, the formation of social networks, and visa status and 
citizenship. Section 21 focussed on return migration intentions with section 22 ending the 
survey with a series of demographic questions and the opportunity for respondents to provide 
any additional comments. Respondents wanting to participate in an interview were asked to 
provide their contact details. By structuring the survey in this way, it meant questions that 
were easy to answer were placed towards the beginning with more sensitive topics such as 
income placed towards the middle. Ending the survey with demographic questions meant 
respondents could quickly answer these questions, as they did not have to put too much 
thought into their responses.  
The interview guide for the semi-structured interviews was again based on the theoretical 
framework depicted in Figure 3.1 and the questions included in the survey (attached as 
Appendix 6). As this stage of the research occurred after the survey, it provided the researcher 
with the opportunity to discuss in-depth some issues that were raised in the open-ended 
questions in the survey.  
4.6 Sampling 
Given the geographic spread and the unavailability of public lists of where New Zealanders in 
Australia live, it was not possible to use a probability sampling strategy, and so non-probability 
strategies were used to conduct the questionnaire and interviews. Purposive sampling is when 




find people with those characteristics (Hibberts et al., 2012; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). 
These people have information that will aid the researcher in answering the research aim and 
objectives. A second sampling technique was employed to gain research participants: 
Snowballing. Snowballing is a standard method used extensively in geographic and migration 
research (Green et al., 2008; Ho, 2009; McMillan, 2017; Ryan et al., 2015; Yeoh & Willis, 2005). 
It involves researchers asking research participants to pass on information about the research 
to other individuals who are in the same category of interest (Cloke, 2004). In doing so, it can 
overcome one of the biggest barriers to participant recruitment, which is gaining the trust of 
the interview participants (Valentine, 2005). In this research, participants were asked to 
forward the survey to people they knew who met the selection criteria, which aided in gaining 
respondents who would not have found out about the research through the other recruitment 
strategies. Scott (2004) points out that snowballing needs to be used with some caution, as it 
can lead to an over-representation of certain groups of people. Using personal networks and 
informal gateways or targeting people based on age or gender can aid in trying to achieve a 
representative and diverse sample (Ryan et al., 2015; Scott, 2004). 
The nature of non-probability sampling means the sample is not representative of all New 
Zealanders in Australia, meaning generalisations cannot be made about this population. 
Itzigsohn and Giorguli-Saucedo (2005, p. 906) point out:  
‘There is no known universe of transnational immigrants from which to draw 
a representative sample. Hence we cannot generalize the results of our 
analysis. Yet what we lose in generalisability we gain in an in-depth 
exploration of the relationship between incorporation, transnationalism, 
and gender.’ 
The strength of the information gained from the sample is from the depth of the information 
provided, allowing insight into the experiences of New Zealanders in Australia to be achieved. 
As survey distribution was uncontrolled, it is difficult to address the issue of response rate. 
This is because the survey was not sent to a specified number of people, as this was not 
possible. Instead, gaining responses was based on distribution, which was not controlled by 
the researcher. The reach of the Facebook advertisements discussed in the next section 
provides an indication of how many people were targeted and the number who subsequently 




4.7 Data collection 
4.7.1 Online survey  
The survey was conducted online and created using SurveyMonkey. Weblinks generated by 
the software were used to disseminate the survey. Multiple strategies were used to distribute 
the survey. First, organisations aimed at New Zealanders living in Australia were emailed, 
messaged through Facebook, or enquiries lodged on their website, asking them to distribute 
the survey on their social media pages (see attached Appendix 2). These organisations and 
Facebook groups were contacted based on their reach through the number of ‘likes,’ see Table 
4.1. 
Table 4.1: Details of groups and pages contacted  
Group  Number of ‘likes’ on Facebook 
OzKiwi 
National advocacy group for 
New Zealanders in Australia 
47,000 
Māori Wardens Victoria 
An organisation that helps 
Māori living in Victoria 
5,400 
Iwi n Aus 
Have Facebook page and 
website, focussed on 
highlighting issues faced by 
New Zealanders 
14,700 
Kiwis in Australia Online Facebook page 22,390 
The second strategy used was paid for Facebook advertisements. A Facebook page was 
created, which provided information about the research and a link to the survey. Three 
advertisements were run to target those who had not ‘liked’ any of the groups listed in Table 
4.1. The first advertisement ran from 25 July 2018 to 1 August 2018, targeting those who 
indicated they now lived in Australia, were aged 18-65+, and previously lived in New Zealand, 
and had ‘liked’ the All Blacks, www.nzherald.co.nz and www.stuff.co.nz. This ad reached 5,644 
people, with 730 people clicking on the link. A second advertisement ran from 6 August 2018 
to 12 August 2018 with this advertisement only targeting those who had indicated they had 
lived in New Zealand and were now living in Australia, reaching 6,114 individuals and resulting 
in 718 link clicks. A final ad ran from 11 October 2018 to 16 October 2018 with the same target 
criteria as advertisement two, reaching 3,015 and had 438 link clicks.  
The final strategies used to disseminate the survey were personal networks and snowballing. 
Survey participants were asked to share and forward the survey link to any other New 




From using these different strategies, 2040 survey responses were obtained, however, 
because completion of the survey was based on self-selection, each question did not have a 
response rate of 100 per cent. Item nonresponse was due to several factors. First, the design 
of the survey included skip-logic functions and questions that only required answering based 
on their answer to a previous question meaning not every question applied to each 
respondent. Second, respondents may choose not to answer questions based on the topics 
they feel uncomfortable answering. Gallagher (2004) note that this is common for questions 
on income and can be mitigated using income ranges to help increase the item response rate. 
In the New Zealanders living in Australia survey, the income question has a response rate of 
84 per cent (n=1713). The final factor affecting item nonresponse were respondents who 
began the survey but stopped partway through or skipped sections of the survey. For example, 
the question ‘Had you previously travelled to Australia before moving here’ which was toward 
the beginning of the survey, had a response rate of 96.2 per cent (n=1963), while the question 
‘Do you think you will return permanently to New Zealand in the future?’ in section 21 of the 
survey had a response rate of 80.1 per cent (n=1634). Based on the item response rates, the 
results of the survey are reliable and as a non-probability sampling strategy was used, the 
results are not generalisable to the broader New Zealand population in Australia.  
Over the period the survey was live, Australia was in the process of leadership change, having 
another leadership spill. At the beginning of 2018, Malcolm Turnball was Prime Minister. By 
August, current Prime Minister Scott Morrison and Peter Dutton were both vying to be the 
leader of the Liberal Party. While Scott Morrison defeated Peter Dutton 45-40 points to 
become the leader (Madden, 2020), the prospect of Peter Dutton as Prime Minister was cause 
for concern for New Zealanders living in Australia. This was because shortly after the 
amendments were made to Sections 501 and 116 of the Migration Act 1958 in 2014, then 
Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott replaced Scott Morrison, who was the Minister for 
Immigration and Border Protection with Peter Dutton taking over the portfolio in December 
2014. Consequently, Peter Dutton was viewed as being responsible for the deportation of New 
Zealanders from Australia. As detailed in Chapters 1 and 2, this has adversely affected New 
Zealanders living in Australia and the political relationship between the two countries. This 
political turmoil at the time the data was being collected may have influenced the responses 




4.7.2 Face-to-face interviews 
Twenty-one semi-structured interviews were conducted with New Zealanders in cities across 
Australia. Interview participants were primarily recruited through the questionnaire on New 
Zealanders in Australia and were conducted in the researcher’s home state of South Australia, 
and the cities of Melbourne in Victoria and the Gold Coast and Brisbane in Queensland. The 
rationale for selecting Melbourne was it had the most significant increase in the New Zealand-
born population among all capital cities between the 2011 and 2016 census, increasing 15 per 
cent from 67,042 to 78,904 (ABS, 2011, 2016). The Gold Coast and Brisbane were selected as 
another fieldwork site, as this is the state with the largest number of New Zealanders. The 
2016 census identified that a typical migrant in Queensland is a 44-year-old female New 
Zealander (ABS, 2016). This differs from all other states where the typical migrant is from 
England (ABS, 2016). 
Potential participants were selected based on their occupation, visa status, if they had 
obtained Australian citizenship or whether they were considering getting it. These criteria 
were used to capture a range of migrant experiences. Potential participants were then 
emailed to see if they were still interested in participating in a face-to-face interview along 
with a participant information sheet, which provided more information about the research 
(see attached Appendix 3 and Appendix 5). The interviews occurred in a public place such as 
a library, meeting room, or café to ensure that the interviewee was at ease and also the safety 
of the researcher. (see attached Appendix 4). Interviews generally began with respondents 
discussing their background- where they grew up, what life was like for them growing up, and 
what led to their decision to move to Australia. This was followed by a discussion on their 
experience of life in Australia - how they found settling here, their experience of making 
friends and gaining employment, visa status, citizenship, and treatment of New Zealanders 
living in Australia. Their maintenance of ties to New Zealand was also discussed, return 
migration intentions, and how they would describe their overall experience of living in 
Australia. Before the interview, interviewees were asked to sign a consent form, which asked 
for their permission for the interview to be audio-recorded (see attached Appendix 4). The 





4.7.3 Secondary data  
Secondary data sources are used to complement the primary data collected. In this research, 
a range of secondary data sources were used. The Australian population census provides a 
stock of the population in relation to a wide range of characteristics. These characteristics 
include occupation, income, housing, education, and country of birth, which can be used to 
provide a comprehensive insight into migrant groups in Australia. This study includes data 
from the 2016 census. Overseas arrivals and departures information collected by the 
Department of Home Affairs (previously Department of Immigration and Border Protection) 
provides information on the movement of people to Australia from different countries and 
the movement of people from Australia to different countries. Accompanying the secondary 
data sources from Australia are those from New Zealand. Statistics New Zealand provides data 
on the arrivals and departures of New Zealanders, including those who have returned to New 
Zealand after living permanently in Australia. The statistical data used from both countries is 
critical for indicating the scale of migration between the two countries. Importantly it provides 
a profile of New Zealanders in Australia through which specific aspects can be researched 
further through primary data collection.  
4.8 Data analysis 
Data analysis and treatment occurred over several stages. As survey data was collected using 
SurveyMonkey responses were automatically numerically coded, which is the advantage of 
using this software. The data was downloaded to Excel for cleaning and then uploaded into 
SPSS Statistics 25 for analysis. Once working with the data in SPSS, some variables were 
recoded to aid data analysis. For example, respondents were asked what year they arrived in 
Australia, and this was recoded into year groups to see if any differences emerged based on 
when they arrived in Australia. Descriptive statistics and cross-tabulations were the primary 
forms of statistical analysis used.  
The open-ended questions in the survey were analysed using Nvivo 11 through manual text 
analysis. Here each response was coded into the corresponding theme. These themes 
emerged as responses were being coded with some responses falling into multiple themes. 
For example, some of the themes that emerged from the analysis of the reasons why 
respondents had not obtained Australian citizenship were cost, eligibility requirements, time 




this process were then used to structure Chapters 5,6, and 7. The interviews were used to 
expand on the themes discussed in these chapters.  
4.9 Overview of the interview participants and the survey population 
The characteristics of the twenty-one interview participants are detailed in Table 4.2. 
Interview participants had moved to Australia since the 2001 policy change, with 2003 being 
the earliest arrival and 2017 the most recent arrival. Three of the interviewees had obtained 
Australian citizenship, three held permanent residency, one was on a New Zealand Citizen 
Family Relationship Visa Subclass 461 and the rest were SCV 444 visa holders. Interviewees 
worked in occupations with different ANZSCO occupation skill levels which revealed different 




Table 4.2: Characteristics of interview participants 
 
  








M Gold Coast 






Couple Gold Coast Retired 2005 SCV 444 
No intention of 
applying 
65+ 
F Gold Coast Teacher 2006 SCV 444 Ineligible 55-60 
M Gold Coast Mechanic 2005 SCV 444 Told ineligible 55-59 




F Marsden Youth Support Worker 2012 SCV 444 
No intention of 
applying 
50-54 
F Brisbane Business Manager 2004 189 visa  

















2014 SCV 444 
Has not lived here 
long enough 
40-44 
M Melbourne Cardiologist unknown PR 






2012 SCV 444 Income too low 30-34 
M Melbourne Procurement Director. 2010 SCV 444 Cost prohibitive 45-49 
M Melbourne Commissioning Editor 2002 SCV 444 In PR process 40-44 
Couple Melbourne 














M Melbourne Software Developer 2003 RRV 
In process of 
applying 
40-44 
F Adelaide Psychologist 2011 SCV 444 
Do not meet 
criteria 
35-39 
F Adelaide Nurse 2015 SCV 444 






Cleaner 2017 SCV 444 













Table 4.3 shows that between the survey population and the New Zealand-born census 
population aged 18 years and over, there was a similar population distribution across states. 
Amongst the survey population, a higher proportion was living in the Australian Capital 
Territory and Victoria compared to the 2016 Australian census.  
 Table 4.3: Survey and 2016 New Zealand-born census population 18 years and over, by the 
state of residence 
 
 
Source: ABS (2016); New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=2016 
Table 4.4 details the demographic characteristics of the survey respondents and compares 
some of these characteristics to the New Zealand-born census population aged 18 years and 
over. The median age of survey respondents was 46.6 years, which was slightly higher than 
the census population, which was 44.4 years. This higher median age can be attributed to the 
over-representation of those aged 50-59 and underrepresentation of those aged 20-29. There 
was a gender bias, with just under three-quarters of the survey respondents identifying as 
female. Just under half were married (49.8 per cent), which was slightly higher than the census 
population (45.0 per cent), but the same proportion was separated. The higher proportion of 
females completing the survey could be attributed to self-selection bias as they may have 
more time available to complete the survey because of their employment status and/or 
caregiving responsibilities.  
Most respondents were born in New Zealand (90.1 per cent), with 3.5 per cent born in the UK. 
Other countries of birth included India, Canada, Philippines, South Africa, China, Germany, and 
Malaysia and accounted for those who indicated they identified as an ‘other’ ethnicity. From 
the first ancestry response in the 2016 census, 1.4 per cent of the New Zealand-born 
population identified as Chinese, 1.0 per cent as German, 0.85 per cent as Indian, 0.2 per cent 
as Filipino, 0.13 per cent South Africa, and 0.02 per cent identifying as Canadian or Malay (ABS, 
2016). Three-quarters of female respondents had children. Of these respondents, 10.5 per 
cent had children born in both New Zealand and Australia. Two-thirds of the survey population 
arrived in Australia post-2001, while amongst the census population, just over half had arrived 
in Australia pre-2001.   
 
QLD NSW VIC SA TAS WA NT ACT 
Survey (%) 37.5 19.2 21.3 2.9 1.6 14.0 1.4 2.2 




Table 4.4: Demographic characteristics of survey respondents and 2016 New Zealand-born 
census population 18 years and over 
 
 Male  Female  Total Census 
Gender 
Male 27.4 50.3 
Female 72.6 49.7 
Age (%) 
18-19 1.1 0.6 0.7 2.7 
20-29 8.0 5.5 6.2 16.9 
30-39 21.1 22.3 22.0 19.8 
40-49 29.1 28.5 28.8 21.7 
50-59 22.0 26.5 25.2 9.62 
60-64 9.8 9.7 9.7 7.7 
65+ 8.9 6.9 7.4 13.67 
Country of birth 
(%) 
New Zealand 86.1 91.6 90.1 
 
Australia 0.2 0.4 0.4 
UK 4.2 3.5 3.7 
Pacific Islands 1.2 0.4 0.6 
Europe 0.7 1.1 1.0 
North America 0.7 0.4 0.5 
SE and NE Asia 1.6 1.2 1.3 
Southern Asia 2.5 0.4 1.0 
South Africa 1.9 0.5 0.9 
Other 0.9 0.3 0.4 
Ethnicity (%) 
Pākehā/NZ European 81.0 75.6 77.1  
Māori 7.1 15.0 12.9 9.2 
Pacific Islander 0.9 2.9 2.4  
Māori/ Pākehā 0.7 2.1 1.7 
Other 10.3 4.4 6.0 
Marital status 
(%) 
Never married 18.1 13.8 14.9 37.0 
De facto relationship 20.0 18.7 19.0 17.6 
Married 52.1 48.9 49.8 45.0 
Separated 2.5 4.8 4.2 4.2 
Divorced 5.5 10.7 9.3 10.4 
Widowed 1.8 3.1 2.8 3.1 
Children (%) 
Yes 63.9 75.0 72.0  
No 36.1 25.0 28.0 
Country children 
were born in (%) 
New Zealand 46.3 56.5 53.9  
Australia 39.0 26.8 29.8 
Both 6.6 10.5 9.5 
Other 8.0 6.3 6.8 
Year of arrival 
(%) 
Pre-2000 24.3 23.3 23.5 51.0 
2001-2015 70.4 71.3 71.1 43.7.0 
2016-2018 5.4 5.5 5.4 1.3* 
Source: ABS (2016); New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, Age n1 male=440, n1 female=1164, n1 
total=1606; Country of birth n2 male= 432, n2 female=1131, n2 total=1565; Ethnicity n3 male=437, n3 female= 
1164, n3 total= 1603; Marital status n4 male= 436, n4 female= 1161, n4 total= 1599; Children n5 male=432, n5 
female= 1153, n5 total=1587; Country child born n6 male=432, n6 female= 1153, n6 total= 1587; Year of arrival 
n7 male=425, n7 female=1153; n7 total=1580  





This chapter has detailed the methodological and research strategies that will be used to 
collect data on New Zealanders living in Australia. A sequential mixed-methods approach 
addresses the limitations associated with quantitative and qualitative data collection. Using 
multiple data collection strategies provides different perspectives and strengthens the 
conclusions made. The data collected in the survey and interviews provide insight into the 
experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia. As a non-probability sampling strategy was 
used, these results are not generalisable to the broader New Zealand population in Australia. 
Secondary statistical data from Australia and New Zealand is used for context and comparison. 




CHAPTER 5: MIGRATION MOTIVATION, LINKAGES, AND RETURN 
INTENTIONS TO NEW ZEALAND 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores respondents’ motivations for moving to Australia, their transnational 
practices, and return intentions. The first section looks at the factors that contributed to 
respondents’ decision to migrate and who they migrated with. Using the concept of 
transnationalism defined as ‘the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-
stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement’ (Basch et 
al., 1994, p. 6), section two examines how respondents maintain social, political, economic, 
and cultural ties with New Zealand. The last section explores respondents’ return intentions, 
highlighting the factors that keep them in Australia and the factors that would make them 
return to New Zealand. 
The results show that respondents’ motivations to migrate to Australia are linked to why they 
would not return to New Zealand. The low wages and high cost of living in New Zealand made 
Australia an attractive destination, as respondents perceived there to be more employment 
opportunities available in Australia. The results also show that respondents have weak 
economic and political ties and strong social and cultural ties to New Zealand. However, while 
respondents’ ties can be classified as being transnational because of the crossing of national 
borders, their social and economic ties are more reflective of long-distance internal migration. 
This is because geographic proximity, visa conditions, and cultural and familial expectations 
play a role in how respondents maintain ties to New Zealand.  
5.2 Motivations to move to Australia  
The decision to migrate is complex, influenced by economic opportunities, social networks, 
politics, visa requirements, geographic proximity, and previous travel experiences. Table 5.1 
summarises respondents’ motivation to move to Australia with employment opportunities, 





Table 5.1 Respondents’ motivation to move to Australia, ties to Australia, and whom they 
migrated with 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, Who migrated with n male=440, n female=1163, 
n total=1605 
*multiple responses selected 
Amongst respondents who moved for better employment opportunities, 47.2 per cent were 
in an occupation with a skill level of one, and 20.4 per cent had an occupation skill level of 
four. A skill level of one is commensurate with a bachelor’s degree or higher, while skill level 
four is equal to a Certificate II or III or one year of relevant work experience. A higher 
percentage (26.2 per cent) of female respondents indicated they moved to Australia because 
of friends and/or family living there, compared to only 17.7 per cent of males. Interestingly, 
  Male Female Total 
Motivation to 
migrate* (%)  
Employment 
opportunities 
55.7 47.3 47.4 
Higher income 48.0 37.7 38.3 
Lifestyle 40.2 39.3 37.2 
Weather 35.0 34.7 31.9 
Friends and/or family 
living in Australia 
17.7 26.2 22.4 
Job offer 27.3 21.1 21.3 
Desire to go abroad 24.1 19.5 20.2 
Spouse partner 14.1 19.2 16.8 
Move with family 12.3 15.3 15.1 
No visa application 21.1 14.0 14.8 
Similar to New Zealand 19.5 13.8 14.0 
Education 8.2 7.6 7.1 
Reunion with parents 
and/or children 
3.4 5.0 4.2 
Who respondents 
knew living in 
Australia* (%)  
Knew no one 21.1 16.0 17.5 
Spouse/partner 2.3 4.0 3.5 
Child/ren 2.7 7.7 6.0 
Parent(s) 7.7 10.6 9.4 
Sibling(s) 16.8 22.9 21.2 
Cousin(s) 20.0 22.0 21.0 
Other relative(s) 23.9 28.0 27.8 
Colleagues(s) 9.1 5.7 5.8 
Friend(s) 51.4 41.9 42.6 
Other 3.6 4.4 4.2 
Who respondents 
migrated with (%) 
On their own  40.0 29.4 31.3 
Family 30.2 38.7 37.7 
Partner/spouse 25.9 26.1 25.9 
Single parent with 
child/ren 
3.0 4.1 3.6 




21.1 per cent of male respondents said they moved to Australia because there was no visa 
application required, compared to just 14.0 per cent of female respondents.  
Even though only 22.4 per cent of respondents indicated they moved because friends and/or 
family were living in Australia, the majority of respondents knew a New Zealander who was 
living there. For 17.5 per cent of respondents, they knew no one living in Australia before 
moving, while 42.6 per cent had friends living in Australia. A higher percentage of female 
respondents had children living in Australia; of these respondents, just under half (46.7 per 
cent) were over the age of 60, suggesting they may have moved to Australia after the birth of 
grandchildren. Amongst respondents who knew someone already living in Australia, 45.4 per 
cent lived in the same location they had migrated to. Most respondents migrated to Australia 
with their partner/spouse or family. Nearly one-third (31.3 per cent) of respondents moved 
by themselves, with 40.0 per cent of males moving on their own.  
Over three-quarters (78 per cent) of respondents had travelled to Australia before moving, 
with 18.5 per cent of these respondents having been to Australia more than six times and 18.2 
per cent just once. Amongst respondents who had not previously travelled to Australia, 35.4 
per cent had moved before 1994, and 48.6 per cent had moved between 2001 and 2015. Just 
over a third of survey respondents had lived in a third country before moving to Australia, with 
16.5 per cent considering moving elsewhere before they migrated to Australia.  
A few respondents highlighted the cyclical nature of migration between New Zealand and 
Australia. Some had moved to Australia for a few years after finishing high school and then 
returned to New Zealand before moving to Australia again once they had established their 
career. While for others, they had moved to Australia to see what it was like, and upon 
returning to New Zealand they were reminded why they had left and subsequently returned 
to Australia. 
Respondents were asked to explain which of the motivations to migrate listed in Table 5.1 had 
the greatest impact on their decision to move to Australia. Unsurprisingly, out of the 1,856 
responses given, 18 per cent said employment opportunities were why they moved to 
Australia, followed by higher income (14.4 per cent). The small labour market in New Zealand 
meant many respondents struggled to gain employment or had limited opportunities for 




‘Job opportunities/income - I reached the ceiling in NZ, and further 
opportunities were not going to be available due to the specialised nature of 
my work.’ (Respondent 93: Female, unknown age, Health Service Coordinator, 
arrived 1998, Australian citizen) 
‘Job opportunities, I was struggling to find work in NZ fresh out of high 
school.’ (Respondent 79: Female, 30-34, Store Manager, arrived 2004, SCV 444) 
The low wages, coupled with the limited employment opportunities, meant many 
respondents struggled financially in New Zealand, and as these respondents explained, having 
a higher income would improve their quality of life: 
‘Higher income. Thought it would make [it] easier as I was a single parent.’ 
(Respondent 86: Female, 55-59, Nurse Aide, arrived 1996, PSCV) 
‘Sick of slogging our guts out for [NZD]$22 p/hr and no penalty rates, making 
[NZD]$1100 per week max for 6 days. Currently earning [AUD]$3300 for 6 
days.’ (Respondent 152: Female, 40-44, Parts Sales Representative, arrived 2012, 
Australian citizen) 
‘Money, we were finding things tough in NZ despite both of us working. We 
were living pay check to pay check and never getting ahead.’ (Respondent 
739: Female, 50-54, Early Childhood Centre Director, arrived 2010, SCV444) 
Moving to Australia provided 13.5 per cent of respondents with the opportunity for a fresh 
start and the ability to experience a different way of life. Changes in family circumstances and 
relationships were a motivating factor, as respondents wanted to be close to family who had 
already moved to Australia: 
‘I was the last of my immediate family to move here. After the breakdown of 
my marriage, I felt I needed to have myself and my children in a place that 
we could be safe and supported.’ (Respondent 1079: Female, 35-39, Print and 
Copy Specialist, arrived 2006, SCV 444) 
‘My husband's mother was unwell, so we moved to be closer to her. My 
husband was made redundant, so we had the funds to move our household. 
We were looking for new experiences.’ (Respondent 928: Female, 40-44, Project 
Manager, arrived 2002, Australian citizen) 
For one survey respondent, living in rural New Zealand had become stifling:  
‘We lived in a very small farming community in NZ. Did the same things each 
week, saw the same people. Had also seen most of NZ. Wanted to have more 
opportunities to have new experiences.’ (Respondent 1454: Unknown gender, 
age and occupation, arrived 2011, SCV 444) 
Benson and O’Reilly (2009) refer to this as lifestyle migration, where an individual in response 




control of their lives by choosing the lifestyle they want to have. Lifestyle migration is 
facilitated by the structural conditions, ethnicity, class, gender, and race in the origin and 
destination country that together grant certain individuals the opportunity to migrate (Benson 
& Osbaldiston, 2016). In the context of trans-Tasman migration, the TTTA provides the policy 
structure that makes migrating to Australia an option available to these respondents.  
Family reunification was the primary motivating factor for 13 per cent of respondents, with 
an additional 11.8 per cent moving to Australia because of their spouse/partner. Some 
respondents wanted to join family living in Australia as they felt they were missing out on 
building relationships with grandchildren or nieces/nephews that had been born in Australia. 
While for others, hearing about the employment and lifestyle opportunities from family 
members painted a picture of what life could be like in Australia. A female interviewee who 
had always planned on moving to Australia, discussed how her partner’s family had influenced 
their decision to move: 
‘His family that were based here in Brisbane, kept calling almost weekly 
saying you know there were a couple of families here, come over there's 
heaps of money to be made, 50,000 jobs a week are advertised, you know 
we've got this we've got that, you know painted this amazing picture so 
when we decided that's it we're going to move, we're going to move over 
because the grass appears to greener over there…They kept saying you can 
stay with us, we can get settled you know you just need a little bit of money, 
by the time that came around, and we said look we're coming over...the 
excuses started to roll in like, ohh we can't have you here for very long, or 
you can't stay with us, we don't have the room, umm I'm like this is really 
strange we'd already committed ourselves to move over, he went 5 weeks 
before me, found a job um said to me that where his family were living was 
in really rough part of town, like a lower socio-economic part of town, what 
they told him they had they never had, in fact they basically talked 
themselves up, probably never thinking that we'd make the moved to go 
over…’ (Female, 40-45, Business Manager, arrived 2004, 189 visa) 
Many of the respondents moved to Australia because their partner/spouse had got a job 
there: 
‘My husband was living and working in Queensland while I lived in New 
Zealand with our children. We moved to Australia to keep our family 
together.’ (Respondent 1685: Unknown gender, age, and occupation, arrived 
2014, SCV 444) 




‘Married to an Australian. He wanted to return home. He had lived in New 
Zealand for four years.’ (Respondent 1066: Female, 65+, Enrolled Nurse, arrived 
1980, PSCV) 
‘I had reached the top of [my] career in NZ… was advised to seek experience 
in other organizations before I could be promoted further. Was in [a] long-
distance relationship with [a] partner who lived in Melbourne who suggested 
rather than looking at other job opportunities in NZ I look[ed] in Melbourne.’ 
(Respondent 100: Female, 55-59, Nurse, arrived 2011, SCV 444) 
A small proportion (7.0 per cent) of respondents were motivated to move to Australia because 
of the opportunities it would offer their children. Australia was viewed as a better country to 
raise children because of the educational and lifestyle opportunities:  
‘Education and employment prospects, far better here than in NZ. 
Daughter's grades started failing because she was bored, but she excelled 
here, and hubby is happier with working conditions and pay.’ (Respondent 
654: Female, 40-44, unemployed, arrived 2001, SCV 444) 
The potential to receive a higher income would allow respondents to spend more time with 
their children: 
‘Pay - the better pay meant that I did not have to go back to work at the end 
of my maternity leave while pregnant with [my] second child.’ (Respondent 
85: Female, 40-44, Museum Registrar, arrived 2007, SCV 444) 
While income, employment opportunities, social ties, and lifestyle factors were given as some 
of the primary reasons for migration, for a few respondents, societal issues in New Zealand 
and events such as the Christchurch earthquake in 2011, and proximity to New Zealand 
contributed to their decision to move. Societal issues discussed by respondents included the 
cost of living, housing affordability, gang violence, and limited opportunities in rural New 
Zealand to get out of poverty: 
‘I came from a small town that's based on two gangs where it's normal to 
drink and smoke weed and have kids real young and not get anywhere in life, 
and there is only one main employer there, the meat works.’ (Respondent 
1671: Female, 25-29, Kitchenhand, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
‘At the time, mortgage interest rates in NZ were 21%. They were lower in 
Australia and wages/job opportunities were better.’ (Respondent 2002: Male, 
60-64, unemployed, arrived 1989, Australian citizen) 
A couple of respondents discussed the disparity between Māori and Pākehā in New Zealand:  
‘Move away from institutionalisation discrimination towards NZ Māori. To 




life. Not just me, also my children.’ (Respondent 1913: Female, 40-44, 
Community Mental Health Worker, arrived 2005, SCV 444) 
Respondents affected by the Christchurch earthquake felt the need to move because of the 
impact it had both on Christchurch and their mental health, with one respondent saying: 
‘Needed to move out of Christchurch for our well-being. Made sense to move 
somewhere where we could get ahead with better income & work 
conditions.’ (Respondent 1161: Female, 40-44, Midwife, arrived 2013, SCV 444) 
For another, their support network had subsequently moved to Australia: 
‘Lots of my friends had moved to Australia immediately following the 
earthquakes in Christchurch, and I moved to join them.’ (Respondent 1878: 
Male, 30-34, Teaching Associate/Research Assistant, arrived 2012, SCV 444) 
Those who had lived in a third country moved to Australia because it allowed them to be close 
to friends and family in New Zealand while also providing more opportunities: 
‘Lifestyle. I was 27, had lived in London, and New Zealand seemed too 
boring.’ (Respondent 1218: Female, 30-39, Orthodontist, arrived 2009, SCV 444) 
‘Friends and lifestyle. I hadn’t lived in NZ for five years anyway, so felt closer 
to my Aussie friends I’d met travelling.’ (Respondent 67: Female, 60-64, retired, 
arrived 1981, Australian citizen) 
5.3 Transnational connections to New Zealand  
A migrant’s ties to their homeland are multifaceted, having political, economic, and socio-
cultural dimensions. The ability of a migrant to maintain these ties is influenced by their visa 
status, family structure, culture, beliefs, and economic status. Research on transnationalism 
has tended to focus on those who move from less-developed countries to the Global-North, 
where immigration policies prevent individuals from migrating with their families, 
subsequently forcing individuals to become transnational (Parreñas, 2001; Zuberi & Ptashnick, 
2012). In this context, migration is often used as a family risk diversification strategy where 
one family member is sent overseas to increase their earning capacity so they can send money 
back to their family (Stark & Bloom, 1985). This has resulted in a focus on remittances and 
how they both provide economic support and demonstrate/represent a form of long-distance 
care (Parreñas, 2005). Other research has looked at the establishment of hometown 
associations (HTAs) as a way of maintaining not only cultural ties but economic and political 




This section explores the characteristics, motivations, and structures that facilitate the 
transnational ties of New Zealanders living in Australia and how they differ from a South-North 
migration context. While they do not establish HTAs and the sending of remittances is not 
prevalent, the concept of transnationalism provides a useful framework for understanding the 
importance of political, economic, and socio-cultural ties and how respondents maintain 
them. 
5.3.1 Social ties  
Unlike most migrants who come to Australia, New Zealanders moving to Australia can bring 
their family under the TTTA. As Table 5.1 above showed, 67.2 per cent of respondents 
migrated with their family or partner/spouse, while one-third moved by themselves. A moving 
to Australia was an individual or familial decision; the majority of respondents still had siblings 
(62.2 per cent), parents (53.5 per cent), cousins (65.1 per cent), and grandparents (19.3 per 
cent) living in New Zealand. Some respondents had children (14.6 per cent) in New Zealand, 
while a small proportion (4.1 per cent) of respondents no longer had family living there. 
Staying in contact with these family members was facilitated by different forms of 
communication, including phone calls, emails, and social media. Vertovec (2004) observed 
that the proliferation of cheap phone cards at the turn of the millennium meant regular 
communication with family members was now possible without the need for regular travel 
between countries. 
Respondents primarily communicated with family members weekly via phone calls and emails 
with social media and messaging applications used daily, see Figure 5.1. The post was the least 
used method of communication, followed by video calling. Figure 5.2 shows that respondents’ 
contact with friends in New Zealand was less frequent than with family members, with social 
media, the main form of contact occurring on a daily or weekly basis. Communication to 
friends via phone calls and email was less frequent when compared to family members, 10.4 
per cent of respondents called friends weekly compared to family members (36.7 per cent). 
The reduced use of post as a communication method reflects the technological changes that 
have occurred over the last 20 years as increased connectivity through the internet and cheap 






Figure 5.1: Regularity of use of various communication methods by respondents with 
family members 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, multiple responses selected 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Regularity of various communication methods by respondents with friends 




















































While these advances in technology have reduced the need for face-to-face contact, just 
under one-quarter (24.6 per cent) of respondents travelled back to New Zealand yearly. One-
fifth (21 per cent) had not travelled back in the last three years, just over one-quarter (28.2) 
went back every couple of years, 17.6 per cent went every six months, 1.4 per cent went 
monthly and a small proportion (7.2 per cent) had not travelled back. Amongst those who had 
travelled back, over three-quarters (77.3 per cent) went back to visit family and/or friends 
with an additional 9.5 per cent travelling for a specific family event such as a wedding or 
funeral. Many of the respondents who had travelled back for a family event had not travelled 
back for over three years. Other reasons for returning included for a holiday (7.9 per cent), 
business (2.7 per cent), or for a specific reason such as selling property or watching the All 
Blacks. Respondents who had most recently travelled back to New Zealand for business were 
mainly Business, HR and Marketing Professionals (19.0 per cent), Specialist Managers (14.3 
per cent), and Chief Executive, GM, and Legislators (11.9 per cent). Amongst respondents who 
travelled back every couple of years, one-third (31.3 per cent) called family members weekly 
with 26.2 per cent calling monthly, indicating the role of technology in the maintenance of 
familial relationships.  
Table 5.2 examines the frequency of travel back to New Zealand by occupation at the major 
group level. Managers and Professionals travelled back to New Zealand more frequently with 
25.2 per cent, and 23.7 per cent respectively travelled back every six months. Whereas 
Machinery Operators and Drivers (36.9 per cent) and Labourers (35.2 per cent) were more 






















1 Managers (%) 5.6 2.0 25.2 26.0 27.6 13.6 100.0 
2 Professionals (%) 5.4 2.6 23.7 30.3 21.3 16.7 100.0 
3 Technicians and 
Trade Workers (%) 
9.7 0.0 6.8 23.3 34.0 26.2 100.0 
4 Community and 
Personal Service 
Workers (%) 
7.4 0.6 14.8 29.0 26.1 22.2 100.0 
5 Clerical and 
Administration 
Workers (%) 
4.0 1.3 15.9 21.6 33.5 23.8 100.0 




6.2 1.5 12.3 21.5 36.9 21.5 100.0 
8 Labourers (%) 12.5 1.1 9.1 13.6 35.2 28.4 100.0 
Total (%) 6.4 1.6 18.4 25.8 27.7 20.1 100.0 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018. Mangers n1=250, Professionals n2=498, Technicians and 
Trade Workers n3=103, Community and Personal Service Workers n4=176, Clerical and Administration Workers 
n5=227, Sales Workers n6=81, Machinery Operators and Driver n7=65, Labourers n8=88. 
von Koppenfels et al. (2015) discuss the role geographic proximity has on return visits amongst 
highly skilled migrants. They found that for French migrants in London, those from Paris could 
readily return because of the train between London and Paris, which only took two-and-a-half 
hours. Whereas for those from rural parts of France, regular return visits were not always 
possible, given the greater distance and time needed to get there. For this group, their 
experiences were similar to American’s living in London, Paris, and Berlin, where the distance 
meant they could only return every year. The geographic distance between cities such as Perth 
and Auckland and the associated cost, frequency, and flight time may affect the frequency of 
return visits possible. For those living on the east coast of Australia, a flight takes 
approximately three hours, whereas it takes six hours to fly between Perth and Auckland. One-
quarter of respondents living in New South Wales indicated they travelled back every six 
months compared to only 7.5 per cent of those living in Western Australia. When going back 
to New Zealand, those living in New South Wales typically stayed for 3-7 days (41.7 per cent), 
whereas, amongst those living in Western Australia, longer trips lasting 2-4 weeks (38.0 per 





The maintenance of social ties is a two-way process, as even though respondents may not 
regularly travel back, family and friends still visit them in Australia. Friends were less likely to 
have visited respondents in Australia compared to family members, with 30.5 per cent of 
respondents having had family members visit them in the last six months, see Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3: Frequency of visits by family and friends 
 Immediate family (%) Friends (%) 
Have not visited 14.1 30.4 
Last 6-months 30.5 18.7 
Last 6-12 months 16.7 13.5 
1-2 years ago 19.2 18.9 
3+ years 19.4 18.5 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, immediate family n1=1840, friends 
n2=1853 
Communicating with family members in New Zealand had become part of the interviewees’ 
daily and weekly routines. One female interviewee explained that: 
‘Everyone’s back there um all my family, it's just myself, I’m here and my 
husband, and so I contact them all the time, I call my parents twice a day, I 
skype them I call the children, I talk to my grandsons, um I have a lot to do 
with NZ.’ (Female,40-44, Business Manager, arrived 2004, 189 visa) 
While for a male interviewee, the geographic proximity and the nature of his relationships 
with different family members influenced the frequency of communication: 
‘[Parents] you know FaceTime, yeah like most weekends yeah ah so really 
well connected, know exactly what's going in their lives, you know mum got 
hearing aids last week, and you know so I’m pretty up to date, you know all 
that stuff so that's fine and my sister in Christchurch, speak to her maybe 
every 3 months, or so I guess, and it will be a messenger call I’ll be in the car 
she'll be on speakerphone, and I’ve got a sort of 45-minute drive home, so 
I’ll chat to her for 40 odd minutes, um, reasonably frequently so pretty well 
connected to family, yeah, and I got a sister in the UK in London so I don't 
speak to her as quite as often as I should really, to be honest, yeah um, but 
that's just by virtue of distance rather than anything else.’ (Male, 45-49, 
Procurement Director, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
Being in regular contact with his parents not only facilitated intergenerational communication 
with his children but allowed him to care for his parents at a distance by being able to see 
virtually how they were doing. He explained that as his father was getting older, travelling 




communication had replaced the need for regular travel to New Zealand as priorities had 
changed: 
‘I haven't been back for 3 years because there's so much to do, I mean, leave 
is finite… I need to go back…we should because it's cheap and it's easy, but 
we just sort of don't…like this is home now, we're not going home anytime 
soon, in my head I’m retiring here.’ (Male, 45-49, Procurement Director, arrived 
2010, SCV 444) 
For other interviewees, returning to New Zealand was now based on necessity: 
‘Yes, oh my father's died recently, but my mother's in a rest home, but she 
had dementia, ahh and my sister, she lives with her two daughters in 
Auckland. Well, finances restrict us, we find more and more we just going 
back when there's an emergency.’ (Male, 60-64, Land Use Investigation Officer, 
arrived 2005, Australian citizen) 
‘We only go home for funerals, we actually have to pick and choose when we 
go home, funeral um live in Palmerston North, we have to travel to 
Whangarei, 3 days, we're there we stay for a day or two, we come home 
here, we can't take three days, we got to take a whole week because if you 
take a whole week off to finish that process.’ (Female,50-54, Youth Support 
Worker, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
Interviewees who had children viewed trips to New Zealand as an opportunity to not only 
build intergenerational relationships but a connection to New Zealand. A male interviewee 
whose three children were born in New Zealand recognised that although they were born 
there and had family there, for them, Australia was home, as he explained: 
‘The kids are really happy here, my two older children they both flew out to 
NZ earlier this year, and we said right you're old enough to fly together on 
your own, and you can go and stay with your grandparents and your uncle 
on the farm and ahh they went out there and spent two weeks out there, 
and they're ohh it's going to be so long dad, they got out there, and they did 
enjoy it, but they're also glad to get back here and catch up with their mates 
so yeah, they did enjoy it, and they'd love to go back… but yeah all their 
friends are over here, they have no desire to live out there.’ (Male, 45-49, 
Dozer Miner, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
One interviewee who moved to Australia after the Christchurch earthquake explained how 
visits by family and friends had changed over time:  
‘So my brother, my younger brother um he moved to Wellington after the 
earthquakes but a few years ago here as well so he lives here now too, and 
yep we've had cousins visit and stuff like that, so people definitely come and 




visit more in the first few years that I was here, not so much anymore.’ (Male, 
30-34, Teaching/research associate, arrived 2012, SCV 444) 
While the results presented above indicate most respondents have strong familial ties to New 
Zealand and hence exhibit a high degree of transnationalism, the role of familial relationships, 
culture, and geographic proximity need to be considered. Because of the cultural similarities 
between New Zealand and Australia, it is often remarked that moving to Australia is like 
moving to another city within New Zealand. Hence, this thesis proposes that because of this 
familiarity and the ability of New Zealanders to travel with their family, these patterns of 
communication and engagement with New Zealand are more akin to long-distance internal 
migration. This is because, at the micro-scale, how an individual communicates and engages 
with their family does not inherently change upon migration. Whereas for migrants who are 
separated from their husband/wife and children and cannot migrate as a family, 
communicating remotely forms the basis of the primary family unit and becomes a form of 
caregiving that is vital in the maintenance of these relationships (Parreñas, 2001). 
In Western culture, the family is understood to mean the nuclear family, a couple with 
dependent children, with adult siblings, parents, and other relatives making up the extended 
family. Research by Silverstein and Bengston (1997) on the structure of adult child-parent 
relationships in America identified five different types of intergenerational relationships: 
tight-knit, sociable, obligatory, intimate but distant, and detached. These relationships are 
composed of six dimensions: structure (proximity), associations (frequency of contact and 
shared activity), affect (emotional closeness), consensus (actual or perceived agreement in 
opinions, values), function (exchanges of instrumental or financial assistance and support), 
and norms (strength of obligation). Families who are tight-knit exhibit all these dimensions, 
whereas those that are obligatory only engage based on proximity and frequency of contact 
and are not emotionally close nor have consensus in values and lifestyle.  
These familial relationships apply to many New Zealanders living in Australia; however, for 
those who are Māori, familial relationships are shaped by the concept of whānau and are 
central to Māori understanding of family. Whānau encompasses an individual’s tribe and sub-
tribe and includes physical, emotional, and spiritual dimensions through which values, 
histories, and traditions are shared (Walker, 2017). Whakapapa is the foundation of whānau, 
and links people to all living things to the earth and sky and the origins of the universe, shaping 




of family beyond the nuclear family results in stronger familial bonds that remain regardless 
of geographic proximity. Walker’s (2013) research on the lived experience of whānau found 
that for those with family members in Australia, passing on knowledge on whānau, hapu, and 
iwi was important as it helped to maintain connections to the tribe. In this research, Māori 
respondents did not explicitly mention keeping connections to their tribe. Still, one 
interviewee discussed how she needed to teach children who had grown up in Australia, Māori 
funeral customs:  
‘One of the things I really miss is language, customs and protocols, we used 
to talk in New Zealand all the time, about dial a koh matu, or dial an old 
person or dial a karanga, ring an aunty, we [have a] body coming, can you 
come and call them, yeah sweet as, it happens naturally there… I think it was 
interesting to see that the kids were all supporting each other, which was 
great, but they were just sitting there, they, my family and my kids, you know 
get up get active, do the food and all of that these kids were just sitting 
around, you know hanging off each other, and they were, people were 
coming in filing in, and these kids were lying around, and I thought what the, 
anyway, I said okay guys, we're going to get a tray line up we need a tea 
station, someone to butter the bread, we need to pots cooking, cleared the 
room, (laughs), in New Zealand, tangihanga happened, whatever gathering 
they just happen, we take it for granted here, we have to find somebody oh, 
who does that, oh the kohmatua one elder.’ (Female, 50-54, Youth Support 
Worker, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
5.3.2 Political and cultural ties to New Zealand 
Political engagement with the origin country occurs at varying degrees, ranging from political 
party membership to occasional participation in rallies or meetings (Østergaard-Nielsen, 
2003). The degree to which a migrant maintains political ties can be influenced by the time 
spent in the destination country and/or politics and policies in the destination or origin 
country. For New Zealanders who live abroad, they can vote in the New Zealand general 
election provided they have visited New Zealand within the last three years, if they have not 
visited within this time frame, they lose their voting rights (Electoral Commission New 
Zealand, n.d.). In New Zealand, individuals are required to be on the electoral roll but do not 
have to vote in the election. The 2017 general election had a voter turnout of 79.0 per cent 
with 61,524 votes were cast by New Zealanders living overseas (Electoral Commission New 
Zealand, 2017). Amongst survey respondents, 21.1 per cent voted in the 2017 general 
election. A minor proportion (2.3 per cent) of respondents had strong political ties to New 
Zealand as they were either a member of a political party/group or had donated money to 




New Zealand, with 2.6 per cent loosely following New Zealand politics online through social 
media and news websites.  
Social media and news websites allowed respondents to find out what was happening in New 
Zealand more broadly, with these sources primarily keeping respondents informed daily, see 
Figure 5.3.  
 
Figure 5.3: Source of news about New Zealand and frequency of consumption. 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, multiple responses selected 
In addition to these sources, interviewees mentioned being kept informed on what was 
happening in New Zealand through conversations with family members. Two interviewees 
who moved to Australia in 2010 had differing levels of engagement with New Zealand news. 
As the first interviewee explained: 
‘I read the paper online, in NZ especially the local paper, the Marlborough 
express, and um yeah read about what's going on and yeah follow what's 
happening with [the] earthquake and things, yeah pretty much up to speed 
with what's happening out there and there's pretty good communication 
with family and things and what’s going on, what's hot and what's not.’ 
(Male, 45-49, Dozer Miner, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
While for the other interviewee, knowing what was happening in New Zealand no longer had 
the same relevance as he continued to establish his life in Australia: 
‘Pretty loosely, to be honest, like I’m a pretty bad excuse for a kiwi, like I don't 
really know really know what's going on with the rugby apart from the 






























link on Outlook for me, so it's kind of there, but I click on The Age more often, 
the Australian newspapers rather than the New Zealand ones to read 
because it's more relevant to me, so whatever comes through as a headline, 
whatever comes through from conversations with mum or friends or 
whatever then yeah, but apart from that, I don't deliberately go looking for 
New Zealand yeah.’ (Male,45-49, Procurement Director, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
For this interviewee, his connection to New Zealand had changed over time as he felt more 
integrated into Australia. Items in his home that said ‘made in New Zealand’ no longer had the 
same resonance as they had initially, with items saying ‘made in Australia’ now proving a sense 
of pride. While for some survey respondents, New Zealand made products such as clothing, 
skincare, and art allowed them to express their cultural connections to New Zealand. Figure 
5.4 shows that cultural connections were maintained primarily through social media, sport, 
and the purchasing of New Zealand made food and beverages.  
 
Figure 5.4: Ways respondents maintain cultural ties to New Zealand 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, multiple responses selected. 
Some respondents mentioned attending New Zealand specific cultural events such as 
Waitangi Day3 or Matariki4. Incorporating te reo Māori into conversations or learning te reo 
 
3 Waitangi Day on the 6 February commemorates the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi which was discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
4 Matariki is the Māori New Year which is occurs midwinter when the Matariki cluster of stars rise. It is a time to 
remember the dead and celebrate new life (Meredith, 2006).  
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Māori was another way in which respondents maintained cultural ties. For one respondent, 
they maintained their cultural ties through their everyday practices, which did not change 
upon migration as being Māori was their identity,  
‘Being Māori and having an upbringing of Māori culture, language, our 
traditions etc.... It’s as given… I sing, dance, speak, cook, teach my kids, live 
and breathe, and AM my beautiful culture, so maintaining it isn't hard for 
me.’ (Respondent 774: Female, 40-44, Carer, arrived, 2001, SCV 444) 
One interviewee explained that although at the macro-scale New Zealand and Australia are 
culturally similar, living in Australia heightened his New Zealand identity:  
‘I mean New Zealand and Australia in the grand scheme of things the 
countries are very similar however I find for me the small points of difference 
become magnified, um… so often I guess I try to make the most of those 
small points of difference if that makes sense, so I’m keen to like I don't know 
I’ll always do things like... um it’s just stupid things like small things but, I’ll 
like get a peanut slab at the supermarket or like um, make a point of talking 
to like my friends who follow AFL about rugby sometimes, or you know just 
kind of asserting these things that to me have become… strangely important, 
that I hadn't thought much about before.’ (Male, 30-34, Teaching/research 
associate, arrived 2012, SCV 444) 
5.3.3 Economic ties  
Economic ties to the origin country include the sending of remittances at the micro-scale to 
government schemes that facilitate transnationalism at the macro-scale (Constant & Massey, 
2002; Vertovec, 2004). The literature on economic transnationalism has focused on the 
sending of remittances. As explained earlier in this chapter, those from less developed 
countries will send a family member overseas to increase their earning capacity to support 
their family (Constant & Massey, 2002). In this South-North migration context, the sending of 
remittances is an integral part of an individual’s migration journey and is influenced by cultural 
norms and expectations.  
Interestingly just under one-fifth of survey respondents sent money abroad. Amongst these 
respondents, 96.6 per cent sent money back to New Zealand. Other destinations included the 
Philippines, South Africa, Serbia, Fiji, and the USA. Nearly 60 per cent sent money to family 
members, 28.5 per cent transferred money to their personal bank accounts, and 8.6 per cent 
transferred the money to the New Zealand government to pay off their student loan or pay 
for child support. Just over one-quarter (26.7 per cent) sent money every month, 15.9 per cent 




between AUD$101 and AUD$500, 16.6 per cent sent between AUD$501 and AUD$1000, and 
13.6 per cent sent over AUD$1001. Over half (56.5 per cent) of the of respondents who sent 
over AUD$1001, sent this money to their bank accounts while 70.9 per cent of those who sent 
between AUD$101 and AUD$500 sent it to family members. Respondents who sent money to 
family members primarily did so for special occasions such as birthdays and Christmas, with a 
few respondents sending money on a more regular basis to support their elderly parents by 
paying for services such as Meals on Wheels.  
Interestingly, although 37.7 per cent of respondents still had a bank account in New Zealand, 
only 28.9 per cent indicated they regularly transferred money into it. Just under ten per cent 
(9.8 per cent) of respondents still had a house/property in New Zealand, 5.9 per cent had 
financial investments, and only a very small proportion (0.3 per cent) had a business there. 
Amongst respondents with house/property, 69 per cent had moved between 2001 and 2015, 
and 18.5 per cent had moved before 2001.  
In the migration literature, economic opportunities have been well documented as one of the 
key drivers of migration (de Haas et al., 2015; Smith, 2003; Zontini, 2004). These results show 
that for survey respondents, the ability to send remittances is not the main driver of migration, 
even though respondents indicated they moved to Australia for the economic and 
employment opportunities available. A key difference in this context is that the increased 
income earned in Australia is for personal economic gain rather than being able to maximise 
the amount of remittance that can be sent to the origin country. Morrison and Clark’s (2011) 
analysis of internal migration in New Zealand found that those who moved for employment 
did not necessarily increase their income and instead noted that those seeking a larger 
economic return would move to Australia. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the ability of New 
Zealanders to gain employment in Australia is facilitated by the TTTA and the integrated labour 
markets of the two countries, which results in New Zealand migration to Australia resembling 
long-distance internal migration within Australia rather than international migration (Hugo, 
2004b, 2015).  
The internal nature of New Zealand to Australia migration is also reflected in the instances in 
which respondents send money back to New Zealand. Those who sent money back on a 
monthly or fortnightly basis primarily did so into their own bank accounts or to the New 
Zealand government rather than family. Those who sent money to family did so irregularly for 




expectations and would occur regardless of whether respondents were living in New Zealand 
or Australia. The lack of remittances sent by respondents also reflects the fact that New 
Zealand is predominantly a Western country in their familial structure, and so adult children 
are not expected to support their parents financially. This differs from migrants from other 
cultures who are discussed in the remittances literature. For migrants from a patrilineal 
society such as India, sons are expected to support their parents as it is part of being ‘a good 
son’ (Singh et al., 2012). While for migrants from matrilineal societies such as Poland and 
Vietnam, women send money as a way of fulfilling their familial care obligations and to uphold 
norms associated with being a ‘filial daughter’ (Krzyżowski & Mucha, 2014; Yeoh et al., 2013). 
5.4 A possible return to New Zealand 
A migrant’s desire or intention to return to their home country is influenced by a combination 
of socio-cultural, economic, and political factors. The decision to return can be affected by life 
stage such as the birth of children or retirement, where returning home can provide greater 
social support (Cerase, 1974). Alternatively, individuals may be forced to return because of a 
change in circumstances beyond their control, such as family illness or changes to immigration 
policies (Gmelch, 1980). Yet despite intending to return, return migration may not happen 
because of factors keeping them in the destination country and/or negative aspects of life in 
the home country that are still persistent, such as high unemployment or violence.  
One-fifth of respondents indicated they would return to New Zealand, with 41.2 per cent 
unsure and 38.7 per cent saying they would not return. From the thirteen factors displayed in 
Table 5.4, respondents were asked to rank the top three factors that would influence their 
decision to return to New Zealand. A desire to be closer to friends and family was given as the 
top two reasons for wanting to return to New Zealand. Amongst respondents who provided 
this as their first factor (35.7 per cent), a desire to retire in New Zealand (24.9 per cent) and 
the New Zealand environment (24.5 per cent) were given as factors two and three. Whereas 
respondents who ranked friends and family second (25.7 per cent), said the lack of access to 
government services in Australia would be the main reason for returning (29.8 per cent), with 













To be closer to friends and family 35.7 17.4 11.9 
Lack of access to government services in 
Australia 14.5 14.5 12.7 
Employment 12.6 7.7 5 
Desire to retire in New Zealand 10.4 16.8 14.7 
Wanting to bring children up in New Zealand 5.2 6.1 4.3 
Dislike way of life in Australia 4 2.7 3.3 
New Zealand environment 4 11.4 19.2 
Spouse/partner 3.9 4.3 3.4 
Home sickness 3.4 6.3 6.7 
Cost of living in Australia 2.2 3.7 5.9 
New Zealand superannuation 2 3.5 3.8 
Education 1.1 1.9 3.4 
Healthcare system 0.9 3.7 5.7 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, Rank 1 n1=1477, Rank 2 n2=1390, Rank 3 
n3=1327 
Respondents were also asked whether the introduction of the 189 visa or the potential 
changing of the citizenship requirements which were occurring at the time of the survey would 
influence their decision to return to New Zealand. One third (32.5 per cent) indicated it had 
no impact at all, just under one-fifth (18.6 per cent) said ‘very little,’ 22.5 per cent indicated 
‘somewhat,’ 6.9 per cent ‘to a great extent’ with the rest indicating it did not apply to them. 
Just under half of those who had selected ‘not applicable’ had already become an Australian 
citizen.  
Respondents were asked to elaborate on why they would or would not return to New Zealand. 
Reasons given fell into three categories: factors that kept them in Australia and the positive 
and negative aspects of life in New Zealand. The familial and social ties respondents had built 
in Australia were the primary reason for not wanting to return to New Zealand. Because of 
these relationships and respondents establishing their lives in Australia, Australia was now 
viewed and thought of as home:  
‘My children both live here. I have friends here. I own a unit here. I would 
only return to NZ if I became unemployed, and my savings ran out & my 





‘This is my home. My partner is Australian; we have a dog together and 
intend to buy a home here.’ (Respondent 281: Female, 35-39, Operations 
Administrator, arrived 2004, SCV 444)  
The economic and employment opportunities available were other reasons why respondents 
wanted to stay as they provided respondents with the ability to have the lifestyle they wanted, 
such as being able to buy a house or go on holiday. For some respondents, the economic 
opportunities in Australia had provided them with the ability to start their own business and 
hence would not return to New Zealand in the foreseeable future. Together these social, 
economic, and cultural factors contributed to why respondents wanted to stay in Australia 
and why they said they loved living here.  
Respondents indicated they would return to New Zealand if there were a change in 
circumstances that prevented them from living in Australia. Frequently mentioned was the 
Australian government’s treatment of New Zealanders and the difficulty of obtaining 
permanent residency and citizenship, leaving many questioning what impact future policy 
changes would have:  
‘I enjoy living in Australia. I hope it will be my home for the rest of my life. 
But anything could change, especially if the new path to citizenship was 
suddenly rescinded before I could apply.’ (Respondent 183: Female, 40-44, 
Executive Assistant, arrived 2011, SCV 444) 
For SCV 444 holders, being ineligible for government services meant if they lost their job or 
were injured, they could not support themselves in Australia and would have to consider 
returning: 
‘We would be forced to return if we fell on hardship or if any of our family 
became disabled.’ (Respondent 1916: Female, 35-39, unemployed, arrived 2017, 
SCV 444) 
Other respondents mentioned that if there was a severe change in their health, they would 
return:  
‘If it became impossible for us to live here, then we would return to NZ. But 
as I have found when I was UNABLE to legally leave Australia (Hague 
Convention), I am capable to make it work here. If my health deteriorated 
suddenly, I would have to go back to NZ.’ (Respondent 519: Female, 30-34, 




Even though the majority of respondents would return because of family in New Zealand, 
many mentioned they would only return if there was a serious change in health conditions, as 
one respondent explained:  
‘We have built our life here in Perth. The only reason we would consider 
moving back to NZ is if our parents are very ill.’ (Respondent 1503: Female, 40-
44, unemployed, arrived 1980, PSCV) 
Having family in New Zealand contributed to respondents viewing New Zealand as ‘home.’ 
Life events such as the birth of children increased respondents desire to be closer to family 
while also wanting to recreate the upbringing they had:  
‘Although I do want to travel more after finishing my study ultimately, I feel 
NZ is my home, and it's such a beautiful place. My family lives there, and if I 
have children in the future, I would love to bring them up in NZ.’ (Respondent 
22: Female, 20-24, Student, arrived 2018, SCV 444) 
For other respondents, this emotional connection to New Zealand was why they wanted to 
retire there or be their final resting place.  
The limited employment opportunities, low wages, high cost of living, and property were 
some of the main reasons preventing respondents from returning to New Zealand. The low 
wages and high cost of living meant respondents would struggle, as moving back would result 
in a significant pay cut:  
‘Life in NZ is too hard financially. I absolutely love it there, but I have honestly 
only ever felt prosperous living outside of New Zealand. The wages and 
conditions are terrible, plus the cost of food, utilities, and petrol is insane. 
Medicare is so much better than anything I experienced in NZ. Everything is 
easier in Australia once you are established. I miss the landscape and 
NZ/Māori culture, but I doubt I would ever seriously consider returning to 
live.’ (Respondent 835: Female, 45-49, Senior Community Engagement Officer, 
arrived 2002, Australian citizen) 
The disparity in wages between the two countries made one interviewee feel like an economic 
refugee: 
‘Although we enjoy living here, we enjoy the lifestyle, we enjoy the climate, 
we enjoy the people, we enjoy going to the bush and things like that, we 
actually miss NZ, there are certain things we miss, but we're economic 
refugees, we can't afford to move back to New Zealand, so you know, a 
house like this here, probably [AUD$]850,000, what's [AUD$]850,000 going 
to buy you in Auckland…and my wife's a nurse so she'd half her salary, 
wouldn't be half now but ah, she would lose about 30% of her salary now 




so there are certain things here, so in a way, we're kind of stuck.’ (Male, 50-
54, Business Development Manager, arrived 2006, Australian citizen) 
Because of the low wages and high cost of living, during return trips back to New Zealand, 
respondents were shocked at the prevalence of homelessness and poverty in cities such as 
Auckland and in rural New Zealand. Seeing this made respondents appreciate the 
opportunities they had in Australia to improve their economic situation and lifestyle, as this 
female interviewee explained:  
‘You see a lot of ice [methamphetamine] use, and how bad it's become and 
a lot of poverty a lot of homelessness and when I was in Hamilton, I drove to 
Napier then I drove back to Tolaga Bay, Gisborne, around that area so I could 
see a lot of homelessness, I could see a lot of poverty I could see, I’m no snob, 
don't get me wrong but it was freezing, and people were generally doing it 
tough there, and yeah I couldn't see myself living there and for once in my 
life, well for the first time in 14 years I thought you know what Australia is 
my home now.’ (Female, 40-44, Business Manager, arrived 2004, 189 visa) 
For her, the increased income in Australia provided her with the opportunity to regularly travel 
back and to help her daughters financially who were living in New Zealand, something she 
would not have been able to do in New Zealand. However, she was one of the few 
interviewees who mentioned financially supporting family members back in New Zealand. 
Another female interviewee said how family members in New Zealand had the perception 
that because she was living in Australia, she was financially well off. But for her, returning to 
New Zealand was a high financial cost and involved a lot of planning to get cheap flights: 
‘We have to pick and choose when and what funerals we go back to, huge 
occasions and if we go back it's going to be for more than blimming 3 
days….that can cost for all of us probably [AUD]$2000, to go back to NZ, 
that's just the flights…I couldn't believe it, I went home, and I had [NZD]$40, 
and I bought two boxes of booze, and shared them around, and everyone’s 
just going wow wow, geeh your rich aunty, aren't you aunty, I said no I’m 
not, I had to save 3x as much money to come home and enjoy this time here.’ 
(Female, 50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2012, SCV 444) 
Other reasons mentioned by respondents as to why they would not return included the 
practical aspects associated with moving countries, the low pension in New Zealand, 





This chapter discussed respondents’ motivations for moving to Australia, how they maintain 
ties to New Zealand, and their return migration intentions. The first section found that like 
other international migrants, the economic opportunities available in Australia were the main 
drivers of migration. Many respondents also moved because they wanted a change of lifestyle, 
to join family or were escaping societal issues in New Zealand. Section two found respondents 
had strong familial and cultural ties to New Zealand, with respondents calling or emailing 
every week and one quarter travelling back every year. Social media allowed respondents to 
keep in touch with family and friends and to find out what was happening in New Zealand. 
Two-thirds of respondents had no political ties and only one-fifth of respondents had 
economic ties to New Zealand. The last section discussed respondents’ return intentions and 
found that family kept them in Australia and would also be why they returned to New Zealand. 
Yet societal issues in New Zealand such as low wages, lack of employment, and high cost of 
living prevented them from returning. 
The findings in this chapter demonstrate how, although respondents’ migration to Australia is 
transnational at the macro-scale, at the micro-scale, it is more reflective of long-distance 
internal migration. This is because, unlike other migrants who move to Australia with specific 
visa conditions, the open nature of the TTTA facilitates family and circular migration. While 
New Zealanders, like other migrants, are motivated to migrate because of the economic 
prospects in the destination country, a key difference is how that economic gain is utilised. 
For New Zealanders, the lack of remittances sent indicates that the increased income allows 
individuals to improve their own and/or family’s economic position in Australia. Whereas for 
other migrants, the income generated through migration is used to improve the lives of those 
in the origin country. However, while these differences exist, it is important to recognise the 
interplay between how visa conditions and cultural and familial norms influence and shape 
migrants’ economic practices transnationally.  
This chapter also found that the social and economic disparities between Australia and New 
Zealand contributed to why respondents moved and why they would not return. Respondents 
discussed how the low wages, limited employment opportunities, and high cost of living 
contributed to their decision to move to Australia. In particular, those from outside the major 




and gangs. These were the same reasons given by respondents for why they would not return. 
Return visits home reminded respondents of what life was like in New Zealand and the 
struggle faced to get ahead. In addition, the wage disparity meant returning would not be 
economically feasible. Yet, many would have to consider returning if they could not secure 




CHAPTER 6: LIFE IN AUSTRALIA: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
INTEGRATION  
6.1 Introduction 
A migrant’s transnational practices can affect their integration into the destination country. 
This chapter details the economic, community, social, and overall integration of respondents 
into Australia. Political integration will be discussed in the following chapter. Each of these 
dimensions of integration is influenced and shaped by different actors at the micro-, meso- 
and macro-scales. The integration of migrants into the destination country has commonly 
been examined by looking at their structural and socio-cultural integration (J. Bell, 2016; Erdal 
& Oeppen, 2013). Structural indicators include their education level and labour market 
position in relation to the host society, access to employment opportunities and their ability 
to get citizenship (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; Snel et al., 2006). Whereas socio-cultural indicators 
relate to engagement with the host society, adoption of cultural practices, sense of belonging, 
and the building of social networks (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; Snel et al., 2006). Using data from 
the New Zealanders living in Australia survey and the semi-structured interviews, this chapter 
begins by detailing their economic integration, focussing on occupation and workplace 
integration. Following this, respondents’ housing status and their situation will be examined. 
Section three discusses respondents’ experiences making friends in Australia with section 
four, highlighting the impact cultural stereotypes have had on integration. The last section 
looks at how respondents viewed their overall experience of living in Australia.  
The findings presented in this chapter show that each dimension of integration is highly 
interlinked and affected by the structures in place in the destination country. While 
respondents generally felt they had integrated into Australia, this was primarily at the micro- 
and meso-scales as the government’s stance on immigrants and treatment of New Zealanders 
left them feeling unsettled and disenfranchised. Structural barriers such as the casualisation 
of employment affected their experience of their workplace, the formation of social networks, 
their ability to rent a house, and what visa options were available to them. The lived 
experiences of respondents also highlight how even though an individual may meet all the 
‘markers’ of integration-employment, strong social network, home-ownership, and obtained 




linear process and is continually evolving in response to the dimensions and scales of 
integration and transnational practices.  
6.2 Economic integration  
In Australia, participation and success in the labour market are tied to the national psyche of 
a ‘fair go.’ A ‘fair go’ is the notion that an individual’s effort and hard work are more important 
than status and family background (Côté et al., 2019). For migrants, having a ‘fair go’ means 
having the same employment opportunities as the domestic-born population, their overseas 
qualifications and employment experience recognised, and not being discriminated against 
based on their race, ethnicity, or religion (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). Structural indicators of 
employment status, education, and occupational class are commonly used to assess the 
economic integration of migrants into the destination country (Becker, 2019). However, it has 
been acknowledged that even though skilled-migrants are granted entry based on their 
occupational skills, language ability, and education, there are still employment disparities 
between the overseas-born and Australian-born population (Colic-Peisker, 2011; Hawthorne, 
1997). Employment is crucial for migrants as it provides them with an income that dictates the 
type of accommodation they live in and the lifestyle they can have (OECD & European Union, 
2018). While the workplace allows them to interact with others, practice the dominant 
language, and learn more about the host society (OECD & European Union, 2018). 
This section uses occupation and employment experiences to examine the economic 
integration of New Zealand migrants. The occupation of New Zealanders is discussed because 
under the TTTA they are not required to have an occupation on the SOL nor need to complete 
regional work to extend their visa. Migrants who enter through the skilled permanent and 
temporary streams are considered highly skilled as the occupations on the SOL typically have 
an occupational skill level of one. Requiring a relevant tertiary qualification and at least five 
years’ work experience. Among Temporary Work (skilled) visa holders and permanent skilled 
visa holders, 10.4 per cent and 9.5 per cent respectively are employed as Business, Human 
Resource and Marketing Professionals. This broad category includes Accountants, 
Management Consultants and Marketing Specialists, occupations that are on the SOL. 
Whereas, WHMs whose time in Australia is a mix of work and travel are often employed in 
low-skilled jobs, even if they have a tertiary qualification. The requirement of three- or six-




per cent), Factory Process Workers (12.6 per cent), and Farm Forestry and Garden Workers 
(11.4 per cent). This polarisation between the occupations and skill levels of different visa 
holders indicates how the Australian government utilises migrants to fill occupational 
shortages in urban, regional, and rural Australia.  
6.2.1 Occupation and employment experiences 
Section 5.2 found that employment opportunities and higher income were why many of the 
survey respondents moved to Australia. Given the importance of the employment 
opportunities available in Australia, this section discusses the respondent’s employment 
experiences. Income was cited as one of the main motivating factors for moving to Australia. 
The median income amongst respondents was AUD$1,216 per week (AUD$63,264 per year), 
which was higher than the New Zealand-born census population, which had a median income 
of AUD$840 (ABS, 2016). Just under two-thirds (64.3 per cent) of respondents indicated that 
their current income was higher than the income they had received in New Zealand. Similar 
percentages said their income was comparable (9 per cent) or less (8.4 per cent) than what 
they received in New Zealand. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present a comparison of the income received 
in Australia versus New Zealand for female and male respondents in the top five occupations 
for each gender. Respondents across all occupations predominantly indicated that they 
currently earned a higher income in Australia, with 80.5 per cent of Midwifery and Nursing 
Professionals, indicating they made more than they did in New Zealand.  
Table 6.1: Comparison of income received in Australia versus New Zealand for female 
respondents in the top five occupations, at ANZSCO 3-digit occupational level 
How does your 
current income 
compare to the 
income you received 




























More 72.5 64.7 80.5 75.4 65.2 72.6 
Comparable 13.7 11.8 7.8 7.7 13.0 10.5 
Less 5.9 2.9 5.2 9.2 10.1 7.1 
Prefer not to answer  5.9   2.9 1.4 
Not applicable 7.8 14.7 6.5 7.7 8.7 8.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 





Table 6.2: Comparison of income received in Australia versus New Zealand for male 
respondents in the top five occupations, at ANZSCO 3-digit occupational level 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=150 
Respondents had a range of educational backgrounds with secondary school year 10 or above 
being the highest level of education achieved by 19.9 per cent of respondents followed by 
certificate III and IV level (18.4 per cent), as apparent in Table 6.3. Professionals, Managers, 
and Clerical and Administration workers were the primary occupations, with Health Care and 
Social Assistance, the top industry of employment amongst all respondents. Amongst 
Professionals, for one-third (34.9 per cent) their highest qualification was a postgraduate 
degree with 31.7 per cent holding a bachelor’s degree. Whereas only a small percentage (3.5 
per cent) of Clerical and Administration workers held a postgraduate degree, with the majority 
(27.9 per cent) having achieved secondary education at year 10 or higher. Based on the highest 
level of educational attainment, respondents can be classified as middling migrants given the 
proportion of respondents who have a bachelors degree or below. This is also reflected in the 
top ten occupations for female and male respondents, presented in Table 6.4 and 6.5, where 
these occupations reflect the spectrum of ANZSCO occupation skill levels and associated 
educational levels.   
How does your 
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compare to the 
income you 


























More 63.3 72.5 72.2 75.0 61.9 69.3 
Comparable 10.0 13.7 13.9 8.3 9.5 12.0 
Less 13.3 5.9 8.3  4.8 7.3 
Prefer not to 
answer 
- - 2.8 8.3 - 1.3 
Not applicable 13.3 7.8 2.8 8.3 23.8 10.0 




Table 6.3: Occupation, industry of employment and education of respondents 
  Male  Female  Total  
Occupation, ANZSCO 
major group code (%) 
1 Managers 20.70 14.5 16.3 
2 Professionals 29.3 33.9 32.6 
3 Technicians and Trade Workers 14.60 3.6 6.7 
4 Community and Personal Service 7.6 12.8 11.4 
5 Clerical and Administration 4.0 18.9 14.7 
6 Sales Worker 3.8 5.8 5.3 
7 Machinery Operators and Drivers 10.1 1.7 4.0 
8 Labourers 6.6 5.4 5.7 
Other nfd* and Self-employed 3.3 3.4 3.4 
Top five industries of 
employment (%) 
Health Care and Social Assistance 6.9 24.8 19.7 
Education and Training 8.1 13.2 11.7 
Retail Trade 3.4 7.7 6.5 
Professional, Scientific and Technical 
Services 
7.4 5.9 6.3 
Construction 12.3 3.0 5.6 
Highest level of 
education (%) 
Postgraduate Degree Level 16.5 15.9 15.2 
Graduate Diploma and Graduate Certificate 
Level 
6.0 7.5 7.2 
Bachelor Degree Level 16.1 18.6 17.4 
Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level 14.9 15.0 14.8 
Certificate III & IV Level 19.0 17.3 18.4 
Secondary Education - Years 10 and above 20.2 19.3 19.9 
Certificate I & II Level 2.1 2.4 2.2 
Secondary Education - Years 9 and below 5.3 4.1 4.9 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, Occupation n1 male=396, n1 female=1028, n1 total=1425, 
Education n2 male=436, n2 female= 1159, n2 total=1597 
*nfd=not further defined 
While Table 6.3 summarises of the occupations held by respondents, Tables 6.4 and 6.5 display 
the top ten occupations for female and male respondents at the ANZSCO 3-digit level 
compared to the 2016 Australian census. Table 6.4 shows there was an overrepresentation of 
Midwifery and Nursing Professionals and an underrepresentation of Sales Assistants and 
Salespersons when comparing the female survey population to the census data. The 
underrepresentation of Sales Assistants and Salespersons may be related to the age of the 
survey respondents, who were primarily aged between 40 and 54. From the census data, only 
4.8 per cent of 40-44-year-olds were employed as Sales Assistants and Salespersons compared 
to 14.1 per cent of 20-24-year-olds (ABS, 2016). The top occupations amongst the census 
population also included Personal Carers and Assistants (4.7 per cent), Account Clerks and 




Table 6.4: Top ten occupations for female respondents compared to female New Zealand-
born population Australian census 2016, at ANZSCO 3-digit occupational level 
ANZSCO minor group code Survey (%) Census (%) 
254 Midwifery and Nursing Professionals 7.6 4.5 
531 General Clerks 6.4 3.6 
411 Health and Welfare Support Workers 5.1 1.9 
132 Business Administration Managers 3.7 1.5 
225 Sales, Marketing and Public Relations Professionals 3.6 1.4 
621 Sales Assistants and Salespersons 3.3 6.9 
272 Social and Welfare Professionals 2.6 1.3 
134 Education, Health and Welfare Services Manager 2.5 0.8 
224 Information and Organisation Professionals 2.5 1.1 
811 Cleaners and Laundry Workers 2.5 3.8 
Source: ABS (2016); New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=952 
Table 6.5 shows that male respondents were primarily employed as Managers, in particular, 
Construction, Distribution and Production Managers (4.8 per cent), Chief Executives, General 
Managers and Legislators (3.6 per cent), and Business Administration Managers (3.4 per cent). 
The overrepresentation of respondents in these roles compared to the census data meant 
there was an underrepresentation of respondents in occupations such as Storepersons, Sales 
Assistants and Salespersons, and Stationary Plant Operators. In the 2016 census, 3.1 per cent, 
3.0 per cent and 2.9 per cent were employed in these occupations respectively, while among 
survey respondents 0.7 per cent were employed as Storepersons, 1.6 per cent as Sales 
Assistants and Salespersons, and 1.3 per cent as Stationary Plant Operators (ABS, 2016). Again, 
given that 29.1 per cent male survey respondents were aged 40-49, and only 8.0 per cent were 
aged 20-29, it would explain the number of respondents in management positions.   
Table 6.5: Top ten occupations for male respondents compared to male New Zealand-born 
population Australian census 2016, at ANZSCO 3-digit occupational level 
ANZSCO minor group code Survey (%) Census (%) 
133 Construction, Distribution and Production Managers 4.8 3.7 
821 Construction and Mining Labourers 4.3 5.2 
111 Chief Executives, General Managers and Legislators 3.6 1.5 
132 Business Administration Managers 3.4 1.0 
733 Truck Drivers 2.7 4.5 
261 Business and Systems Analysts, and Programmers 2.5 1.1 
411 Health and Welfare Support Workers 2.5 0.6 
225 Sales, Marketing and Public Relations Professionals 2.3 1.2 
331 Bricklayers, and Carpenters and Joiners 2.0 2.3 
341 Electricians 2.0 1.4 





Coding respondents’ occupations to this level provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
occupations held and filled by respondents as many of the occupations, held by respondents 
are not on the SOL. These include General Clerks, Sales Assistants and Salespersons, Cleaners 
and Laundry Workers, Sales, Marketing and Public Professionals, Health and Welfare Support 
Workers, Truck Drivers, Construction and Mining Labourers, and Chief Executives, General 
Managers and Legislators. Bricklayers, Electricians and Midwifery and Nursing Professionals 
are included on the SOL, meaning respondents can, in theory, apply for permanent residency 
through the skilled points-tested stream or with employer sponsorship. Whereas for 
respondents who do not have an occupation on the SOL, the only permanent visa pathway 
available to them is the 189 visa, which is based on income.  
Table 6.6 provides insight into respondents’ current employment status, how long it took for 
them to gain employment, the number of jobs held, and length of employment with their 
current employer. For nearly three-quarters of respondents, they either had a job offer before 
moving or were employed within the first month of living in Australia. Respondents who 
indicated ‘other’ for how long it took them to gain employment had often moved to Australia 
while still at secondary school, so they had not entered the labour force. While for some 
female respondents, moving to Australia allowed them to initially stay home and look after 
their children. Respondents who were not in the labour force included retirees, women caring 
for young children, or who were the primary carer of family members who had a disability or 
illness. Other respondents in this group were not working because they had been injured or 
were ill.  
The employment status of respondents is an important indicator of the employment rights 
they have access to. Respondents were predominantly employed permanently, with 17.3 per 
cent employed on a contract basis. Those on a contract are employed for a fixed-term 
generally on a full-time or part-time basis and have the same leave and sick leave entitlements 
as permanent employees. Whereas those on a casual contract, 7.6 per cent of respondents, 
are not entitled to paid annual or sick leave and often do not know in advance how many 
hours they will work each week. Hence, for those employed on a casual or contract basis, 
there is no guarantee of what their income will be yearly, which can have implications for their 





Table 6.6: Current employment status and employment experiences of respondents 
 




Self-employed/business owner 10.0 7.9 8.5 
Employed, working full-time 65.4 50.4 54.5 
Employed, working part-time 5.0 17.4 14.0 
Employed, casual 6.4 8.1 7.6 
Unemployed, looking for full-
time work 
3.0 1.8 2.1 
Unemployed, looking for part-
time work 
0.9 2.1 1.8 
Not in the labour force 9.3 12.3 11.5 
How long did it take 
you to get 
employment in 
Australia? (%) 
Job offer before moving 32.8 20.4 23.9 
Less than a month 39.6 41.7 41.2 
Longer than a month 19.7 27.0 24.9 
Still looking 0.0 1.3 0.9 
Other 7.8 9.6 9.1 
How many jobs have 
you had while living 
in Australia? (%) 
1 20.0 17.9 18.5 
2 20.3 21.2 20.9 
3 16.3 20.0 19.1 
4 12.9 12.3 12.4 
5 8.9 10.4 10.0 
6+ 21.5 18.2 19.1 
How long have you 
been in your current 
job? (%) 
Less than 6 months 10.1 9.5 9.7 
6-12 months 11.4 11.2 11.3 
1-5 years 40.5 43.3 42.5 
6-10 years 20.5 20.8 20.7 
10 years + 17.4 15.1 15.8 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018. Employment status n1 male=439, n1 female= 1165, n1 
total=1606; Time taken to gain employment n2 male= 414, n2 female= 1068, n2 total=1484; Number jobs n3 
male= 418, n3 female= 1089, n3 total=1509; Length in current job n4 male=398, n4 female=1009, n4 total=1409 
While Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 provide an overview of the occupation, education, employment 
status, and length of employment of respondents, the rest of this section discusses 
respondents’ experiences of gaining employment. Even though one-fifth of respondents had 
a job offer before moving to Australia and 40 per cent were employed within a month of 
moving, respondents discussed how employers did not always recognise prior work 
experience, qualifications, and referees. This made gaining employment in Australia harder 
than they had expected, as they had thought the strong economic ties, cultural similarities, 
and shared language would make finding a job in Australia easy. Respondents found that even 
though they had New Zealand work experience, they were overlooked by employers because 
they did not have ‘Australian’ work experience. One respondent even mentioned how an 




For this respondent, the privileging of their British work experience over their New Zealand 
experience suggests that for employers, there is a hierarchy in relation to the colonial ties that 
exist between Australia and Britain, and Australia and New Zealand, and the value they place 
on the education and work experience gained in each of these countries (Carangio et al., 
2020).  
In combination with the lack of ‘Australian’ work experience, respondents mentioned having 
non-Australian referees as a barrier to gaining employment. The absence of an Australian 
social network and work connections meant gaining employment took longer than expected. 
For these respondents, the connections they had helped them gain employment:  
‘I only gained employment because of connections. Not because of my actual 
individual merits. It makes me feel like my achievements are overlooked.’ 
(Respondent 1869: Male, 25-29, Retail Assistant, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
‘Initially, having no Australian work history. Took 6mths to gain employment 
after I was recommended by a family member at my current workplace.’ 
(Respondent 750: Female, 40-44, Purchasing Administrator, arrived 2013, SCV 444) 
While for other respondents, they utilised the connections they already had in Australia to 
gain employment as they recognised the importance of social networks. As this interviewee 
explained, neither he nor his wife, who was a nurse, had any issues obtaining employment:  
‘We moved over here in 2006, um back then things were going gangbusters, 
and the best example is, I moved over a month before, I was working same 
day; basically, someone heard I was over there gave me a call, can you come 
in, I’ve pretty much been working ever since if I’ve taken time off it's because 
I’ve wanted to, my wife turned up on Friday morning arranged an interview 
at the hospital, she was working the Monday morning, she doubled her 
salary, doubled it, and that was at the lowest pay grade.’ (Male, 50-54, 
Business Development Manager, arrived 2006, Australian citizen) 
For female respondents who had not initially entered the workforce when they moved to 
Australia because of child-caring responsibilities, they struggled to gain employment when 
they re-entered the workforce. A female interviewee who was able to be a stay-at-home mum 
when she moved to Australia due to her husband’s increased salary explained that after her 
marriage broke down, she needed to find employment:  
‘All of my work experience is in NZ, and I haven’t been in paid employment 
since 2000 due to my ex-husband insisting I stay home with our kids. None 
of my references are contactable any longer. My age also works against me, 





The lack of recognition for qualifications obtained in New Zealand was a surprise for many 
respondents. Respondents found they needed to get their New Zealand qualification assessed 
by the relevant accreditation council to work in their chosen field. Yet gaining the 
accreditation was not something they could afford to do, so they had to get a job in a different 
field. Other respondents found employers were biased towards those who had obtained a 
bachelor’s degree, meaning employers overlooked those who had obtained a Diploma or 
Advanced Diploma level education. The lack of recognition of their qualifications became an 
unanticipated cost for this female interviewee and her husband, who moved to Australia to 
be with their grandchildren but wanted to continue working in their chosen fields:  
‘It wasn't until we got here that we realised how much of a difference it was, 
but we came with the mindset that we were going to make things work here, 
and we did… um I had a lot of skills, I guess um, I didn't know what the job 
scene was like it was a real shock when we came here, our New Zealand 
qualifications aren't recognised, it was a bit of a kick in the guts actually… I 
have a diploma in adult teaching, my husband's a qualified nurse in mental 
health, but we weren't allowed to use those um credentials here; we actually 
had to get Australian credentials, so rather than fight the system, we just 
had to suck it up and do it.’ (Female, 50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2012, 
SCV 444) 
Some respondents also mentioned that their visa status and what working rights they had in 
Australia affected their ability to apply for a job and caused confusion for employers. 
Respondents said that when applying for jobs online, the automated nature of the application 
process often omitted New Zealand citizen as an option for residency status. This left the 
respondents confused as to whether they could apply for the job despite having working 
rights. While other respondents found employers were unaware of the SCV 444 and asked for 
evidence of their visa, as this interviewee explained: 
‘Even for me to get that job at [company X] um subclass visa we had to show 
evidence of our visa and of course our visa never gets stamped, our passport 
never gets stamped going through customs so um cuz they're all 
electronically done now days so yeah that was a nightmare…’ (Male, 45-49, 
Dozer Miner, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
Career progression was also constrained, as being a permanent resident or SCV 444 holder 
meant they could not apply for jobs that required Australian citizenship. However, many 
respondents were unable to obtain citizenship because of the permanent residency 




‘Couldn’t work for the govt as a NZer, would have done wonders for Disability 
S[outh]A[ustralia]! So instead [I] started my own business.’ (Respondent 332: 
Female, 35-39, Psychologist, arrived 2011, SCV 444) 
These challenges faced by respondents have also been cited as issues by migrants from other 
countries (ABS, 2020b; Carangio et al., 2020; Colic-Peisker, 2011; Colic-Peisker & Tilbury, 2007; 
Côté et al., 2019). Colic-Peisker and Tilbury (2007) examined the labour market integration of 
four refugee groups in Australia. They found that a lack of Australian work experience and 
Australian referees affected their ability to gain employment. This has also been cited as an 
issue by high-skilled workers as even though they have an in-demand occupation, often 
employers still privilege local work experience (Carangio et al., 2020). The building of social 
networks, therefore, becomes crucial for a migrant’s ability to gain employment, yet English 
language ability can act as a barrier to them doing so (Côté et al., 2019). Hence for 
respondents, their English language ability and for the majority, identifying as ‘white’ New 
Zealand European gives them an advantage because of the ethno-racial prejudices that exist 
in workplaces (Colic-Peisker, 2011). This ethno-racial advantage is also experienced by 
migrants from the UK, Ireland, and South Africa who achieve an income that is higher than 
migrants from other countries and is comparable to the Australian-born population (Colic-
Peisker, 2011). Suggesting that at the meso- and macro-levels migrants who have an ethno-
racial advantage achieve a higher degree of structural integration.  
Even though visa status was mentioned as an issue for some respondents, the TTTA grants 
them indefinite work rights in Australia. This means respondents’ experiences are not entirely 
comparable to migrants who entered Australia on a temporary work visa. Migrants from other 
countries often struggled to gain employment because employers would not hire them 
because of their visa status. Robertson (2014) notes that this leads to underemployment and 
affects their ability to obtain permanent residency if they cannot get work experience in a job 
on the SOL. Yet, even once citizenship is gained, migrants can still face discrimination by 
employers based on their phenotypic appearance (Carangio et al., 2020). 
Through the job application process, respondents became aware of the structural differences 
between New Zealand and Australia. Respondents were surprised by the prevalence of casual 
contracts in Australia, whereas in New Zealand, they were used to being offered a permanent 
contract. A female interviewee who moved in 2012 worked as a youth support worker and 




‘I've had few, I’ve been working in the same sector, youth work, I’ve also 
noticed the jobs over here aren't secure, in New Zealand, you might be 
granted a permanent position, permanent is permanent, there's a lot of 
contract work over here, so we'll give you a job, but we'll give you a three-
month contract see how you go extend three months, oh okay so the position 
doesn't work anymore, we've lost funding, they defund a lot over here, which 
means I have to jump from position to position which is great, but there's no 
security in regards to that.’ (Female, 50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2012, 
SCV 444) 
While she found the lack of job security a worry as there was no guarantee she would find 
another job, she recognised each job allowed her to gain new skills and knowledge. 
Another female interviewee who was 55 found being on a casual contract stressful. As a 
trained primary school teacher, she moved with her then two school-aged daughters in 2006, 
with the belief that it would be easy to secure a full-time job in her profession. She had thought 
relief-teaching would lead to a full-time job, but after five years of only ever being offered 
short-term contracts, she needed a break and got a part-time position in a friend’s shop. 
During this period, she explained:  
‘When I had two girls with me, it caused me a lot of stress because trying to 
pay bills, and knowing sometimes you work every day for three weeks and 
then you wouldn't get any work for two weeks, so you just it was very hard 
juggling that and that did cause me a lot of stress, and there were times back 
then, where I'd say right we're not doing grocery shopping this week, we've 
got tins in the cupboard, and we're just, I’m not saying we were starving or 
poor, but I just felt I’ve got to make this stretch until I get some more work.’ 
(Female, 55-60, Teacher, arrived 2006, SCV 444) 
For the last two years, she had been teaching English to adults on a casual basis but again was 
becoming increasingly aware of the instability of the job as they could just cancel classes if no 
students were booked in. However, while she had employment at this stage, she knew her 
age would impede her ability to gain employment in the future. To mitigate this, she ensured 
all her bills were paid in advance and had saved up enough money to last her a year in the 
event she could not get another job. Especially given she is not entitled to unemployment 
benefits. Like this interviewee, other respondents knew their age had begun to affect their 
ability to change jobs. Respondents expressed that:  
‘I now work in [the] corporate industry and now at middle age that I'm 
feeling opportunities may not be as abundant.’ (Respondent 505: Unknown 




‘Ageism - although I'm always told "a more qualified person won the 
position." (Respondent 2002: Male, 60-64, unemployed, arrived 1989, Australian 
citizen) 
Respondents also found that they were rejected from jobs because they did not have the 
requisite qualifications but had the relevant work experience. However, further study was not 
viewed as a feasible option given the cost to do so, and there being no guarantee of getting a 
job at the end. 
Respondents’ experiences with the ageism and casualisation of labour reflect existing issues 
in the Australian labour market. Gringart et al. (2005) found that amongst employers, there 
was systematic negative stereotyping towards older workers as they perceived older workers 
to be less adaptable, less creative, lacking interest in new technology and to be less healthy 
and less physically strong. This perception has meant that on average, those aged 55 and over 
are unemployed for 130 weeks and are unlikely to find continuous employment before 
retirement age. The inability of older people to find permanent employment is linked to the 
expansion of casual employment in Australia over the last thirty years. Currently, 
approximately 25 per cent of the workforce is employed casually (Gilfillan, 2018). Those on a 
casual contract are not entitled to sick and annual leave and are not guaranteed regular hours 
or future work (Campbell, 1996). Burgess et al. (2008) note that this has implications on 
individuals’ ability to access loans, apply for rental properties, superannuation, and holidays. 
This situation differs from New Zealand, where those on casual contracts after six months are 
entitled to sick, and bereavement leave if they have worked at least 40 hours a month 
(Employment New Zealand, 2020). The example of the primary school teacher above 
highlighted how being on a casual contract adds extra stress for New Zealanders. In particular, 
those on an SCV 444 visa, as they are not entitled to any social security meaning if they lost 
their job or there was a long period of unemployment, they would have to rely on their savings 
to continue living in Australia or consider returning to New Zealand.  
6.2.2 Workplace integration 
For working migrants, most of their day and experiences in the destination country occur at 
work. Having a positive or negative experience in their place of employment or struggling to 
get work can affect their integration and sense of belonging (Jaskulowski, 2018; van Riemsdijk, 
2014). Overall, survey respondents felt well integrated into their workplace. Feeling 




position within the workplace. Having a positive and welcoming work environment where the 
respondents knew their colleagues and boss valued their work and opinions made 
respondents feel a part of their workplace. One respondent said: 
‘My work is in a close-knit team, working together on a large, complex data 
analysis project, and my contribution is acknowledged and appreciated, both 
by my immediate team and the division and its managers we are nested 
within. I am fortunate to be with a very pleasant, well-managed entity.’ 
(Respondent 257: Male, 55-59, Spatial Data Analyst, arrived 2006, PR)  
Many respondents also spoke of their work colleagues being like family:  
‘The group I work with have been amazing, they have welcomed me with 
open arms and have almost become like a second family to me, I am 
extremely lucky.’ (Respondent 382: Male, 20-24, Station Agent, arrived 2015, SCV 
444) 
Being recognised for their expertise and knowledge in their field contributed to respondents’ 
workplace satisfaction: 
‘I'm a specialist in my team. I earned the double promotion for showing my 
commitment to the business through exceptional performance. Being a lead 
means my trusted advice is sought from other specialists and team leaders. 
I'm the go-to and 2IC for my team. Plus, in general, Kiwi's appear to be liked 
(for being different) in the workplaces I've been a part of.’ (Respondent 1818: 
Unknown gender and age, Team Specialist, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
Other respondents had been given training opportunities or, in some instances, had their 
university education paid for by their employer which provided promotion and career growth 
opportunities. Rajendran et al. (2020) discuss how employers are vital for facilitating the 
workplace integration of migrants. Being part of the decision-making process and information 
sharing allows migrants to feel like they belong and enhance their subjective career outcomes 
(Rajendran et al., 2020). 
Numerous respondents were in senior positions within their workplace. Being a manager for 
the company they worked for meant they were often responsible for shaping the workplace 
environment to make it welcoming and inclusive: 
‘Senior manager in a large company. Social club member. Take part in events 
outside work hours.’ (Respondent 2023: Male, 60-64, R&D Director, arrived 2011, 
PR) 
‘My role is a support role to various directors, and I have gained a few awards 




drinks/dinners etc.’ (Respondent 335: Female 25-29, Valuations Administration 
Coordinator, arrived 2011, SCV 444) 
‘I work for a new startup, [a] team of 17 people and a big part of the role is 
working to build culture.’ (Respondent 1880: Female, 35-39, Head of Customer 
Success, arrived 2011, SCV 444) 
Interestingly, while many respondents spoke of becoming friends with work colleagues when 
asked about their experience making friends, few respondents discussed this when asked 
about their integration into their workplace.  
Respondents who felt less integrated into their workplace cited the reasons for this related to 
their employment status and workplace. Being employed on a casual or contract basis meant 
respondents were not fully included in their workplace. As one respondent explained: 
‘Contractors are treated differently to perm staff. Not kept in [the] loop of 
communication and not invited to social events.’ (Respondent 1675: Female 
50-54, Change Analyst, arrived 2014, SCV 444) 
There was also uncertainty for those employed on a casual basis as they did not know how 
long they would have their job for: 
‘I'm employed casually by a university, and I feel a part of my workplace for 
the moment, but I am uncertain whether I will have work next semester and 
my employers won't engage in conversation about my ongoing prospects, 
which makes me feel highly dispensable.’ (Respondent 1878: Male, 30-34, 
Teaching Associate/Research Assistant, arrived 2012, SCV 444)  
While for another respondent: 
‘It is a casual technician role, with no real challenges or room for promotion, 
so there is no real sense of being important in the workplace role.’ 
(Respondent 1418: Male, 40-44, Technician, arrived 2008, SCV 444) 
As discussed in the above section, being employed casually is an issue nationally. The 
uncertainty of hours affects an individual’s ability to become a part of their workplace and to 
be involved in the decision-making process. Casual employees do not receive or have access 
to the same level of work-related training as permanent employees, limiting career 
advancement (Markey & McIvor, 2018). 
Working in an environment with a poor workplace culture affected workplace integration. 
Being employed for a large organisation meant many respondents felt they were just a 
number and therefore treated just like everyone else. For these respondents, it limited their 




respondents found that poor management and Australian workplace culture restricted the 
formation of a positive work environment:  
‘Some resentment from a few staff when I was made ongoing/permanent 
ahead of them and they had been there a few years. I don’t see this as my 
issue, I see it as there [sic] problem.’ (Respondent 793: Female, 40-44, Teacher, 
arrived 2017, SCV 444) 
While another respondent spoke of the bullying they received at work: 
‘It’s a very disloyal industry (cosmedical). Meetings get held about you, in 
front of you. A lot of bullying and threatening tactics from head office. No 
trust or loyalty so I find it difficult to fit in when it’s all fake.’ (Respondent 1856: 
Female, 35-39, Laser Technician, arrived 2009, RRV) 
These workplace experiences are not unique to respondents. In Australia, nearly one-third of 
mental health workers’ compensation claims are because of harassment/bullying, with female 
employees three times more likely to make a claim for harassment/bullying (safe work 
Australia, 2017). Reid et al.’s (2020) comparison of the workplace experiences of Australian-
born and migrants from New Zealand, India, and the Philippines found there was no 
statistically significant difference in the prevalence of bullying by migrant status, with females 
from each group being more likely to report being bullied than males. Similar to the issues 
identified by respondents’, Reid et al. (2020) also found that lack of support from supervisors 
and colleagues was the strongest predictor of workplace bullying.  
Some respondents spoke of how not drinking, having children, or following the AFL5 limited 
their ability to engage with their work colleagues. These differences in interests and/or life 
stage meant respondents struggled to find commonalities with colleagues that were not based 
on work. Discussions of sport, in particular AFL, highlighted cultural differences between 
Australia and New Zealand and how central it is to build friendships with colleagues. As one 
respondent explained: 
‘The workplace tries hard to encourage a collaborative workplace culture 
and environment. It relies heavily on AFL, which I try to get [into] but haven't 
managed to click with it, so I pretend to go along with it [to] get along with 
people.’ (Respondent 62: Female, 30-34, Claims Assessor, arrived 2013, SCV 444) 
 
5Australian rules football is a played exclusively in Australia and is one of the main sports followed, whereas in 




For another respondent, they struggled to fit in simply because they were not Australian. 
Needing to learn about sport, news, or politics was also cited by skilled migrants as important 
for facilitating workplace integration (Rajendran et al., 2017). These topics helped skilled 
migrants socialise with colleagues; however, this often did not translate to socialising outside 
the workplace (Rajendran et al., 2017).  
6.3 Housing status and situation  
Housing status can be an indicator of the economic success and integration of a migrant into 
the destination country (Constant et al., 2009; Vono-de-Vilhena & Bayona-Carrasco, 2012). 
For migrants buying a house is viewed as putting roots down and not wanting to leave the 
destination country (Ryan, 2019; Ryan & Mulholland, 2014b; Steiner, 2019). However, the 
ability of a migrant to purchase a house is influenced by their visa status. Forrest et al. (2014) 
found that unsurprisingly, skilled permanent migrants were more likely to be homeowners 
compared to those on a temporary business visa. This is because permanent migrants are 
more likely to have employment security and plan on living in the destination country for the 
foreseeable future (Constant et al., 2009). The desire to buy a home can also be influenced by 
how homeownership is perceived in the origin and destination countries. In Australia and New 
Zealand, in addition to other countries such as the USA, Japan, and the UK, achieving 
homeownership symbolises an individual’s economic success as they can provide a home for 
their family, which offers security and stability for the future (Dupuis & Thorns, 1998). It is also 
viewed as an important milestone as it symbolises having ‘made it’ as an adult.  
Since living in Australia, just over three-quarters of respondents’ housing status had changed. 
Upon moving to Australia 28.7 per cent of respondents could initially live with friends and/or 
family. Just over half (51.2 per cent) were renting, with 3 per cent initially living in a 
hotel/hostel, and interestingly 8.1 per cent were living in their own home. For one-third of 
respondents, their initial housing situation was as a couple-household with child/ren (34.2 per 
cent), with 10.5 per cent of these respondents with a child/ren under the age of five. One-fifth 
were a couple only household (22.2 per cent), 15.3 per cent were a single-person household, 





Respondents who could initially live with family and/or friends had differing experiences. A 
male interviewee in his thirties lived with friends who were already living in Melbourne before 
he moved:  
Researcher: So, were you able to move in with friends, or did they help you 
get set up here? 
Interviewee: Yeah totally, um two of my good friends were living together in 
a sharehouse in Northcote, so I stayed with them, um I sublet let a room 
when the other housemates went away for three months, and that was like 
a really sort of soft introduction, and then through people I met through 
them I found a house to live in. (Male, 30-34, Teaching/research associate, 
arrived 2012, SCV 444) 
The importance of social networks in facilitating migration and helping individuals adjust to 
living in a new country has been noted by researchers such as Conradson and Latham (2005), 
amongst others. Their research on New Zealanders living in London found that friendship 
groups were crucial in facilitating an individual’s move to London. Friends already there could 
provide somewhere to stay, emotional support, and information about jobs and life in London 
more generally (Conradson & Latham, 2005).  
Whereas for another male interviewee who moved to Australia with his wife and three young 
children, being able to live with his in-laws allowed them to find their feet:  
We actually lived with our in-laws for 4 years, and um because we were 
financially struggling with the recession that occurred in NZ we ran a small 
business out there, and yeah so the in-laws kindly put us up for just shy of 4 
years.’  
He later explained that:  
‘Ahhh, living with the in-laws, it caused, it created its own problems too, um 
we lived on our own and had our own independence and things and living 
under the roof of someone else's rule was challenging and it put a fair strain 
on the marriage I suppose.’ (Male, 45-49, Dozer Miner, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
As this household situation affected his relationship with his wife and children, he decided to 
get a job in the mines. This allowed him to earn more money, which enabled them to afford 
to rent a place of their own before purchasing a house.  
Needing to find somewhere to rent after living with family acted as a reminder that New 
Zealand and Australia were, in fact, different countries. A female interviewee who moved with 




secure employment and evidence of income, it made getting a rental challenging, as she 
explained:  
‘We were lucky enough to have a place to live, but then when we wanted to 
move out, um we couldn't get a house, so it took us two months to get a 
house, so we'd been here two months before we applied, we applied for one 
house, because of the area and the rent we could afford, only on one 
payment we were declined, I just got word that I had a job, they wanted to 
see my pay slip, hadn't started yet, it was only the fact that I talked to a um 
real-estate agent, that listed the property, her husband was kiwi, so she said 
I’ll give you a chance, I said please please, we weren't on our knees when we 
did that, but basically, we were.. they were worried about whether or not we 
able to survive financially and pay the rent, very different lifestyle over here 
in regards to that, even though we had referees from New Zealand, no one 
was going to ring New Zealand they wanted a history here, hmm so that was 
a bit of a put-off.’ (Female, 50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2012, SCV 444) 
The experiences of the male interviewee above and this female interviewee show how 
Australian based family networks are utilised upon migration. This practice is not unique to 
respondents. For example, Ryan et al.’s (2008) research on Polish migrants in London found 
familial networks were used to provide housing while they set themselves up and looked for 
work. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their current housing status and situation at the time of 
the survey. For just over three-quarters of respondents, their housing status and/or situation 
had changed since living in Australia. Over half were now living in their own home, with 7.6 
per cent in the process of purchasing a house. One-third were renting, 1.8 per cent were living 
with family and/or friends, and for 2.1 per cent their housing status had not changed. For the 
majority of respondents, their household situation had changed since living in Australia. Only 
2.5 per cent were currently living in a share house compared to 8.8 per cent when they initially 
moved to Australia. There were more respondents in couple only households (29.2 per cent), 
and the number in a single person household has decreased slightly to 11.9 per cent. Just 
under one-third of households were a couple with children. Amongst all respondents, 8.8 per 
cent had gone from being a couple with child/ren to a couple-only household.  
These changes in housing status and situation provide insight into the life stage of respondents 
and how it has changed since living in Australia. The life stages associated with forming a 
relationship, getting married, having children often result in changes in household status and 




these results indicate respondents’ housing situation and status at two specific points in time 
and do not adequately capture the housing career they have had while in Australia. Turner 
and Hedman (2014, p. 271, emphasis in original) define housing careers as ‘a sequence of 
dwellings where each step is related to prior and potentially also future steps,’ and is 
influenced by a range of socio-economic factors including income and life stage.  
This male interviewee who moved to Melbourne with his wife and two children in 2010, 
explained the elements that needed to be considered when choosing where to live in 
Melbourne after initially living in a company-provided house:  
‘So when I came over [company x] put me in one of their houses, for a couple 
of months to give you time to find your own location and do all that stuff so 
that was um you know not without its stresses…so finding a school, you know 
that was our priority when we had that consultant we visited three or 4 
different primary schools, we chose [primary school A]… In hindsight I 
wouldn't have done it that way, I would have looked at houses and suburbs 
rather than schools, cuz one primary school is pretty much as good as the 
next, but at the time we didn't really think of it that way. The first house we 
rented was in Glen Waverley, and actually looking back now, that was 
stressful trying to find rental accommodation, that was hard and [company 
x] wasn't really helping us with that…we landed a magnificent house, we 
really landed on our feet, and we stayed there for a couple of years, and 
we're still in the same area by that time we got to know the South Eastern 
suburbs a lot better, now own a house in Mount Waverley which we bought 
for the public school, for the zone, so my kids go to a really very good school, 
a high ranking school, which we bought the house for quite deliberately to 
be in that zone.’ (Male, 45-49, Procurement Director, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
Being able to provide a stable home life was important to him because, throughout his 
childhood, he always moved because of his parents’ work. This meant he could never form a 
solid and stable friendship group and so wanted his children to move through primary, high 
school, and university with the same friendship group. The school zoning system also shaped 
what neighbourhood he wanted to purchase a house in, and hence the community he became 
a part of.  
Another male interviewee who moved to Brisbane with his wife in 2006, initially lived with 
friends before renting an apartment which they lived in for six months. Before moving into 
the apartment, they had wanted to purchase a property but required proof of income get a 
mortgage. Because of this restriction, they built a townhouse that they lived in before finding 
out they were having twins. They then purchased a house ‘more suitable for kids’ which was 




‘We've got a good cohort of friends, the kids have, the local primary schools 
just up there it's fantastic, so it's not like we're upset, but you know maybe 
this comes back to being a geographer is a sense of place, and even though 
we've lived in this house for 9 years, and lived here for 11 or 12 years, um, 
I’m not Australian, I’m a New Zealander.’ (Male, 50-54, Business Development 
Manager, arrived 2006, Australian citizen) 
Trying to purchase a house shortly after arriving in Australia demonstrates the structural 
barriers that exist in buying a home in Australia and how for migrants, they are made to delay 
buying a house. This interviewee’s experience also suggests that even though he meets the 
indicators of integration discussed in this chapter and the academic literature - employment, 
the formation of a social network, homeownership, and Australian citizenship - the subjective 
understanding of integration is complex. Identifying as a New Zealander does not show how 
he has integrated into Australia but highlights the importance of his New Zealand identity and 
his connection to New Zealand as the place where he was born and grew up.  
6.4 Social networks  
Social integration refers to a migrant’s ability to form new social networks and/or capital in 
the destination country (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013). Social capital, defined by Bourdieu (1986, p. 
248) is ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition.’ For migrants, these networks are established through ties of kinship and 
friendship that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in the destination 
country (Massey et al., 1993). While social capital may aid integration, de Haas (2010) notes 
that having a large amount of social capital does not indicate a higher degree of social 
integration, as those who are viewed as having less social capital may be highly integrated. 
Various factors shape the ability of a migrant to build their social capital and integrate. These 
include the age of migration, prior migration experiences, the extent of engagement with the 
native population, and the make-up of an individual’s close circle of friends (Fokkema & de 
Haas, 2015). While these migrant characteristics and degree of engagement with the native 
population play a role in social network formation, Ryan and Mulholland (2014a) argue that 
the process of social network formation is based on commonalities that exist between people 
irrespective of where they were born. Work, common business interests, leisure activities, 
shared familial circumstances, or living in the same neighbourhood are all utilised to build 




Chapter 5 found that most respondents had family, friends and/or colleagues already living in 
Australia before they migrated. For many, these relations contributed to their decision to 
move with 45.4 per cent knowing a New Zealander who lived in the same location as 
themselves. Over two-thirds (67.9 per cent) moved with their partner or family and 31.3 per 
cent moved by themselves. Amongst those who moved by themselves, the majority had 
friends already living in Australia, and only 18.2 per cent knew no one living there. The 
previous sections of this chapter have highlighted the importance of these existing social 
networks, as respondents could live with family/friends when they moved or gain 
employment through them. Moving with family or being able to live with family/friends 
provides migrants with a support network helping them to navigate and deal with the 
challenges associated with living in an unfamiliar place and the loneliness and isolation that 
can bring (Ryan et al., 2008; White & Ryan, 2008). Yet even with these existing support 
networks, the stressors associated with moving to a new country can cause the breakdown of 
relationships.  
Figure 6.1 shows that respondents most often socialised with Australians or people from both 
countries.  
 
Figure 6.1: Composition of respondents’ social networks  






























Even though respondents socialised with Australians, they often found it difficult to break into 
existing social networks. These respondents explained that:  
‘It can be hard as a lot of Australians have their circle of friends that they 
grew up with and sometimes don't tend to venture outside that circle.’ 
(Respondent 128: Male, 46-49, Videotape Editor, arrived 2003, SCV 444) 
‘Sydney people are very clicky & tend to just stick in their group of friends 
that they made at school. Luckily most of my friends who are from Sydney I 
had met in London & we all moved back to Sydney together. The majority of 
other friends I have made in Sydney are Australian, but from out of Sydney 
or are English or Kiwis. Sydney people I generally find are quite pretentious 
& not genuine anyway.’ (Respondent 180: Female, 30-34, Senior Skin Therapist, 
arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
Becoming friends with Australians who had moved interstate and/or with migrants from other 
countries was easier, as there was a shared understanding of what it was like to be a foreigner 
in a new city and/or country. Having this commonality allowed respondents to build deeper 
friendships, as many felt their friendships with Australians who had always lived in the same 
city were more surface level. For this respondent, the effort they put into forming friendships 
was not reciprocated by the friends they had made: 
‘Very difficult. We have work colleagues & people we have met on social 
occasions, but we have no close friends. We have invited numerous people 
to our house for dinner or drinks in an attempt to form a closer friendship, 
but it is never reciprocated. The same can be said for our children. Their 
friends spend a lot of time at our house, sometimes staying for days, but our 
children do not get invited for sleepovers & if they go to their friend’s house, 
invariably, it is for a matter of minutes before they end up coming to our 
house. Friendship is probably the thing I miss most since moving to 
Australia.’ (Respondent 2: Female, 55-59, Caregiver, arrived 2002, SCV 444) 
This left respondents’ feeling lonely and isolated as they were could not build a strong social 
network in Australia and lead them to question whether this was because of cultural 
differences between Australia and New Zealand: 
‘They are not kiwis. They don’t drop by, don’t offer a cup of tea, they don’t 
invite us to their homes they meet in parks, coffee shops.’ (Respondent 137: 
Female, 50-54, Teacher, arrived, 2001, SCV 444) 
‘Have some great friendships but have known some people for years and 
never been invited into their house - quite different from what I remember in 




These experiences of making friends are similar to the challenges identified by respondents in 
Ryan and Mulholland’s (2014a) research on French information and communication 
technology professionals living in London. Respondents in their research found it easier to 
make friends with other migrants, as they were more welcoming and had no roots or family 
in London. They also found that respondents expected to be invited to someone’s house for 
dinner as they viewed this as a sign of friendship rather than socialising at the pub after work, 
despite this being an important aspect of British workplace culture.  
As respondents were of working age when they moved to Australia, the workplace becomes 
an important place for friendship formation. Many of the respondents found forming 
friendships at work easy and viewed it as a positive experience. While for others, their 
employment status as a casual or shift worker made becoming friends with colleagues 
challenging as they did not have regular work hours. As this respondent explained: 
‘Tough. Have lived here for 6 years and have made one good friend. Have 
met others through jobs but only seemed to talk to them when I was working 
with them. Don’t hear much from them now.’ (Respondent 673: Female 25-29, 
Guest Services Agent, arrived 2012, SCV 444) 
Respondents’ position within their workplace and age was also a hindrance:  
‘It has been hard in Melbourne as my kids are older and not at school, and 
my role at work is as a Manager which limits social group. As an older person 
(45-50 years), I have found that this age group is already very settled and 
less open to new people.’ (Respondent 785: Unknown gender and age, arrived 
2004, SCV 444) 
Again, these experiences are like those identified by Ryan and Mulholland (2014a). Rajendran 
et al. (2017) also found that highly skilled migrants in Australia rarely socialised with work 
colleagues and instead needed to form friendships outside the workplace.  
Like the respondents in Ryan and Mulholland (2014a) and Rajendran et al.’s (2017) research, 
respondents in this research mentioned joining a sports team and attending church as a way 
of building friendships based on common interests and beliefs. This respondent discussed the 
importance of sport:  
‘In rural areas like Orange it was hard to make friends outside of work at 
first, but once I included myself into sports groups I was quickly making 




While for some respondents, the birth of children or having primary school-aged children 
allowed them to make friends through parenting groups, school pick up/drop off and/or their 
children’s extracurricular activities:  
‘It wasn't until we had our first child that I made some actual friends and not 
just neighbours or acquaintances.’ (Respondent 418: Male, 40-44, 
Administration, arrived 2011, SCV 444) 
The relationships formed through children, parenting groups, and sports clubs help to embed 
an individual into their local community and can enhance a sense of belonging (Ryan, 2019). 
However, other respondents cited balancing work and childcare left them little time to 
socialise and that some friendships formed were only based on convenience:  
‘More opportunity to make friends when you have kids, but nothing in 
common besides kids.’ (Respondent 1928: Female, 45-49, Transcriptionist, arrived 
1996, PSCV) 
Respondents, like those who have moved interstate or from another country, face challenges 
building their social networks and capital in Australia. Despite these challenges, respondents 
generally felt they had become socially integrated into Australia, as Figure 6.2 shows. Amongst 
those who did not feel integrated, they believed this was because of the racism they 
experienced, the cultural differences between the two countries, their age, and being unable 
to break into existing friendship networks. 
 
Figure 6.2: Whether or not respondents felt they had socially integrated 









A great deal A moderate
amount













While under ten per cent of respondents actively socialised with New Zealanders (see Figure 
6.1), 40.3 per cent were a member of a New Zealand migrant group or organisation in 
Australia. This engagement was primarily through online groups or pages on Facebook. 
Respondents mainly followed pages aimed at New Zealanders living in Australia in addition to 
pages and groups set up for New Zealanders living in a specific area. For example, many said 
they followed pages such as Kiwis in Australia and Iwi in Aus, which shares relevant news 
stories from Australia and New Zealand. Others had joined closed Facebook groups, such as 
Kiwis in Melbourne, Kiwis in the GC (Gold Coast), and Western Sydney Kiwis, which provides a 
platform to connect with New Zealanders living in that area, allowing them to ask questions, 
search for housemates or ask for help when needed. In addition to these general and specific 
pages and groups, respondents also followed OZ Kiwi, which is the main advocacy group for 
New Zealanders living in Australia. Oz Kiwi shares relevant news articles, provides information 
about the pathways to permanent residency and citizenship available, and campaigns for the 
rights of New Zealanders. Other respondents followed professional organisations such as KEA, 
which connects ex-patriate New Zealanders across the globe and provides networking and 
business opportunities. Some respondents were a part of local community groups that 
included kapa haka6 and te reo Māori language groups. Others were involved with The Koha 
Shed, a charity that assists those in need through the donation of food, money, and goods. 
6.5 Racism  
The majority of respondents had experienced racism and discrimination since living in 
Australia (Figure 6.3). In this context, racism is based on ‘new’ rather than ‘old’ racism. Old 
racism refers to discrimination based on the sociobiological understanding of race, while new 
racism is the intolerance of specific cultural groups shaped by historical constructions of 
national identity (Dunn et al., 2004). In Australia, national identity and belonging is defined as 
being white, allowing Anglo-Celtic Australians to make judgements about belongs (Dunn et 
al., 2004; Kamp, 2010). However, through this understanding of ‘new’ racism, even those who 
are ‘white’ can experience discrimination based on their accent, cultural practices, and/or 
stereotypes. Amongst respondents who identified as Pākehā/New Zealand European, just 
 
6 Kapa haka is the term for Māori performing arts which involves song, dance and chanting. The most famous 




under half (49 per cent) ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that they had experienced racism and 
discrimination, while for those who identified as Māori it was 55 per cent.  
 
Figure 6.3: Whether respondents had experienced racism and discrimination since living in 
Australia 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1839 
Table 6.7 shows that just under one-quarter of respondents living in the Northern Territory 
‘strongly agreed’ with the statement ‘I have experienced racism and discrimination in 
Australia’ compared to only 2.7 per cent of those living in the Australian Capital Territory. 
Those living in South Australia and Queensland were the most likely to select ‘agree,’ 42 per 
cent and 39.2 per cent, respectively. However, those from South Australia were also most 
likely to indicate they ‘strongly disagreed’ with this statement. Aggregating the ‘strongly 
disagree’ and ‘disagree’ categories into one variable and the ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ into 
another variable, found there was no statistically significant relationship between racism and 
state of residence (𝜒2(14, N=1825)=18.17, p=.199).  
Table 6.7: Experiences of racism and discrimination by state of residence 





















Strongly disagree 15.5 14.6 14.6 24.0 22.2 15.6 19.2 21.6 15.7 
Disagree 15.5 21.4 19.0 14.0 22.2 15.3 19.2 27.0 17.7 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
17.3 16.3 21.3 12.0 22.2 16.0 11.5 10.8 17.5 
Agree 39.2 31.8 32.1 42.0 22.2 36.3 26.9 37.8 35.5 
Strongly agree 12.5 15.8 13.1 8.0 11.1 16.8 23.1 2.7 13.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 





























Table 6.8 displays the results of a cross-tabulation between responses to experiences of 
racism and discrimination and the respondent’s ethnicity. Respondents who identified as 
Pacific Islander or Māori were more likely to have indicated that they ‘strongly agreed’ to have 
experienced racism and discrimination. Just over one-third of Pākehā/New Zealand European 
respondents had either ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagree’ with that statement. A chi-square 
test for independence revealed that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
experiences of racism and ethnicity (𝜒2(16, N=1620)=21.56, p=.158) 
Table 6.8: Experiences of racism and discrimination by primary ethnic identity  
I have experienced racism and 















Strongly disagree 16.4 12.9 7.5 17.9 18.8 15.9 
Disagree 18.7 13.9 25.0 7.1 16.7 17.9 
Neither agree nor disagree 16.0 18.2 12.5 17.9 25.0 16.8 
Agree 36.2 37.3 35.0 42.9 26.0 35.8 
Strongly agree 12.8 17.7 20.0 14.3 13.5 13.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1620 
Respondents working as Labourers were the most likely to indicate they ‘strongly agreed’ to 
have experienced racism and discrimination followed by Community and Personal Service 
Workers, presented in Table 6.9. Roughly one-third of respondents across all occupations 
‘agreed’ that they had experienced racism and discrimination. Amongst respondents who had 
selected ‘agree,’ just under half (48.9 per cent) indicated they felt a part of their workplace ‘a 
great deal’, and 43.6 per cent indicated they felt socially integrated ‘a great deal.’ The 
relationship between experiences of racism and discrimination and occupation was found to 





Table 6.9: Experiences of racism and discrimination by occupation, ANZSCO major group 
code 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1488 
When respondents discussed racism, they frequently mentioned their accent being mocked, 
or jokes being made about sheep shagging or being a ‘dole bludger.’ These experiences 
occurred amongst respondents’ social networks and in their workplace. Respondents found 
comments made by friends tiresome and often led to the ending of friendships:  
‘Can be quite hard as the majority of Australians I have met make fun of my 
Kiwi accent...even after 5 years of knowing me.’ 
The mocking of their accent was an expected part of moving to Australia because of their 
pronunciation of words such as ‘six,’ ‘fish and chips,’ and ‘deck.’ While some respondents 
could brush off comments that were made and ‘give it back’ by making comments about how 
terrible the Wallabies were compared to the All Blacks, for others it affected their social and 
workplace integration and mental health. For a female interviewee who worked in security, 
her work colleagues made her feel like nothing she did was right or if something went wrong, 
she was blamed for it:  
Researcher: Is that something you get a lot of at work, you know people 
telling you to just go home? 
Interviewee: I don't know they just make fun of us kiwis, they um, hmm 
bloody kiwis can't even say words right, they just repeatedly say that can't 
say bear and beer, to me like I don't have a different word for beer like beer 
 
I have experienced racism and discrimination in Australia 












1 Managers (%) 20.1 16.1 16.1 32.1 15.7 100.0 
2 Professionals (%) 14.2 22.0 14.8 35.5 13.4 100.0 
3 Technicians and 
Trade Workers (%) 
16.7 15.7 18.6 40.2 8.8 100.0 
4 Community and 
Personal Service 
Workers (%) 
12.5 18.8 15.9 35.8 17.0 100.0 
5 Clerical and 
Administration 
Workers (%) 
11.9 15.9 23.8 35.7 12.8 100.0 
6 Sales Workers (%) 13.6 25.9 11.1 38.3 11.1 100.0 
7 Machinery Operators 
and Drivers (%) 
13.8 13.8 20.0 38.5 13.8 100.0 
8 Labourers (%) 16.9 6.7 22.5 32.6 21.3 100.0 




and bear same fricking thing, (sighs) it's just relentless the just disrespect 
maybe it's just where I am at the moment, but you know that particular boss 
but it's pretty relentless.’ (Female, 40-49, Security Guard, arrived 2004, SCV 444) 
However, even for those who held Australian citizenship, their accent was a marker of 
difference. When asked to explain what citizenship meant to them, this respondent 
expressed:  
‘Inclusiveness into Australian society. If someone comments on my Kiwi 
accent I can say I am a citizen now.’ (Respondent 203: Female, 55-59, Not in 
labour force, arrived 2003, Australian citizen)  
For some respondents, to limit the racism they experienced, they adjusted their accent so they 
would sound more Australian:  
‘I found it hard to take the constant jabs at my accent, so learnt to change 
that quickly. I also stopped following sports as the competitive banter was a 
bit much.’ (Respondent 346: Female, 40-44, Project Coordinator, arrived 2003, SCV 
444) 
‘It's easy because I'm white, and I was able to quickly adopt an Australian 
accent. You never shed the feeling of being unwanted by the government, 
though.’ (Respondent 1146: Male, 25-29, Not in labour force, arrived 2004, SCV 
444) 
These experiences suggest that even those who are ‘white’ feel they have to assimilate rather 
than integrate into Australia. Having an accent becomes a marker of difference and learning 
to sound Australian allows them to become indistinguishable from ‘white’ Australians.  
6.6 Overall experience 
Respondents’ view of their overall integration into Australia is shaped by how the integration 
of migrants has been conceptualised at the national scale. As discussed in Chapter 2, there 
has been a long history of migration between New Zealand and Australia, contributing to the 
establishment of transnational ties. Since World War II, migration has been used as nation-
building and in more recent decades to fill labour market demands. Under the White Australia 
policy, migrants were granted entry based on their perceived ability to assimilate into 
Australia. Following the abolition of this policy in 1973, multiculturalism was adopted as 
national policy and to help build a national identity. This view acknowledged that migrants 
faced challenges settling into Australia and that they should be able to integrate socially, 




disadvantage or prejudice (Koleth, 2010). However, Forrest and Dunn (2006) note in the 
context of the declining dominance of Anglo-Celtic Australians that there has been increasing 
tension between multiculturalism and the need for migrants to assimilate and adopt 
‘Australian values.’  
While the previous sections of this chapter discussed each dimension of integration 
separately, with political integration to be discussed separately in Chapter 7, it is important to 
recognise that each dimension of integration is interlinked. For example, even though an 
individual participates in the labour market, they may feel disconnected from their work 
colleagues affecting their ability to build their social networks. Integration also occurs at 
varying scales, micro-, meso- and macro-, and at different degrees, as an individual can be well 
integrated at the micro-scale but feel marginalised at the macro-scale.  
Over three-quarters (77.1 per cent) of respondents ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the 
statement, ‘I feel I have integrated into Australia,’ with a small proportion (2.3 per cent) 
‘strongly disagreeing’. Just over half of the respondents felt they belonged in Australia, while 
26.1 per cent felt like a foreigner in Australia. Figure 6.4 shows that even though respondents 
felt integrated into Australia, slightly more respondents viewed New Zealand as ‘home.’ 
 
Figure 6.4 Where respondents called home 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, Australia home n1=1838, New Zealand home 
n2=1836 
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While more respondents viewed New Zealand as home when reflecting on their overall 
experience of living in Australia, respondents spoke of how Australia had become home. The 
home had a range of different meanings. Some respondents discussed how even though they 
missed New Zealand, the opportunities available in Australia for themselves and their children 
helped make Australia home. While for others, Australia had become home over time as they 
reached different life stages, forming a relationship, buying a house, having children, and 
seeing their children settle into life in Australia. The life experiences and opportunities 
available while living in Australia contributed to respondents’ sense of belonging and 
integration. In particular, respondents cited the opportunities available in Australia were why 
they would not return to New Zealand, even if they still had family there (see Sections 5.2 and 
5.4). The employment opportunities, coupled with the lower cost of living, allowed 
respondents to improve their lifestyle, purchase a house, start their own business, and afford 
to travel to Asia. This respondent explained:  
‘After 6 years, our family is very settled. We have a better lifestyle, and for 
the first time in our working lives we get tax back rather then [sic] a tax bill 
as we did in NZ. It’s much easier to eat healthier in Australia as the cost is so 
much cheaper. My sister struggles to feed her family in NZ and is often 
surprised at our food costs here in Australia.’ (Respondent 425: Unknown 
gender and age, Not in labour force, arrived 2012, SCV 444) 
While a male interviewee described how it was the everyday interactions with people that 
facilitated his integration:  
‘You know I feel welcome at work and you know I’m not dreading going to 
work and um I yeah feel as though we have I think we have integrated into 
Aus and um yeah it's nice to go to the local shops, and someone recognises 
you and says g'day and things so that's all part of it, yeah it is a good feeling, 
but you know often when I leave NZ and come back to Aus I’m like well it's 
nice to visit NZ but um yeah it's certainly nice to get back here, you know 
great climate and um yeah but not only the climate, it's a nice place to be 
yeah.’ (Male, 45-49, Dozer Miner, arrived 2010, SCV 444) 
Everyday interactions such as this facilitated integration into specific locations and 
communities within Australia, as other respondents said they felt integrated into ‘Brisbane’ or 
‘Sydney’ rather than Australia:  
‘I feel like I live in Canberra rather than in Australia. The rest of Australia feels 




Many respondents mentioned how, although they loved living in Australia and had integrated 
into Australia, their New Zealand identity was still a part of them. As these respondents 
expressed:  
‘I arrived here in the early 70's Hitched Hiked around Aust Jobs as Nanny's, 
picking fruit finally arrived in Sydney and have enjoyed living here. My son is 
an Australian, Love Sydney has been my "home," but I still hold a NZ 
passport, can’t let go…’ (Respondent 1691: Female, 65+, Accountant, unknown 
arrival date, PR) 
‘It has become my home. I have attended university here and have an 
Australian born child. I have lived here [for] many years but first and 
foremost identify as a New Zealander.’ (Respondent 1040: Male, 60-64, Social 
researcher, arrived 1975, Australian citizen) 
Although Chapter 7 discusses the political integration of respondents explicitly, it will be 
touched on briefly here to highlight how it has affected how they view their overall experience 
of living in Australia. Those who have moved after 2001 have been given an ‘indefinitely 
temporary’ status and cannot access social security unless they obtain permanent residency. 
However, many respondents do not meet the eligibility requirements for permanent 
residency, leaving them vulnerable to future policy changes as non-citizens. The importance 
of permanent residency and citizenship has been demonstrated through the deportation of 
New Zealanders from Australia since 2014, which has left many respondents feeling 
unwelcome and unsettled in Australia. When describing their overall experience in Australia, 
responses such as this were common:  
‘Everything has been fine. Only real hiccup has been when you worry about 
your children and realise they had no pathway to citizenship in a country they 
identify as home.’ (Respondent 795: Male, 35-39, Self-employed, arrived 2012, 
Australian citizen) 
Being unable to apply for permanent residency made planning for the future difficult and 
impeded integration at the micro-scale, as this respondent explained:  
‘I do like living here. My job is satisfying, and I earn a good wage. I have an 
active social life and enjoy exploring the city and finding new places to go to 
in Melbourne. I'm frustrated, however, that there is no way for me to become 
a permanent resident. So I feel slightly ill at ease. Should I buy property here? 
Should I continue to put down roots? What if legislation changes further? 
What if I become ill and can't work? This has been playing on my mind a bit 




For another respondent, although they had naturalised, they still struggled to feel like they 
belonged: 
‘I feel like I don't fully belong in NZ or Australia - I feel a bit lost. My kids were 
born in Australia, so Australia is their home. I haven't been to NZ in over a 
decade, so it doesn't feel like home to me. As a NZer I do not feel welcome in 
Australia - I feel the Government treats NZ very unfairly, so I feel I do not 
want to give my heart to Australia. I am now an Australian citizen, but my 
husband is not - so I fear him being deported even though he hasn't done 
anything wrong. We are both employed full time, I am the President of my 
kids sports Clubs, my husband coaches the kid’s sports, we volunteer a lot, 
but it feels like none of that matters.’ (Respondent 928: Female, 40-44, Project 
Manager, arrived 2002, Australian citizen) 
These respondents’ experiences suggest that even though on paper, it would appear they are 
well integrated into Australia, in reality, feeling integrated is complex and shaped by the 
structural barriers in place.  
In addition to the deportation of New Zealanders, many respondents had become increasingly 
concerned about the changing political climate in Australia and globally with the rise of 
conservative views. In particular, the growing anti-migrant rhetoric and Australia becoming 
increasingly aligned with the USA had made respondents question if this was a country they 
wanted to continue living in. Even though this respondent had made Australia their home and 
had obtained citizenship, the shift in government ideology impacted how they now viewed 
Australia:  
‘Up until the last 6-8 years, it has been very good. Even though I still barrack 
for the All Blacks and any team playing against Australia, I have been happy 
to be here and had made it my home. However, with the current government 
regulations on Asylum seekers and the way NZers are being treated, I feel 
that this is not the Australia that I decided to make my home 30+ years ago. 
I did become an Australian citizen but have begun making enquiries to see if 
I can get my NZ citizenship back. It may not happen, but I would be happy if 
it does.’ (Respondent 711: Female, 65+, Teacher, arrived 1971, Australian citizen) 
Other respondents were appalled at how Indigenous Australians are treated:  
‘Really disapprove of govt policy regarding Indigenous Australians e.g. I feel 
pretty upset every year at the disrespect this country shows by celebrating 
'Australia Day' on Jan 26th.’ (Respondent 1565: Male, 55-59, Director, arrived 
2001, Australian citizen) 
‘I still find the treatment of aboriginal people really abhorrent. It makes me 
more proud of the Māori culture in NZ, even though I’m not Māori.’ 





The findings presented and discussed in this chapter found that the economic, community, 
social, and overall integration of respondents into Australia is fraught. The aggregated results 
showed that in general, respondents felt they had integrated into Australia economically and 
socially. The majority of respondents had gained employment within four weeks of moving to 
Australia and faced few challenges in building their social networks. However, respondents’ 
testimonies revealed that structural barriers often restricted integration. In particular, the 
increasing casualisation of employment in Australia over the last 30 years may not be explicitly 
aimed at migrants but has affected the degree of integration possible. This is an issue for New 
Zealanders, particularly those who arrived post-2001, as they do not have access to social 
security, in particular unemployment benefits. Being employed casually means they do not 
know how long they will be employed for or how much money they will earn weekly, or how 
long they could be out of work if they lost their job. The precariousness of being employed 
casually affected respondents’ ability to rent a property, borrow money, meet the earning 
threshold required for permanent residency, build rapport with work colleagues, and establish 
social networks. This, in turn, influences the degree to which they can integrate into Australia.  
The experiences of respondents highlight how even though New Zealand and Australia have 
the same national language and have similar cultures, easily integrating into Australia is not 
guaranteed. While many of the respondents benefitted from identifying as New Zealand 
European and avoiding ethnicity-based racism, they still met negative cultural stereotypes of 
New Zealanders that persisted, such as ‘dole bludger’ or ‘sheep shagger.’ These stereotypes 
affected respondents’ ability to integrate into the workplace and form social networks. 
Integration was also affected by the realisation that despite New Zealand and Australia 
frequently being talked about by the media and politicians as being economically linked at the 
macro-scale, in reality, this was not the case. Respondents’ New Zealand work experience and 
qualifications were not always recognised by employers, which hindered the ease at which 
they thought they would gain employment in Australia. This chapter briefly touched on how, 
at the macro-scale, respondents felt disenfranchised and unsettled because of the Australian 
government’s treatment of New Zealanders. The following Chapter 7 will explore the political 
integration of respondents through examining pathways to permanent residency and 




CHAPTER 7: POLITICAL INTEGRATION  
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter found that although respondents felt they had integrated into Australia 
at the micro-scale, they felt that the government’s changing stance on immigration and the 
deportation of New Zealanders made them wary of future policy changes that could affect 
their ability to stay in Australia. It also made respondents feel unwelcome and taken 
advantage of by the Australian government. This chapter will explore the political integration 
of respondents into Australia. In this context, political integration refers specifically to the 
ability of migrants to obtain citizenship, which allows them to secure their status, have their 
voices heard, and feel their contributions are valued by the government, which contributes to 
their sense of belonging (Erdal & Oeppen, 2013; OECD & European Union, 2018). Birkvad 
(2019) notes that for migrants, naturalising is important as it signifies they are equal members 
of society. Yet, the inability to secure full rights can make them feel like second-class citizens. 
Governments, therefore, use citizenship eligibility requirements to demarcate who belongs 
and hence who can fully integrate (Bloemraad, 2018; Brubaker, 2010; Rung, 2020). This 
chapter will begin by discussing the visa status of respondents and the pathways to permanent 
residency available. The motivations for seeking citizenship and the meanings attached to 
citizenship are then explored. The final section discusses how respondents feel New 
Zealanders are treated in Australia. 
The findings presented in this chapter show that for many respondents becoming politically 
integrated into Australia is constrained by structural barriers. Being eligible to apply for 
Australian citizenship requires applicants to have held permanent residency for at least 12 
months before applying, but as the first section of this chapter finds, for SCV 444 holders 
becoming a permanent resident is not an option for many, because of the eligibility 
requirements for permanent residency. This exclusion from permanent residency and the 
shifting migration rhetoric in Australia contributes to whether respondents want to obtain 
Australian citizenship and the meanings they attach to citizenship. Section two finds that for 
the majority of respondents, Australian citizenship is viewed in instrumental terms while also 
symbolising their belonging and integration into Australia. However, for some respondents, 
their view of Australian citizenship has been shaped by how they feel New Zealanders have 




scale respondents have had positive experiences in Australia, at the macro-scale, respondents 
feel that the historical ties between the two countries no longer carry the same weight in 
Australia, making respondents feel like second-class citizens.  
7.2 Visa status and pathways to permanent residency 
To become an Australian citizen all migrants first need to obtain permanent residency. As 
detailed in Chapter 2, for the majority of migrants seeking permanent residency, they need to 
have a job on the SOL, meet the age, education, language, and health requirements and/or 
have employer sponsorship. This categorisation of prospective migrants based on their 
occupation ensures they not only fill occupational shortages but can finally support 
themselves and contribute to the economy. Hence, migrants who do not have an occupation 
on the SOL cannot apply for permanent residency and therefore have to return to their home 
country. The migration of New Zealanders to Australia falls under the TTTA, which is outside 
Australia’s Migration Program. New Zealanders who moved to Australia before the 2001 
policy change are categorised as PSCV and have permanent residency. In contrast, those who 
moved after this change are referred to as SCV 444 holders who have different rights. SCV 444 
holders are granted an ‘indefinitely temporary’ on arrival to Australia, which prevents them 
from accessing all social security services and requires them to apply for permanent residency 
to have access to social security. The need to obtain permanent residency has become 
pertinent over the last decade with the growing anti-migration rhetoric and the deportation 
of New Zealanders from Australia, which has illustrated the lack of security this visa provides. 
Before these changes, for many, getting permanent residency was not considered, given the 
relative ease with which they moved to Australia. 
This section will focus on respondents who have moved to Australia since 2001 and discuss 
their ability to get permanent residency. Figure 7.1 displays the visas held by respondents with 
just under two-thirds SCV 444 holders. Respondents who have a Returning Resident Visa 
(RRV), permanent residency (obtained through occupation or employer sponsorship), or a 189 
visa, arrived in Australia post-2001 and applied to become a permanent resident. 
Interestingly, a few respondents who have moved since 2001 were unaware of their visa 
status or thought they were automatically permanent residents. One respondent, who arrived 
in 2018 and had selected ‘other’ said, ‘not sure, don’t think I have a visa at all?’ While another 




permanent resident.’ This lack of awareness of their visa status suggests that arrangements 
such as the TTTA disconnects New Zealanders from the immigration and visa process in 
Australia. As the visa is automatically granted upon their arrival in Australia, they therefore do 
not necessarily know what their rights are beyond knowing they can live and work in Australia.  
 
Figure 7.1: Visa held by respondents’ 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1368 
Respondents who had obtained an RRV were eligible for this visa because they had travelled 
to Australia before 1994, when at that stage, those who entered Australia were permanent 
residents. This pathway has been referred to as a ‘loophole’ for New Zealanders as those who 
are eligible do not have to meet occupation or income requirements and is significantly 
cheaper than the other pathways available, AUD$405 versus AUD$4,045 (DHA, 2020c, 2020e). 
Table 7.1 displays the top occupations of respondents who had obtained permanent residency 
through each of the pathways available. The 189 visa provided those who worked as Designer, 
Engineering, Science and Transport Professionals, Specialist Managers, and Office Managers 
and Program Administrators a pathway to permanent residency. Many of the occupations that 
fall under these broad categories are not on the SOL, and hence respondents had no path to 
permanent residency before the introduction of the 189 visa. A female interviewee who 
arrived in 2004 explained that before the introduction of this visa, getting permanent 
residency would not have been possible:  
‘There was no way that I could have, because of this type of job that I do, it's 
not something that's, yeah a skilled you know, like anyone, well not anyone 




























to, but I knew I never could, and when this um [Malcolm] Turnball and John 
Key [New Zealand prime minister], um when that came in I just thought you 
know what here's an opportunity, my husband said because he's Australian 
he look I’ll nominate you, and I’m like no, I don't want to go that way if I can't 
do it off my own merit then yeah.’ (Female, 40-44, Business Manager, arrived 
2004, 189 visa) 
Being able to obtain permanent residency would allow her to apply for citizenship. This was 
important, as she would be able to vote, and it also contributed to her sense of belonging as 
she planned on retiring in Australia. She also acknowledged that she was in a privileged 
position, as not all New Zealanders living in Australia would qualify for this visa.  
Table 7.1: Permanent residency visa obtained and top occupations, ANZSCO 2-digit level 
ANZSCO sub-major group code RRV (%) PR (%) 
189 visa 
(%) 
13 Specialist Manager 8.8 8.7 24.1 
22 Business, HR and Marketing Professionals 8.8 8.7 6.9 
24 Education Professionals 7.5 4.3 - 
26 ICT Professionals 7.5 6.1 - 
73 Road and Rail Drivers 6.3 3.5 6.9 
41 Health and Welfare Support Workers 5 2.6 3.4 
59 Other Clerical and Administrative Workers 5 1.7 3.4 
11 Chief Executive, GM, Legislators 3.8 2.6 - 
25 Health Professionals 3.8 12.2 10.3 
27 Legal, Social and Welfare Professionals 3.8 5.2 - 
53 General Clerical Workers 3.8 7 6.9 
23 Design, Engineering, Science and Transport 
Professionals 
2.5 6.1 17.2 
42 Carers and Aides - 4.3 3.4 
51 Office Managers and Program Administrators 1.3 0.9 6.9 
32 Automotive, Engineering and Trade workers - 0.9 3.4 
71 Machine and Stationary Plant Operators 1.3 1.7 3.4 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, RRV n1=80, PR n2=115, 189 visa n3=29 
For these respondents, the motivations for obtaining permanent residency were so they could 
get Australian citizenship, which would give them security plus the ability to vote. Some 
respondents had become concerned about the rapidly changing immigration rhetoric in 
Australia: 
‘Security didn't want to wake up one day and find out it was illegal for Kiwis 
to own property or something equally stupid, Peter Dutton and people like 





Other respondents wanted to secure their children’s futures in Australia as having permanent 
residency and/or citizenship would give them more education and employment opportunities: 
‘It was the fact that my kids would have a secured future without the 
possibility of having to go home and the fact that we could reside as Aussies 
and not have to worry about being foreigners in our country of choice.’ 
(Respondent 697: Female, 40-44, Clinical Coder, arrived 2012, 189 Visa) 
As the 189 visa was introduced the year before data collection, SCV 444 holders were asked 
whether they had heard of the visa and whether they would apply for it. One-third of 
respondents had not heard of the 189 visa, and just over half (55.9 per cent) of the 
respondents met the three general eligibility requirements: length of residence, income, and 
started residency before 19 February 2016. Respondents who did not meet the criteria either 
did not earn enough, had not been resident in Australia for five years or had moved to 
Australia after the cut-off date. Figure 7.2 shows that amongst respondents who met all the 
eligibility requirements, 6.6 per cent had applied for the visa, with an additional 14.6 per cent 
in the process of applying for it. The motivation for applying was that this visa gave them a 
pathway to citizenship and would provide them not only with the security of legal status but 
access to social services. Under 10 per cent gave other reasons for not having applied, which 
included being eligible for the RRV instead and being uncertain what implications applying for 
the visa would have on their children’s ability to apply for university. This is because as an SCV 
444 holder, they can pay domestic fees upfront, but as a permanent resident, there is a two-
year stand-down period before being eligible for domestic fees, meaning they would then 





Figure 7.2: Whether or not eligible SCV 444 holders have applied for the 189 visa 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=410 
While 27.3 per cent of those who were eligible for the 189 visa indicated they did not intend 
to apply for the 189 visa, Figure 7.3 shows that if SCV 444 holders were hypothetically eligible, 
two-thirds would apply for the visa.  
 
Figure 7.3: If hypothetically eligible, would SCV 444 holders apply for the 189 visa 




























































Table 7.2 displays the occupations of SCV 444 holders who met all three general eligibility 
requirements and the occupations of those who, if they were hypothetically eligible, would 
apply. Those in occupations such as Sales Assistants and Salespersons, Cleaners and Laundry 
Workers, and General Clerks were least likely to have met the eligibility requirements for the 
189 visa. Given this visa is based on income, for respondents in these occupations and 
middling migrants more broadly, achieving this income consistently could be affected by their 
length of employment with their current employer, employment status and/or time spent out 
of the labour force.  
Table 7.2 Top occupations of those who met all three 189 visa criteria and those who 
would apply if eligible, at ANZSCO 3-digit level  
ANZSCO minor group code 




254 Midwifery and Nursing Professionals 7.7 4.7 
132 Business Administration Managers 6.5 3.3 
134 Education, Health and Welfare Services Manager 3.8 3 
225 Sales, Marketing and Public Relations Professionals 3.8 2.8 
133 Construction, Distribution and Production Managers 3.5 1.1 
411 Health and Welfare Support Workers 3.5 5.3 
111 Chief Executives, GM and Legislators 2.9 1.7 
224 Information and Organisation Professionals 2.7 2.2 
531 General Clerks 2.7 5 
149 Miscellaneous Hospitality, Retail and Service 
Managers 
2.1 1.4 
621 Sales Assistants and Salespersons 0.6 2.5 
811 Cleaners and Laundry Workers 0.6 2.5 
272 Social and Welfare Professionals 1.5 2.2 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, meet all 3 criteria n1=339, apply if eligible n2=339 
Regardless of whether or not SCV 444 holders were eligible for the 189 visa, the cost of the 
visa was cited as prohibitive. At the time of the survey, the cost for an individual to apply was 
AUD$3,755 (Kainth, 2018), with this increasing to AUD$4,045 in July 2019 (Grewal, 2020). This 
amount of money respondents felt was wrong, given the amount of tax New Zealanders paid 
without receiving any of the benefits. Other respondents could not justify spending that 
amount of money, especially when the cost for a family is around AUD$10,000. As this female 
interviewee explained:  





Interviewee: Well, how much is it? That's a big cost; the cost is a big factor 
Researcher: At the moment it's nearly [AUD]$3,500 
Interviewee: Yeah no, [AUD]$3,500 I could put that towards a deposit on a 
home; I have more chance of getting a home, even with all our debt, then I 
do with permanent residency, mainly because of her [niece] disability as well, 
yeah so you know we're paying into a system we can't access aye, and that 
hurts me. (Female, 50-54, Youth Support Worker, arrived 2012, SCV 444) 
Those who did not meet the eligibility requirements were critical of the income requirement, 
which they felt was too high and unattainable. Some respondents mentioned how their 
income had been stagnant since moving to Australia. For others, being employed on a casual 
basis meant they never knew what their yearly income would be and earning above the 
income threshold consistently for five years was not feasible. Female respondents who had 
taken time off work to care for their children were particularly frustrated as once they re-
entered the workforce, they would have to wait even longer to meet the income requirement: 
‘For the 18 months, I worked after arriving I more than double the required 
income threshold however I have taken a career break to care for our 
children. We were advised by an immigration lawyer that the quickest route 
to citizenship would be a spousal visa as I would have to return to work and 
earn the income threshold for another 3 years to be eligible.’ (Respondent 916: 
Female, 45-49, Not in labour force, arrived 2009, SCV 444) 
Being excluded based on income indicates how this visa reinforces class biases and the 
importance the Australian government places on a migrant’s ability to contribute 
economically. This reflects how neoliberal governments have shifted welfare responsibilities 
from the nation-state to the individual and how permanent residency and citizenship 
requirements are based on labour market participation (Joppke, 2007; Rung, 2020). Tensions, 
therefore, exist between the TTTA and the Australian immigration system as the eligibility 
requirements for permanent residency privileges applicants’ economic contributions rather 
than their social and civic contributions.  
A few respondents who met the eligibility requirements were unable to apply on health 
grounds:  
‘We would if we could afford it, also our oldest child is ASD [Autism Spectrum 
Disorder] high functioning, and we have been told we may not be successful 
because of this.’ (Respondent 615: Unknown gender, 35-39, Clerical Support, 





For some respondents, they were excluded from all pathways to permanent residency: 
‘We don't currently qualify for the new pathway. We haven't earned enough 
for five consecutive years as I am the higher earner and I was made 
redundant while on parental leave, so [I] chose to become a stay at home 
parent for three years. We don't have enough points to apply outside the 
pathway as we are too old and not rich enough. Law has never been a 
desired occupation for immigration at a state or federal level. My husband 
is a carpenter, and niche aspects of carpentry have been desired occupations 
for NSW in some years (I would apply for partner PR if he was successful), 
but it was so complicated we couldn't get an answer on whether he 
qualified.’ (Respondent 275: Female, 35-39, Legal Counsel, arrived 2009, SCV 444) 
Other reasons for not having or wanting to apply for the visa included being unsure of what 
the benefits of the visa were. Those who questioned the benefits wondered if it would make 
any difference to their lives, particularly for those over 55, and how it differed from the SCV 
444 visa. A few did not realise this visa would grant them permanent residency. Respondents 
were also reluctant to apply because of the paperwork and the time-consuming nature of the 
application process. Applying for permanent residency is the first time they have to fill out a 
visa application form, collate all the supporting documents, and engage with the Department 
of Home Affairs. This means their migrant experience differs significantly from migrants from 
other countries, where meeting the visa eligibility requirements and filling out the required 
paperwork allows them to enter and continue to stay in Australia (Robertson, 2011a; 
Robertson & Runganaikaloo, 2014). A few respondents were wary of this visa pathway as the 
constantly changing immigration policies left them wondering if a better deal would be 
offered. Some felt it was yet another way for the Australian government to take money from 
New Zealanders given the tax paid.  
Interestingly, for SCV 444 holders, the introduction of this visa had little impact on how long 
they planned to continue living in Australia (Figure 7.4). Respondents who indicated it had no 
impact at all mentioned how since living in Australia, Australia had become their home, having 
integrated through work, built their social networks, entered a relationship and/or had 
children:  
‘I was always staying permanently. I have no intention of returning to NZ.’ 
(Respondent 132: Female, 25-29, Secondary School Teacher, arrived 2007, SCV 444) 
‘My wife is Australian, so our Australian born children are protected here 
regardless of whether I’m a citizen.’ (Respondent 356: Male, 30-34, Software 




Erdal et al. (2018) found that for some respondents, a change in visa status does not change 
the experiences already had in the destination country, as everyday practices contribute to a 
migrant becoming integrated and a part of the community they live in. 
Some respondents were planning on returning to New Zealand in the future, and so the 
introduction of this visa had no impact on their plans.  
 
Figure 7.4: Did the introduction of the 189 visa affect how long respondents planned to 
continue living in Australia? 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=758 
Those who indicated it had changed their plans to some extent, had previously considered 
returning to New Zealand or moving elsewhere as permanent residency has not been an 
option. This pathway now provided a path to citizenship, which was necessary for some 
respondents as citizenship represented finally being able to truly belong in Australia and make 
long-term decisions:  
‘Having the ability to become an Australian citizen makes us feel like we have 
a real place here, that this can be our home.’ (Respondent 956: Female, 35-39, 
Not in labour force, arrived 2012, SCV 444) 
Whereas for others, while it did not directly affect their plans to live in Australia, the eligibility 
criteria made them feel alienated:  
‘I am hoping the income requirement will be removed so that eligibility is 
more focused on character and contribution, not income. I think the current 
income requirements discriminate [against] women from NZ.’ (Respondent 
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7.3 Motivation and meanings of citizenship 
In Australia, citizenship has been framed in terms of civic nationalism where adherence to 
laws and procedures is more important than patriotism and loyalty (Betts & Birrell, 2007; 
Fozdar & Spittles, 2010). The absence of needing to ascribe to an ‘Australian way of life’ relates 
to the importance of multiculturalism in Australia in which migrants can maintain their cultural 
identity (Betts & Birrell, 2007; Levey, 2014). However, over the last twenty years, a vocal 
minority of Anglo-Celtic Australian’s have become increasingly concerned about the number 
of migrants who they feel do not have Australian values. In particular, the rise of Islamic 
migration and Islamic militancy at the beginning of the century led to the introduction of the 
citizenship test in 2007 (Levey, 2014). The citizenship test asks questions on Australia’s 
democratic beliefs, rights, government, and the law, with applicants required to score at least 
75 per cent (DHA, 2020b). Potential applicants are required to have lived in Australia for the 
previous four years and have been a permanent resident for 12 months before the citizenship 
application is submitted, be of ‘good character,’ and intend to live or maintain close links to 
Australia (DHA, 2020b).  
In 2017, the year before data was collected for this research, changes were proposed, which 
would increase the period of permanent residency to four years and require applicants to 
prove they had integrated into Australia. These proposed changes sought to mimic the 
integration policies that had been implemented in countries such as the Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Austria, which require more extended periods of residency and more stringent 
testing criteria (Askola, 2020). While these proposed changes were not enacted, they raised 
concerns about how citizenship could be used as a mechanism of control to ensure migrants 
had integrated and had adopted ‘Australian values’ (Askola, 2020). The low up-take of 
Australian citizenship has been discussed by Hamer (2008, 2017) and McMillan (2017), but 
neither author provides an extensive discussion on why New Zealanders do not obtain it. 
Hamer’s (2007) research on Māori, found that 48.3 per cent did not want Australian 
citizenship with 29.7 per cent feeling no need to obtain it with many feeling politically 
disenfranchised because of the eligibility requirements for permanent residency. While 
McMillan (2017) briefly mentioned that respondents would get it for a range of reasons from 




Only 15.8 per cent of respondents had Australian citizenship. Amongst these respondents 59.4 
per cent had moved to Australia before 2001, 78 per cent viewed Australia as home, 49.3 per 
cent considered New Zealand as home and 88.8 per cent felt they had integrated into 
Australia. Just over half (55.4) of all other respondents indicated they would consider 
naturalising, with nearly one quarter (24.7 per cent) undecided and 19.9 per cent, indicating 
they would not obtain Australian citizenship. While the majority stated they would consider 
obtaining Australian citizenship, the structural barriers were seen to be prohibitive. This was 
notably an issue for SCV 444 holders, given the permanent residency requirements, which 
meant getting citizenship would not be a possibility. Other structural barriers included the 
cost of becoming a citizen and the time-consuming nature of the application process.  
Being a citizen of a nation-state corresponds to legal status, rights, integration, sense of 
belonging, and identity (Bauböck, 2006; Bloemraad, 2004; Bloemraad et al., 2008). Amongst 
respondents, citizenship was primarily associated with security. Security meant being 
protected from future policy changes, having a safety net, and being able to secure their 
children’s future. The desire to be protected from future policy changes had become 
increasingly important because of the deportation of New Zealanders from Australia. Seeing 
media reports of New Zealanders who had been deported even though they had effectively 
lived their entire life in Australia reminded respondents of the precarious nature of being an 
SCV 444 holder or permanent resident. This increased respondents’ desire to obtain 
citizenship as it would allow them to secure their status in Australia and protect themselves 
from future policy changes: 
‘Protect myself [me] from future detrimental changes. Ensure that I could 
never be kicked out of the country.’ (Respondent 402: Female, 40-44, Finance, 
arrived 2003, SCV 444) 
However, some respondents were sceptical about the security citizenship provided, as this 
respondent who arrived in 2000 expressed: 
‘[citizenship] It should mean security, but the Australian government keeps 
changing the rules, so I doubt even if I did gain citizenship, I would be any 
more secure than the temporary visa status I currently have. If they can 
deport people who have committed no crimes, they obviously don't have a 
conscience.’ (Respondent 562: Female, 35-39, Disability Support Worker, arrived 
2005, Australian citizen)  
Respondents’ desire to secure their legal status through citizenship has been cited as a 




research on naturalised migrants in the USA found many obtained citizenship to protect their 
rights because of the growing anti-immigrant sentiment. Similarly, Erdal et al. (2018) found 
that for some migrants in Norway, they had an implicit view of citizenship in terms of 
citizenship as security of rights.  
For SCV 444 holders being unable to access any government services contributed to why they 
viewed citizenship as security. Being a citizen would give them access to the government 
services they could not access, yet their taxes went towards. This exclusion from government 
services became increasingly frustrating the longer they lived in Australia and were concerned 
about what would happen if their circumstances changed. A respondent who wanted to 
become a citizen but was constrained by finances said that:  
‘I can relax a little knowing that if circumstances change, I will still be able to 
provide for my kids. I pay taxes just like any Australian and have done in my 
almost 16 years of being here, but have no support or security if my 
circumstances change.’ (Respondent 66: Female, 40-44, Logistics Clerk, arrived 
2002, SCV 444) 
For this respondent, like many others, security was viewed in relation to their children. Having 
children that had spent most of their lives in Australia increased respondents’ desire to obtain 
Australian citizenship. Australian citizenship would provide their children with more 
opportunities and mean they would not be constrained in Australia by their New Zealand 
citizenship. Responses such as this were common when asked what citizenship meant to 
them:  
‘Security for my children. They will have more opportunities available to 
them when they leave school (e.g. university, TAFE, ADF).’ (Respondent 445: 
Female, 35-39, Primary School Teacher, arrived 2013, SCV 444) 
University was often mentioned by respondents, as currently New Zealanders are eligible for 
domestic university fees but are required to pay fees upfront and cannot apply for HECS. HECS 
is the government-assisted loan scheme that allows a person to slowly pay back the cost of 
their university fees. Only SCV 444 holders who have lived in Australia for at least ten years 
can apply for HECS. This means for many, going to university is not an option given the 
significant upfront financial cost, limiting their post-school education and employment 
opportunities. 
Respondents also discussed citizenship as belonging. For a respondent who had become an 




‘Australia is my home, my partner is Australian my children were born here. 
Being a citizen means I can’t be deported and taken away from them. 
Citizenship’s to me means I’ve fully embraced Australian culture, spirit and 
values.’ (Respondent 1241: Male, 30-34, Brick Layer, arrived 2007, Australian 
citizen) 
At a pragmatic level, it represented the security of their legal status in Australia, but at an 
emotional level, it enhanced their sense of belonging and integration into Australia. Another 
respondent viewed it as the next logical step, as they had made Australia their home:  
‘Was able to get Permanent Residence via RRV, married a local Brisbane girl, 
bought a house here, not planning to leave, so thought I’d become part of 
the place.’ (Respondent 400: Male, 50-54, IT Project Manager, arrived, 2001, 
Australian citizen)  
Similarly, Fozdar and Spittles (2010) and Aptekar (2016) found that migrants were motivated 
to naturalise because they had started a family in the destination country and viewed it as the 
next step to take. 
For other respondents, viewing citizenship as belonging was connected to wanting to be 
recognised for the contributions they had already made to Australia, whether it be 
economically, socially or in their community:  
‘It means that I am part of the nation, I have a right to vote and am 
acknowledged as contributing. That my children are as valued as their 
Australian friends and teammates.’ (Respondent 115: Male, 50-54, Technical 
Officer, arrived 2011, PR) 
‘It would mean a great deal as I am now a single mother to five Australian 
children, and we struggle financially as I am not able to access financial 
assistance I could access as an Australian. I contribute a lot to my community 
through leadership roles, and as an educator and feel citizenship would 
complete the whole picture to a satisfying life in Australia.’ (Respondent 39: 
Female, 45-49, Early Childhood Educator, arrived 2004, SCV 444) 
This desire for recognition through the attainment of citizenship relates to how citizenship has 
been conceptualised as equality. Kymlicka and Norman (1994, p. 370) explain that the 
orthodox view of citizenship is based on ‘treating people as individuals with equal rights under 
the law,’ where citizenship is understood as civic participation in society. Civic participation 
includes a wide range of activities, including voting, political party membership, volunteering, 
community gardening, and involvement in recreational sports teams (ABS, 2010). These 
activities help individuals build their social capital and become embedded in their local 




the development of Australia, the inability for many to obtain citizenship shows how the 
requirements for permanent residency privilege those who contribute to Australia 
economically. Rung (2020) argues that citizenship, therefore, becomes a tool used by 
neoliberal nation-states to maintain the non-citizen/citizen binary through only making 
citizenship available to those who are deemed by the nation-state as the most deserving.  
Given respondents already participated economically, socially, and in the community, wanting 
to vote and have a say was also a strong motivating factor for wanting to naturalise. For some 
respondents, they had lost their ability to vote in New Zealand and felt politically 
disenfranchised as they could not vote in either country. For this respondent, citizenship and 
having the right to vote symbolised full participation in society:  
‘I have completed my citizenship test and passed. I am now waiting on a date 
for the ceremony. As I now reside in Australia, I wish to be part of this society, 
a full citizen with the same rights as others and to be able to vote.’ 
(Respondent 440: Female, 45-49, Community Development Officer and 
Coordinator, arrived 2007, RRV) 
While for another respondent, their reasons for gaining Australian citizenship were 
instrumental: 
‘To vote, to have immigration security, access to welfare/social security - 
absolutely no other reason - in my heart, I hate being “Aussie” because I have 
citizenship, but my brain says it makes sense.’ (Respondent 1444: Female, 60-
64, Not in labour force, arrived 2006, Australian citizen)  
With this the meaning they attached to citizenship: 
‘Loyalty & undying love of country for NZ citizenship   Practical reasons only 
for Australian citizenship.’ (Respondent 1444: Female, 60-64, Retired, arrived 
2006, Australian citizen) 
This distinction between how they viewed their Australian versus New Zealand citizenship was 
mentioned by other respondents, including those who had not yet obtained Australian 
citizenship. For some respondents, their New Zealand citizenship was intrinsically tied to their 
identity and connection to New Zealand: 
‘It means being one with the land "Aotearoa." I will never give up my 
citizenship. It's a sense of connectedness.’ (Respondent 1670: Female, 40-44, 




‘I get the paperwork I fill it in, and then I just can’t quite finish it and send. I 
think I have done this 3 times. One day I will. I have lived here [for] 35 years.’ 
(Respondent 1369: Female, 55-59, Hospitality Assistant Manager, PSCV, 1983) 
Although respondents mentioned their New Zealand identity was why they would not 
naturalise, research indicates there are similarities between how New Zealand and Australian 
identities have been constructed. Gilbertson’s (2008) research found that the New Zealand 
identity centred around being laid back, farmer, rugby, Kiwiana clothing (jandals, stubbies, 
and gumboots), beer, beach, and outdoors. While Australian identity is based on mateship 
and ‘fair go,’ sports, leisurely lifestyle, farmers, beer, BBQ, and clothing (Akubra) (Phillips & 
Smith, 2000; Purdie & Wilss, 2007). This overlap between how the identities of each country 
have been constructed suggests that identifying with a country goes beyond these cultural 
and/or national stereotypes. Avril Bell (2009) argues that while these identity markers are 
important, New Zealand’s identity is also about a deep connection to place and the nation 
more broadly. For a couple of respondents, they viewed their Australian and New Zealand 
citizenship as equal:  
‘It’s a commitment to your home. I consider both NZ and Australia my home. 
I often call myself Australasian.’ (Respondent 479: Unknown gender and age, 
Music Teacher, arrived 2012, RRV) 
This demonstrates how, for migrants, the notion of home is experienced in specific locations 
with the relationships formed in each location, contributing to identity and sense of belonging 
(Ralph & Staeheli, 2011).  
However, for a few respondents obtaining citizenship would allow them to prove to others 
that they belong in Australia. A respondent who identified as Pākehā/New Zealand European 
found that despite having lived in Australia for over 25 years, their accent was still a marker 
of difference, saying citizenship meant: 
‘That I belong. People still identify me as Kiwi because of my accent. I feel 
when this happens that to Aussies I will always be a foreigner.’ (Respondent 
364: Female, 55-59, Social Worker, arrived 1994, Australian citizen) 
Erdal et al. (2018) found that migrants in Norway used citizenship to prove they were 
Norwegian. This was important for those who did not look stereotypically Norwegian as it 
shows they belong. However, despite having citizenship, their claim to being Norwegian was 




majority of respondents being Pākehā/New Zealand European allows them to easily integrate 
into Australia with their accent an indicator that they are not ‘Australian.’  
Respondents who were undecided or did not want to become an Australian citizen questioned 
the benefits of citizenship. Some respondents felt that the SCV 444 visa provided enough 
access to opportunities available in Australia:  
‘The path to citizenship for NZers is difficult, and given I have no idea whether 
I will stay beyond study, and the ease of the Special Category Visa for NZers, 
there doesn't seem much point.’ (Respondent 1062: Male, 25-29, Student, 
arrived 2018, SCV 444) 
‘It is extremely expensive, and being a New Zealander in Australia hasn't 
stopped me [from] doing what I want to do.’ (Respondent 1059: Female, 20-24, 
Retail Assistant, arrived 2001, SCV 444) 
PSCV holders felt citizenship would not offer them any additional benefits because of their 
status as permanent residents. Some PSCV holders already had voting rights because of when 
they moved to Australia. This ambivalence towards obtaining Australian citizenship 
contributed to the meanings attached to citizenship. Even though the question asked did not 
refer to Australian citizenship, respondents took this to mean what Australian citizenship 
means to them. Hence many respondents said it meant nothing or had not given it much 
thought. Some respondents emphasised how they would never want to give up their New 
Zealand citizenship. Whereas other respondents only associated citizenship with access to 
services which they did not feel were necessary:   
‘Because it’s not necessary to enable me to work, and I don’t plan on 
accessing pension payments.’ (Respondent 17: Female, 45-49, Team Leader 
Social Work, arrived 2008, SCV 444) 
However, for a few PSCV holders, their view on obtaining Australian citizenship had changed 
in response to the deportation of New Zealanders and the growing anti-immigrant sentiment: 
‘Have not felt the need initially and recently due to political decisions and 
trends it is not the Australia which as a child I had come to respect.’ 
(Respondent 1994: Male, 65+, Retired, arrived 1968, PSCV) 
‘I always thought I had rights as a permanent resident, but worry lately as 
these rights have eroded. Feeling worried actually - my kids are citizens of 
Australia, but these days (an extreme thought... ), I feel [the] government 
could send me home as a worst-case scenario.’ (Respondent 1928: Female, 45-




Some respondents did not want to naturalise because of how the Australian government had 
treated not only New Zealanders but migrants more broadly: 
‘In part, because I do not consider myself in any way Australian. I may reside 
in Australia, but I am tangata whenua first and foremost. Also, due to the 
way the Australian government has chosen to treat New Zealanders and 
New Zealand in general. I feel it would be almost treasonous to become a 
citizen of a country that treats my own people so badly.’ (Respondent 662: 
Male, 25-59, Not in labour force, arrived 2013, SCV 444) 
‘I have a few more months before I become eligible to apply. I feel undecided 
because I strongly disagree with the Australian government's stance on 
refugee treatment.’ (Respondent 1678: Female, 30-34, IT Application 
Administrator, arrived 2010, PR) 
A few respondents could not become an Australian citizen because they already held dual-
citizenship with another country.  
7.4 Treatment of New Zealanders  
Respondents’ desire to obtain permanent residency and citizenship, and hence the meanings 
they attach to citizenship, has been shaped by how they feel the Australian government has 
treated New Zealanders. New Zealand and Australia’s shared history as British colonial 
settlements and as Anzacs has shaped the discourse around how the relationship between 
the two countries has been portrayed at the macro-scale and how individuals have 
subsequently perceived this relationship. Being Anzacs symbolises ‘mateship’ and having each 
other’s back in difficult times. It is talked about as a brotherly, sibling-like relationship, where 
the belief is you put your family first and give each other a fair go. McMillan’s (2017) research 
found that respondents viewed the 2001 policy change as a betrayal of this familial 
relationship, leaving them dissatisfied with how New Zealanders are treated in Australia. This 
dissatisfaction was expressed by respondents when discussing how they felt New Zealanders 
were treated in Australia.  
Figure 7.5 shows how respondents felt New Zealanders were treated in Australia. Amongst 
respondents who had naturalised (n=320), 40.7 per cent indicated they felt New Zealanders 
were treated ‘poorly’ or ‘very poorly’ in Australia, with 36.6 per cent feeling New Zealanders 
were treated ‘well’ or ‘very well.’ The remaining felt New Zealanders were treated ‘fairly.’ 




Zealanders were treated ‘poorly’ or ‘very poorly,’ 25 per cent indicated ‘well’ or ‘very well’ 
and 20 per cent ‘fairly.’ 
 
Figure 7.5 How respondents felt New Zealanders were treated in Australia 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1655 
Looking at the state respondents lived in and how they felt New Zealanders were treated in 
Australia, Table 7.3 shows that those living in South Australia were more likely to indicate they 
felt New Zealanders were treated ‘fairly’ or ‘well.’ One-fifth of those living in the Northern 
Territory selected ‘very well’ with just under half selected ‘poorly.’ One-fifth of those living in 
the Australian Capital Territory felt New Zealanders were treated ‘very poorly’ which may be 
related to the fact that many of the jobs available in Canberra require Australian citizenship. 
A chi-squared test for independence by combing the ‘very well’ and ‘well’ categories into one 
variable and the ‘poorly’ and ‘very poorly’ categories into another variable found there was 
no statically significant relationship between view of hoe New Zealanders are treated in 
Australia and state of residence (𝜒2(14, N=1643)=16.76, p=.269) 
Table 7.3: View of treatment of New Zealanders in Australia by state of residence 
How do you feel 
New Zealanders are 


















Very well 8.8 11.3 10.7 4.2 12.5 11.9 20.8 8.6 10.2 
Well 14.7 19.5 17.3 31.3 16.7 16.2 16.7 25.7 17.2 
Fairly 21.6 20.8 17.9 27.1 25.0 21.3 12.5 11.4 20.5 
Poorly 39.4 33.6 39.8 31.3 29.2 36.6 45.8 34.3 37.6 
Very poorly 15.5 14.8 14.4 6.3 16.7 14.0 4.2 20.0 14.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 






















When examining the occupation of respondents, Table 7.4 shows that aside from those who 
were not in the labour force, those working as Technicians and Trade Workers were more 
likely to indicate they felt New Zealanders were treated ‘very well’ (16.8 per cent) compared 
to Machinery Operators and Drivers (6.8 per cent) and Labourers (7.1 per cent). Machinery 
Operators and Drivers were more likely to feel New Zealanders were treated ‘very poorly’ 
(27.1 per cent) compared to only 11.7 per cent of Managers. A chi-squared test for 
independence found that there is not a statistically significant relationship between view of 
how New Zealanders are treated in Australia and occupation (𝜒2(28, N=1426)=40.63, p=.058).  
Table 7.4: View of treatment of New Zealanders in Australia by occupation, ANZSCO major 
group code 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1426 
Table 7.5 finds that respondents whose highest level of education is secondary school year 10 
or above are more likely to feel New Zealanders are treated in Australia ‘very well.’ 
Interestingly, just under half (46 per cent) of those with a postgraduate degree felt New 
Zealanders were treated ‘poorly’ with those who have secondary school below year 10 most 
likely (17.1 per cent) to view the treatment of New Zealanders as ‘very poorly.’ This 
relationship was found not to be statistically significant (𝜒2(28, N=1643)=28.65, p=.43). 
  
 How do you feel New Zealanders are treated in Australia? 
ANZSCO major group 
Very 
well 




1 Managers (%) 10.0 17.9 22.9 37.5 11.7 100.0 
2 Professionals (%) 7.9 16.4 20.3 42.5 12.9 100.0 
3 Technicians and Trade 
Workers (%) 
16.8 17.8 21.8 33.7 9.9 100.0 
4 Community and Personal 
Service Workers (%) 
10.2 17.4 19.8 30.5 22.2 100.0 
5 Clerical and Administration 
Workers (%) 
8.3 19.4 20.4 38.9 13.0 100.0 
6 Sales Workers (%) 11.8 19.7 19.7 32.9 15.8 100.0 
7 Machinery Operators and 
Drivers (%) 
6.8 10.2 22.0 33.9 27.1 100.0 
8 Labourers (%) 7.1 12.9 22.4 35.3 22.4 100.0 




Table 7.5: View of treatment of New Zealanders in Australia by the highest level of 
education achieved 








Postgraduate Degree Level (%) 10.0 14.9 17.2 46.0 11.9 100.0 
Graduate Diploma and Graduate 
Certificate Level (%) 
9.3 11.9 24.6 41.5 12.7 100.0 
Bachelor Degree Level (%) 7.1 17.2 22.2 37.7 15.8 100.0 
Advanced Diploma and Diploma Level 11.4 19.1 21.1 32.5 15.9 100.0 
Certificate III & IV Level (%) 9.6 16.8 22.3 36.6 14.7 100.0 
Secondary Education - Years 10 and 
above (%) 
13.6 18.3 17.3 35.3 15.5 100.0 
Certificate I & II Level (% 8.3 13.9 22.2 44.4 11.1 100.0 
Secondary Education - Years 9 and 
below (%) 
11.4 21.4 20.0 30.0 17.1 100.0 
Total (%) 10.3 17.0 20.4 37.7 14.7 100.0 
Source: New Zealanders living in Australia survey 2018, n=1643 
Respondents who viewed the treatment of New Zealanders favourably discussed this in 
relation to their personal experiences. At the micro-scale, respondents mentioned how they 
had a positive experience living in Australia and found it easy to integrate into Australia: 
‘We are treated great here. There is support for families, the school system 
is great and free. I would never expect anything for nothing so we get out 
there and earn what we need. We are paid well and have no complaints.’ 
(Respondent 594: Female, 40-44, Bookkeeper, arrived 2016, SCV 444) 
However, many respondents acknowledged that while their experiences had been positive, 
they felt that prevailing stereotypes of New Zealanders affected their treatment. The view 
that New Zealanders are ‘dole bludgers’ dates back to the 1980s, when there were claims 
made by the Australian media and unions that New Zealanders just moved to Australia to 
claim social welfare. As discussed in Chapter 2, this led to a series of amendments during the 
1980s and 1990s which tightened New Zealanders’ access to social welfare in Australia before 
the 2001 policy change was made. This stereotype has continued, with respondents believing 
it has continued to be the basis for how the Australian government views New Zealanders, 
with this respondent expressing:  
‘We contribute to Australian society and the economy but don't get the 
benefits. There's also a perception, perpetuated by politicians (i.e. Dutton 
and the like), that NZers are freeloaders that come to take Australian jobs. 




couldn't get enough people in Australia.’ (Respondent 2040: Male, 25-29, 
Process Engineer, arrived 2013, SCV 444) 
The deportation of New Zealanders from Australia has also contributed to how respondents 
feel New Zealanders are treated at the macro-scale:  
‘The Australian government has been chipping away at the rights of Kiwis in 
Australia since 1994. Some of the recent targeted incarcerations and 
deportations of long-term Australian resident Kiwis are horrifying and 
human rights violations. Summary - the average Australian treats us as well 
as any other person, the Australian Governments, Federal and State do not.’ 
(Respondent 275: Female, 35-39, Legal Counsel, arrived 2009, SCV 444) 
Many respondents felt it was unjust that people who had lived in Australia since they were a 
baby and had no ties to New Zealand were being sent back, echoing the remarks that have 
been made by the New Zealand Prime Minister. As mentioned in the above section, the 
deportation of New Zealanders contributed to why respondents wanted to naturalise, but for 
many, obtaining citizenship is not a possibility because of the permanent residency 
requirements. Being excluded from pathways to permanent residency made many 
respondents feel like New Zealanders were treated as second-class citizens as the government 
took their taxes, yet they received none of the associated benefits. While many moved to 
Australia knowing they would not have access to social security, it was only once they had 
been living in Australia for an extended period that they realised the extent they were 
excluded particularly from emergency support services:  
‘Most NZers are hardworking taxpayers. We can have a good life and 
contribute to society. It’s when things go wrong that we are disadvantaged 
and limited support is available ie: domestic violence relationships, children 
arrangements after [a] marriage breakdown, children develop a disability 
etc. These situations all occur from having integrated in[to] the community.’ 
(Respondent 647: Female, 40-44, Feedback Manager HR, arrived 2009, SCV 444) 
For a female interviewee who moved to Australia in 2004 with her then-husband and her 4-
year-old son, ended up being a victim of domestic violence but could not access any of the 
services:  
‘I was struggling to pay my bills when the child support stopped, and there's 
another issue if you have a partner here you can't go back home, you actually 
literally can't because you leave them with the violent domestic partner, you 
can't leave because you're physically restrained from doing that, you feel 
trapped, so you're trapped here unless you want to abandon your kid and 




She went on to say:  
‘There's no support, no benefit, you can't even go to emergency 
accommodation because you're not in receipt of a Medicare or a Centrelink 
benefit, it's fucking ridiculous and they [government] need to change it, and 
it needs to be quite urgent.’ (Female, 40-49, Security Guard, arrived 2004, SCV 
444) 
This left her feeling trapped as becoming a permanent resident was not a possibility, as she 
did not meet the income or occupation requirements. In addition, she no longer had any ties 
in New Zealand and had only travelled back once since moving. Hence returning ‘home’ was 
not an option given her home was now Australia.  
While for another respondent, their citizenship status prohibited them from accessing services 
for their Australian son: 
‘I have been in Australia for 14+ years and have paid tax every year. I am 
married to an Australian, and we have been together for 9+ years. We have 
three children, and one has a disability, and I cannot apply for any carers 
payments for him as I am a NZ citizen. So I need to work nights and 
weekends, so I miss out on family time with my kids and husband. Even 
though my son is an Australian.’ (Respondent 677: Female, 35-39, Restaurant 
and Bar Assistant, arrived 2004, SCV 444) 
These experiences suggest that even though individuals are aware of the SCV 444 visa 
conditions before moving to Australia, it is not until living in Australia that they comprehend 
the degree to which they are excluded. Ottonelli and Torresi (2013) and Oberman (2017) 
discuss the concept of consent and how voluntary migrants migrate, knowing the terms of 
their visa and their subsequent status in the destination country. By agreeing to these terms, 
migrants cannot complain about unjust or unequal treatment but need to know they have an 
exit option that allows them to change their status to be able to fully consent to the 
restrictions placed on them (Oberman, 2017; Ottonelli & Torresi, 2013). In this context, 
respondents can, therefore, not consent to the restrictions placed on them as they only realise 
they have no exit options once they have established their lives in Australia.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the historical ties between New Zealand and 
Australia have contributed to how respondents view the treatment of New Zealanders in 
Australia. Many respondents recognised New Zealanders had a privileged position compared 




‘No other nationality can move here without jumping through hoops or 
costing a lot of money. I have friends here from different countries and when 
I here [sic]what they had to go through just to live and work here, us Kiwis 
are treated extremely favourably. It’s something that many Kiwis do not 
realise how lucky we are in comparison. Many Kiwis here would probably not 
be successful in obtaining a work visa here.’ (Respondent 222: Male, 35-39, 
Communications, arrived 2008, Australian citizen) 
This ease of migration plus cultural similarities between the two countries meant moving to 
Australia was often viewed as moving to another city in New Zealand. Seeing migration as akin 
to interstate rather than international, and the dominant national rhetoric that New Zealand 
and Australia have a sibling-like relationship meant some respondents forgot Australia was a 
separate country that made its own rules. Because of this, many respondents felt New 
Zealanders were treated poorly compared to how Australians are treated in New Zealand and 
that being Anzacs no longer mattered. Some thought that the Australian government should 
make it easier for New Zealanders to become citizens in Australia because of the shared 
history: 
‘It would be great if we didn’t have to go through the full process of Skilled 
migrant, NZ’ers are the same as Australians, we go to war together however 
we can’t become citizens unless we meet certain requirements. This also 
restricts what I am able to do as I am not eligible to become a permanent 
resident.’ (Respondent 301: Female, 35-39, Manager, arrived 2006, SCV 444)  
Other respondents felt it was unjust that migrants from other countries were treated better 
than New Zealanders:  
‘Given the history of our nation's it is disappointing we are valued the same 
as most other immigrants.’ (Respondent 1781: Male, 55-59, Office Administrator, 
arrived 2010, Australian citizen)  
‘We are Australia’s Mexicans, expected to come here and work, be taxed, 
entitled to very little and f@!k off if we fall on hard times or difficulty. I could 
go on elaborating, but I won’t bore you.’ (Respondent 795: Male, 35-39, Self-
employed, arrived 2012, Australian citizen)  
While others recognised that this change in the treatment had been part of a bigger shift in 
the rhetoric towards migrants in Australia:  
‘NZers are treated like any other immigrant, which is on average poor. 
Australians tend to not like foreigners.’ (Respondent 1901: Female, 45-49, 




Respondent’s views on the treatment of New Zealanders in Australia highlighted that there is 
a contestation between political integration at the micro- and macro-scales. The examples 
used in this section have demonstrated how the policy changes have elicited individual 
responses rather than resulted in community mobilisation. These personal responses have 
ranged from general frustration and disagreement with how the Australian government has 
treated New Zealanders to refusing to celebrate Anzac Day as a form of protest. While over 
half of the respondents felt New Zealanders were treated ‘poorly’ or ‘very poorly’ none of the 
respondents mentioned taking active steps to change the situation meaning political 
integration was weak at the meso-scale. Section 6.4 found that many respondents followed a 
group online called Oz Kiwi, who is the main advocacy group for New Zealanders living in 
Australia. Oz Kiwi has made several submissions to government inquiries, including the 
Citizenship Amendment Bill (2017) inquiry in June 2017, the Citizenship Amendment Bill (2018) 
inquiry in February 2018, and in March 2018 the review of the processes associated with visa 
cancellation (Oz Kiwi, 2019). This passive online engagement at the meso-scale differs from 
how migrants from other countries have sought to mobilise political change in Australia.  
For example, attacks on Indian students in Melbourne and Sydney in 2009 led to protests 
organised by Indian community groups who were concerned that the Australian government 
nor the police were taking the attacks seriously as they had not condemned the attacks (Baas, 
2014; Dunn et al., 2011). Adverse media reports in India and concerns raised by the Indian 
Prime Minister were cause for concern for the Australian government as international 
students from Indian had become an important contributor to the Australian economy and 
higher education (Dunn et al., 2011). The potential economic impacts of these attacks forced 
the Australian government to condemn the attacks. This led to a round-table discussion 
between the Australian government and 31 international students, which provided the 
students with a platform to voice their concerns but did not result in any tangible changes 
(Dunn et al., 2011). This example shows how micro-scale experiences lead to mobilisation at 
the meso-scale and macro-scale, which facilitated a broader political discussion about the 
experiences international students had in Australia and what could be done to improve their 
experiences. Whereas in this research, despite the critiques made by the New Zealand 
government in relation to the deportation of New Zealanders, see Chapter 1, this has not 
resulted in the Australian government making any changes. This lack of action by the 




changes are made, migration and economic trade will still occur given the relative size of the 
Australian economy compared to the New Zealand economy.  
7.5 How to make political integration possible 
When discussing how they felt New Zealanders were treated in Australia, many respondents 
expressed changes needed to be made to make it easier for New Zealanders to obtain 
permanent residency and citizenship. The movement of middling migrants under the TTTA has 
become at odds with Australia’s shift to skilled migration leaving many New Zealanders 
without a pathway to permanent residency. A respondent who had naturalised said: 
‘Their rights are being eroded (eg not being eligible for the NDIS even though 
they pay taxes) and new arrivals have little chance of getting permanent 
residency. In fairness, the Australian Government needs to spell out what 
sort of New Zealanders it wants here. If it is only the skilled then let's be 
honest about that, and everyone knows where they stand. Kiwis can make 
an informed decision whether to come over... and maybe see their time here 
as a working holiday only and have no expectation of building a life here. 
Don't hide the facts. Be honest. Also, give this [those] who have lived long 
term a better path to citizenship the new visa is costly.’ (Respondent 213: 
Female, 50-54, Communications Manager, arrived, 2012, Australian citizen)  
This need for transparency was reiterated by one interviewee:  
‘If you have a NZ passport, and if the rules are such that you can live and 
work here under the SCV then that's great, but after a certain period, there 
needs to be an easy and transparent um transfer to PR, it's like having the 
guest workers in Germany … and generations not knowing when they're 
going to be kicked out, or left or anything like that, again I’m happy for there 
to be criteria, and you know if you're a criminal and you've been to prison for 
more than a few years but this stuff that someone went to prison 30 years 
ago for burglary is now being deported, its[sic] just no in the way they do it, 
but it needs to be a transparent pathway otherwise scrap it, do one or the 
other, just say right New Zealanders are just like English and anybody else 
now, if you want to work in Australia you need to get a 457 or work visa.’ 
(Male, 50-54, Business Development Manager, arrived 2006, Australian citizen) 
Whereas others suggested having a system similar to that in New Zealand, where Australian’s 
are granted automatic permanent residency after two years:  
‘A clear pathway to citizenship should be a right after 5 or 10 years of law-
abiding, tax-paying contributions.’ (Respondent 970: Female, 65+, Retired, 
arrived 2011, SCV 444) 
‘There should be a proper pathway to citizenship, say 10 years or something. 




second class citizen.’ (Respondent 1087: Male, 45-49, Software Engineer, arrived 
2007, RRV) 
One respondent pointed out that the 189 visa created more complexities,   
‘This is also like the problem in 2001 where there is another cut-off date, and 
everyone migrating after that date still have no pathway to citizenship.’ 
(Respondent 680: Male, 20-24, Registered Nurse, arrived 2008, Australian citizen) 
7.6  Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the political integration of respondents into Australia, looking at 
the pathways to citizenship available and the meanings attached to citizenship. This chapter 
found that for SCV 444 holders, their political integration is dictated by the eligibility 
requirements for permanent residency, as having permanent residency is required to apply 
for citizenship. The current permanent residency pathways are based on an individual’s ability 
to contribute economically to Australia through their occupation or income. This focus on 
economic contribution reflects the shift in how Australia has viewed migrants over the last 30 
years, where migrants are used to fill labour shortages. Yet as detailed in this chapter, under 
the TTTA, any New Zealander, regardless of their occupation, can move to Australia, while the 
SCV 444 visa conditions prevent New Zealanders from accessing social security. Hence for SCV 
444 holders, staying in Australia is predicated on having employment without stipulating the 
need to have a job on the SOL. Therefore, this disjuncture between the TTTA and Australia’s 
Migration Program and the minimum income requirement fails to acknowledge that all New 
Zealanders, regardless of their income or occupation, make economic contributions to 
Australia.  
This chapter also found that the historical ties between New Zealand and Australia contributed 
to how respondents viewed the attainment of Australian citizenship and the treatment of New 
Zealanders in Australia. For respondents, the historical significance of being Anzacs shaped 
how they saw the paths to permanent residency available and attainment of citizenship. Being 
Anzacs has been constructed as a ‘mateship’ like relationship, yet the inability of many New 
Zealanders to obtain permanent residency because of the eligibility requirements made them 
question whether this relationship still meant anything. This exclusion contributed to 
respondents viewing citizenship as equality. Equality not only meant being treated the same 
as Australians who pay taxes but being treated the same as how Australians are treated in 




Interestingly, this chapter also showed that while immigration policy changes contributed to 
how respondents view Australian citizenship, policy changes have not necessarily affected 
respondents’ plans to live in Australia. The deportation of New Zealanders from Australia and 
the changing immigration policies informed the reasons why respondents would want to get 
permanent residency and citizenship: security and legal status. However, the introduction of 
the 189 visa had little effect on respondents’ plans to live in Australia. This was because the 
SCV 444 allows them to live in Australia indefinitely and so are not reliant on continually having 
a valid visa, unlike migrants from other countries. It also demonstrates how even though the 
majority of respondents had not become integrated at the macro-scales, their integration at 




CHAPTER 8: IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION AND SOCIAL 
INCLUSION POLICIES AND RESEARCH 
8.1 Introduction 
The historical ties and geographic proximity of New Zealand and Australia have facilitated the 
migration of New Zealanders to Australia. While currently the second largest migrant group in 
Australia, the experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia have remained largely absent 
from Australia’s migration rhetoric. This has changed over the last six years in response to the 
large numbers of New Zealanders who have been deported from Australia on character 
grounds, many who have few ties to New Zealand. This research has explored the role 
immigration policy changes have had on the integration and transnational practices of New 
Zealanders living in Australia. Particular attention was paid to the ways in which integration 
and transnational practices are multi-layered and multi-scalar to highlight the nuances of 
these migrants’ settlement experiences. Using primary data collected from an online survey 
and semi-structured interviews, the findings of this research contribute to the knowledge of 
integration and transnationalism for middling migrants in a North-North migration context.  
This final chapter reviews the key findings in relation to the stated research objectives and 
details the theoretical and policy implications of these findings. The chapter concludes by 
making recommendations for future avenues of research.  
8.2 Summary and discussion of the main findings  
The overall aim of this thesis was to explore the role immigration policy changes have on the 
integration and transnational practices of New Zealanders living in Australia. Using the 
theoretical framework detailed in Section 3.8, this considered how multi-scalar factors 
affected integration and transnational practices. Table 8.1 summarises the research 





Table 8.1: Summary of key findings and contributions and implications of these findings 
  
Research objectives Key findings Contribution and implications 
 
 4.To explore the implications for 
policy and theory and put 
forward recommendations for 
future research based on the 
findings of the study 
1. To examine the 
motivations to move to 
Australia and the 
strength of the social, 
political, economic, and 
cultural ties to New 
Zealand. 
• Economic opportunities were the 
main driver of migration for 
personal rather than familial, 
economic gain 
• Strong social and cultural ties 
facilitated by regular use of social 
media 
• Weak political and economic ties 
• Characteristics of integration 
and transnationalism different 
in North-North migration  
• Found that these ties are more 
akin to long-distance internal 
migration 
• Explore the impacts of COVID-
19 on transnational practices 
2. To investigate the 
settlement experiences of 
New Zealanders living in 
Australia through 
examining their socio-
cultural and structural 
integration into Australia 
• Micro-scale well integrated into 
Australia overall particularly socially 
and economically 
• Structural integration impeded at 
macro-scale particular for SCV 444 
holders due to eligibility 
requirements for permanent 
residency 
• Demonstrated that integration 
is multi-scalar and multi-layered 
and not necessarily a two-way 
process 
• Future research should include 
those who do not identify as 
Pākehā/New Zealand European 
to understand better the range 
of experiences had 
• Research should consider how 
integration is viewed by 
different groups and at 
different scales to uncover how 
to make integration two-way 
3. To examine how 
immigration policy 
changes intersect with 
the socio-cultural and 
structural integration of 
migrants and their return 
migration intentions 
• 189 visa did not affect how long SCV 
444 planned to continue living in 
Australia for as they had already 
integrated  
• 189 visa and talk of changing 
citizenship requirements did not 
have a significant impact on return 
intentions 
• Respondents would return if there 
was a significant change in 
circumstances and needed 
government assistance 
• There needs to be a pathway to 
citizenship for all SCV 444 
holders to enable them to 
secure their status in Australia  
• Research should consider the 
impact the ten-year citizenship 
stand down period has on the 
integration of Australian-born 
children 
• Look at Australians living in New 
Zealand and what role being 
granted automatic permanent 





8.2.1 Motivations to move to Australia and the strength of transnational ties  
This study found that the economic opportunities available in Australia were the primary 
motivating factor to migrate, followed by lifestyle, weather, and friends and family. This 
supports the research by Green et al. (2008), who also found that economic factors were the 
main drivers of migration from New Zealand to Australia. The continued importance of 
economic factors in facilitating migration between these two countries, to some extent, can 
be conceptualised from a macroeconomic viewpoint where wage differences between two 
countries act as the primary driver of migration. Respondents frequently mentioned that the 
low income and limited employment opportunities were reasons for leaving New Zealand and 
were a barrier to returning to New Zealand. While economic reasons have been well 
documented as a driver of migration (see Föbker et al., 2016; Ho, 2011; Massey et al., 1993; 
Stark & Bloom, 1985), this context differs as unlike the NELM conceptualisation of migration, 
respondents here moved to Australia for individual economic gain or to improve their 
immediate (nuclear) family’s economic position.  
Respondents were asked a series of questions to ascertain how they maintained social, 
political, economic, and cultural ties to New Zealand and the strength of these ties. The results 
found respondents had strong social and cultural ties and weaker political and economic ties. 
Social media was primarily used to keep in contact with friends and family and used daily. In 
addition to social media, respondents primarily communicated with family more frequently 
than friends through email and phone calls. One-quarter of respondents travelled back to New 
Zealand every year, and 28.3 per cent travelled back every couple of years. For some 
respondents, regular virtual communication reduced the need for frequent travel, with many 
citing they now only travelled back for certain occasions such as graduations, weddings, or 
funerals. Social media was also the primary way through which respondents maintained 
cultural ties using it to keep up to date with what was happening in New Zealand. Cultural ties 
were also sustained through the following sports, watching movies or television shows, music, 
and the purchasing of New Zealand made products. A few respondents cited they participated 
in kapa haka groups or attended te reo Māori classes.   
The results showed that only one-fifth of respondents maintained economic ties with New 
Zealand, with 60 per cent sending money to family and 28.5 per cent transferring money into 
personal bank accounts. Those who sent money to themselves typically sent over AUD$1001 




generally for special occasions such as birthdays and Christmas. Regarding political ties, two-
thirds of respondents maintained no political ties with New Zealand. One-fifth of respondents 
had voted in the 2017 general election, with only 2.3 per cent actively engaged with New 
Zealand politics as a political party member and/or donor.  
The relative strength of the social and cultural ties and the weakness of the economic and 
political ties indicated how, at the micro-scale, respondents’ transnational practices were 
more indicative of long-distance internal migration. These findings provide support for Hugo’s 
(2004b, 2015) long-standing argument that trans-Tasman migration is more akin to long-
distance internal migration. This was because respondents’ economic transnational practices 
were primarily based on familial obligations and were sporadic in frequency based on when 
birthdays and special events occurred. Similarly, the frequency of contact with family 
members again does not necessarily change upon migration, as communication is based on 
the nature of one’s familial relationships. Hence, while at the macro-scale these practices can 
be viewed as being transnational; in this context, these practices would still occur regardless 
of whether migration had been domestic or international.  
8.2.2 Analysis of New Zealanders settlement experiences through examining their social-
cultural and structural integration into Australia 
Data from the 2016 Australia census showed that when looking at the indicators of 
employment status, education, and income, the New Zealand-born population can be 
described as being well integrated into Australia. This is because, compared to the Australian-
born population, New Zealanders have a higher median income and 47.4 per cent are 
employed full-time. The primary data collected as part of this research found that 54.5 per 
cent of respondents were employed full-time, with a further 8.5 per cent self-employed or a 
business owner. While the majority of respondents were employed within four weeks of 
moving to Australia, many cited that gaining employment in Australia had been more 
challenging than they had expected. This was because employers did not readily accept their 
qualifications, non-Australian work-experience, and/or international referees. This 
demonstrated how although New Zealand and Australia are economically linked at the macro- 
and meso-scales, this did not translate at the micro-scale and highlighted how migrants from 




Regarding the political integration of New Zealanders into Australia, this research found the 
eligibility requirements for permanent residency primarily constrained political integration. 
This was particularly an issue for those who had moved to Australia post-2001. Despite this, 
over half of the respondents indicated they would consider obtaining Australian citizenship 
for the security of legal status, access to social services, and the sense of belonging it would 
provide them. This desire by the majority of respondents to obtain citizenship is consistent 
with McMillan’s (2017) research, which found that New Zealanders would take out Australian 
citizenship if available to them.  
In general, respondents felt they had socially integrated into Australia. While many 
respondents knew other New Zealanders living in Australia before migrating, their social 
networks comprised of Australians or both Australians and New Zealanders. Respondents 
faced similar challenges to migrants from other countries, and in different country contexts in 
that, they found it difficult breaking into existing local friendship networks and utilised extra-
curricular activities to form friendships based on common interests. The results found that 
there was an absence of engagement with organisations or community groups targeted at 
New Zealanders, which differs from migrants from other countries who utilise HTAs or ethnic-
based groups to facilitate their integration. Instead, 40.3 per cent New Zealand migrants 
engaged with social media pages or groups targeted at New Zealanders living in Australia or a 
particular city. These platforms provided a setting to ask general questions about life in 
Australia, advertise employment opportunities and rooms for rent. Some respondents felt 
that despite the macro-view that New Zealand and Australia are culturally similar, cultural 
differences were highlighted upon migration. These differences included sporting 
preferences, AFL instead of rugby, expectations around how friendships were maintained, and 
national political alignments. Being subjected to jokes made about their accent or cultural 
stereotypes, respondents found impeded social network formation and workplace 
integration.  
Respondents, overall, felt they had integrated into Australia at the micro and meso-scales and 
viewed both New Zealand and Australia as home. Many respondents had bought a house since 
living in Australia, allowing them to further their integration into their communities. However, 
the decision to purchase a house is facilitated not only by their ability to live and work in 




eligibility requirements for permanent residency and citizenship and the changing migration 
rhetoric in Australia hampered integration at the macro-scale. 
8.2.3 The intersection of immigration policy changes with socio-cultural and structural 
integration and return intentions 
This research found that immigration policy changes affected the structural integration of 
respondents. The 2001 policy change created a stratification of New Zealanders, those who 
arrived pre-2001 and were granted automatic permanent residency and those who have 
arrived since then, SCV 444 holders, who need to apply for permanent residency to access 
social security services. SCV 444 holders were further stratified following the introduction of 
the 189 visa as only those who moved to Australia between 26 February 2001 and 19 February 
2016 were eligible. This research found for three-quarters of SCV 444 holders, the introduction 
of the 189 visa in 2017 had no impact on how long they planned to continue living in Australia. 
This was because even without obtaining the 189 visa, they could still continue living in 
Australia indefinitely as an SCV 444 holder and under the TTTA. Respondents explained that 
because of this arrangement, their ability to live and work in Australia had not been affected 
with the introduction of this visa and felt that they had already become integrated at the 
micro- and meso-scales. Their view of the implementation of this visa differs significantly from 
migrants from other countries whose ability to stay in Australia is dictated by visa policy 
changes and ensuring they meet the eligibility requirements. 
While the introduction of the 189 visa did not affect SCV 444 holders’ plan to live in Australia, 
the changes made to the Migration Act in 2014 concerning the deportation of non-citizens on 
character grounds has demonstrated the insecurity of being a non-citizen in Australia. 
Although not targeting New Zealanders, this policy change has disproportionately affected 
New Zealanders, which increased respondents’ desire to obtain permanent residency and 
citizenship. Yet, the majority of SCV 444 holders indicated that despite wanting to get 
Australian citizenship, they could not do so because of the eligibility requirements of 
permanent residency. The exclusionary nature of the eligibility requirements for the 189 visa 
and the other permanent residency visas available made respondents feel like second-class 
citizens as they thought that their contributions and integration into Australia was not 
recognised. This exclusion left respondents feeling taken advantage of by the Australian 
government and questioning whether being Anzacs still meant anything to the Australian 




by the Australian government in recent years made them question if naturalising was 
something they wanted.  
The eligibility requirements for permanent residency also overlook the unrestricted nature of 
the TTTA, as individuals are not required to have a job on the SOL and hence do not fall into 
the low/high-skilled dichotomy, which Australia’s Migration Program reinforces. For 
respondents, particularly SCV 444 holders, their inability to change and secure their status in 
Australia affects not only their long-term integration but on their children’s ability to integrate 
into Australia. SCV 444 holders were concerned about their children’s futures, as without 
citizenship their post-school education and employment opportunities would be limited and 
impact their ability to apply for permanent residency and citizenship.  
The impact of immigration policy changes was also discussed in relation to respondents’ 
return intentions. The 189 visa was introduced the year before data collection, and there had 
been increasing discussions about changing the citizenship eligibility requirements, so 
respondents were asked whether impacted their intentions to return to New Zealand. Just 
over half the respondents indicated these changes had no or little effect on their intention to 
return, with 6.9 per cent indicating these changes had influenced their return intentions to a 
great extent. For other respondents, these changes had no impact on them as they had 
already become Australian citizens. Respondents ranked their top three reasons for wanting 
to return to New Zealand. Those who ranked friends and family as their second reason ranked 
lack of access to government services as the main reason they would return to New Zealand. 
Respondents mentioned they would be forced to return if there was a significant change in 
their circumstances, such as unemployment, disability, or health, as they would be ineligible 
for social security services. Respondents were also concerned about future policy changes and 
the impact they would have on their lives in Australia. Despite these concerns, family, the 
economic opportunities available, and their integration into the community kept them in 
Australia.  
8.2.4 Implications for theory, policy, and recommendations for future research 
8.2.4.1 Theoretical implications 
This study has found that the applicability of migration theories depends on the country and 
migration context. Contemporary migration between New Zealand and Australia has been 




migration argued that wage differential drives migration at the macro-scale and as a risk 
diversification strategy at the micro-scale (Massey et al., 1993; Stark & Bloom, 1985). From 
the results of this research and previous analysis on drivers of migration between the two 
countries, it could be argued that macroeconomics is the key driver of migration. But as this 
research has detailed, the drivers of migration cannot be reduced to the economy as it ignores 
how the economic drivers of migration intersect with the social, cultural, and political 
dimensions. In the context of trans-Tasman migration, being Anzacs has played an important 
role in framing how respondents have understood New Zealand’s relationship with Australia. 
At the macro-scale, each government continues to reinforce the Anzac rhetoric of ‘mateship’ 
and having each other’s back, which shapes many New Zealanders’ expectations of how they 
will be treated in Australia. For respondents, moving to Australia revealed the disconnect that 
exists between how this relationship has been constructed at the trans-Tasman level and their 
subsequent lived experience in Australia.  
This research contributes to our understanding of transnationalism in a North-North migration 
context. To date, much of the research on transnationalism and the typologies of migration 
developed have arisen from researching South-North migration, specifically in the European 
context. Research on North-North migration has looked at the social transnational practices 
of Polish in London (see Ryan et al., 2008; White & Ryan, 2008) or the lifestyle migration of 
British to Spain (see Oliver & O’Reilly, 2010), where in these contexts, language and cultural 
differences play a role in shaping transnational practices. In examining the transnational 
practices of New Zealanders in Australia, this research has found that the traditional indicators 
of transnationalism developed through observations of South-North migration are not 
necessarily applicable in this context. This was because many of the social, cultural, and 
economic ties exhibited by respondents were more akin to long-distance internal migration. 
While the methods of communication with family members changed upon migration, the 
nature of these relationships did not change because of their migrant status. Hence when 
theorising the transnational practices of migrants, researchers need to move beyond the 
migrant/non-migrant binary as individuals experience different pressures such as work, 
children, class, and life-stage which influence the engagement possible with those who live in 
a different neighbourhood or city regardless of the nation-state.  
Examining the integration of respondents into Australia revealed that integration is multi-




destination country is facilitated and contingent not only on immigration policies but the 
policies that structure society in the destination country. This intersection between 
immigration policies and non-immigration policies highlights how the integration of migrants 
is not only multi-layered (see Erdal, 2013) but also multi-scalar. The results also highlight how 
migrants are subjected to the limitations of the current systems in the nation-state as 
exemplified through the impact the casualisation of employment in Australia had on 
respondents and their ability to integrate not only economically but socially and at the 
community level as well. Future research is needed to recognise that each dimension of 
integration does not occur in a vacuum or in isolation and to tease out the interlinkages that 
exist to give a more holistic understanding of how migrants adapt to life in the destination 
country at different scales. 
A critique of migration research has been the continued dominance of methodological 
nationalism; while this research focussed on New Zealanders living in Australia, it has 
demonstrated the pre-existing social inequalities that exist in Australia. This challenges 
Korteweg’s (2017) claim that by focusing on ethnicity, it ignores how the existing social 
structures in the destination country affect the integration of migrants. This research has 
shown how through exploring the social, economic, political integration of New Zealanders 
into Australia with a focus on occupation, it has revealed how social structures in Australia 
reinforce inequalities. For example, while respondents faced many of the same challenges 
migrants from other countries experience when seeking a job, such as lack of recognition of 
qualifications and prior experience, this research has shown how national issues such as the 
casualisation of labour and age discrimination affect the economic and social integration of 
migrants.  
Through analysis of respondents’ settlement experiences, this research found that even 
though most respondents identified as Pākehā/New Zealand European, some struggled to 
integrate into Australia. While their experiences are not comparable to migrants of colour and 
those whose first language is not English, this research demonstrates how even ‘White’ 
migrants feel the need to assimilate into Australia. Respondents spoke of adjusting their 
accent to sound Australian or obtaining citizenship to prove they belonged in Australia. These 
conscious decisions taken by respondents indicate how, even in a multicultural society like 
Australia, migrants are still expected to assimilate or integrate. Despite the arguments by 




in which host societies change in response to migration, this can only work if at the macro-
scale the rhetoric towards migrants changes. As even though respondents felt highly 
integrated at the micro-scale, multi-scalar integration was not possible because of the current 
anti-migrant rhetoric.  
To date, a significant proportion of research on integration and transnationalism has focussed 
on low- and high-skilled migrants. This dichotomy Conradson and Latham (2005) point out 
ignores a group they refer to as ‘middling transnationals,’ a group that has received more 
attention in recent years (Colic-Peisker & Deng, 2019; Ho & Ley, 2014; Parutis, 2014). This 
research has contributed to the research on ‘middling’ migrants as it showed how an open 
migration pathway such as the TTTA facilitates the migration of those with varying education 
levels and who work in a wide range of occupations. Many of whom would not have otherwise 
been able to migrate under Australia’s Migration Program.  
8.2.4.2 Policy implications 
Over the last forty years, migration to Australia has become increasingly complex, with the 
Australian government seeking to ensure they continue to attract and retain the ‘right’ kind 
of migrant. One who will contribute economically to Australia without being a burden on the 
Australian government. This has meant prospective migrants need to meet a wide range of 
eligibility requirements, including age, health, occupation, education, and English language 
ability, while also being able to afford the high fee of entry. While Australia’s migration system 
has become increasingly meticulous, the focus of this thesis has been on the migration of New 
Zealanders to Australia, which falls under the TTTA and is not considered part of Australia’s 
Migration Program. This has meant New Zealanders, regardless of their age, education, 
health, and occupation, can move to Australia. However, since the 2001 policy change, New 
Zealanders seeking to obtain permanent residency and citizenship need to meet the same 
eligibility requirements applied to migrants from other countries. While the 189 visa, which 
was introduced specifically for New Zealanders in 2017, has provided some individuals with a 
pathway to citizenship, many respondents found the income requirement exclusionary as it 
does not reflect the occupations of New Zealanders nor the changing nature of employment 
in Australia. This was particularly an issue for female respondents, who made up three-
quarters of the survey population. Many of those who were employed as General Clerks and 
Health and Welfare Support Workers wanted to apply for the 189 visa but did not meet the 




provide more New Zealanders and women, in particular, with a pathway to permanent 
residency, this visa could be amended by 1) reducing the minimum taxable income by 
AUD$10,000 to include those who work part-time, in casual jobs, or low-income jobs; 2) 
decrease the number of consecutive tax years that need to be met to account for people 
changing jobs, taking time off work to raise children or periods of unemployment, and; 3) 
remove the eligibility dates to provide those who have moved after 2016 a pathway to 
permanent residency.  
While these suggested changes offer one possible solution as they would make permanent 
residency available to a wider number of New Zealanders, the cost of the visa was cited by 
respondents as being prohibitive. Paying AUD$4000-$10,000 for a visa that was not 
guaranteed was something respondents could not justify, nor did they feel they should have 
to pay that amount of money because of the economic contributions they had made through 
taxes. Wanting to be exempt from paying for a visa stemmed from two things: 1) many 
respondents felt that being Anzacs meant New Zealanders should be treated differently to 
migrants from other countries; 2) how Australians are treated in New Zealand as they get 
automatic permanent residency after two years. Hence respondents felt that being Anzacs no 
longer carried the same meaning because of how they were treated in Australia compared to 
Australian’s living in New Zealand and believed migrants from other countries were treated 
better. These views held by respondents reflect how each country’s government continues to 
reinforce the Anzac ‘mateship’ rhetoric, yet in reality, particularly in the context of Australian 
migration, this rhetoric does not count for much. Mainly because the TTTA benefits Australia 
by providing an unlimited pool of labour migrants who have the right to live in Australia 
without being able to access the services, their taxes pay for. Viewing this pathway in terms 
of its economic benefit to Australia while granting SCV 444 holders an ‘indefinitely temporary’ 
status ignores the reality that many can now be considered long-term resident non-citizens 
who have economically, socially, and culturally integrated into Australia but receive no 
additional rights or entitlements based on their length of residence.  
The lack of a clear pathway to permanent residency and citizenship left many of the 
respondents frustrated with the current system and felt the system needed to change, so New 
Zealanders were fully aware of what their options were when moving to Australia. Particularly 
as the only actual change since the 2001 policy change had been the introduction of the 189 




are treated in New Zealand, where New Zealanders could automatically get permanent 
residency after a defined period of residence, whether that be two, five, or ten years. 
Alternatively, a more drastic approach could involve scrapping the TTTA. This would mean 
New Zealanders wanting to work in Australia would have to apply for a visa like migrants from 
other countries, so they are not left in limbo as ‘indefinitely temporary’ non-citizens.  
For respondents, the deportation of New Zealanders on character grounds has demonstrated 
the insecurity of their visa status in Australia and the irrelevance of length of residence. This 
research found that deportations increased respondents’ desire to obtain permanent 
residency and citizenship as they wanted to secure their future in Australia. The fear of being 
deported for an arbitrary reason and the constantly changing immigration policies made 
respondents concerned about what would happen in the future. Yet, many could not obtain 
permanent residency and citizenship because of the eligibility requirements. It is therefore 
important that migrants can change their status in response to changing immigration policies; 
without it, they will always be second-class citizens. 
A final policy implication highlighted in this thesis is regarding the attainment of citizenship by 
children born in Australia to New Zealand parents. Currently, those born in Australia to non-
Australian citizen parents have to wait ten years before they are eligible to apply for Australian 
citizenship. Respondents noted this had implications on their children’s sense of belonging, as 
they could not call themselves Australian, despite being born here. Rather than waiting until 
the age of ten, children should be able to gain Australian citizenship once they begin primary 
school to enable integration into their school community and to help develop their national 
identity.  
In addition to the practical policy implications detailed in this section, the results also 
contribute to broader policy debates concerning more open and freer general migration 
pathways. While open migration pathways such as the TTTA and within the EU facilitate the 
movement of people, it is the policies in place in each country that affect mobility and security 
of legal status. For example, Australians moving to New Zealand automatically get permanent 
residency after two years and can apply for citizenship after five years of residence, whereas, 
in the EU although permanent residency is automatic, applying for citizenship in the 
destination country is not straightforward with each country having different eligibility 
requirements. As this thesis showed, for many SCV 444 holders obtaining permanent 




not attainable. For an open migration pathway to work, it should benefit not only the receiving 
country but also the migrant by making obtaining permanent residency and citizenship 
possible. This could be achieved by granting automatic permanent residency after a certain 
period of residence or by application but should be available to everyone who migrates under 
an open migration pathway. Through doing so it would enhance a migrants integration and 
facilitate wider social cohesion as it would provide migrants with a more secure legal status in 
the country they call home and allow them to travel home in a COVID-19 era.  
8.2.4.3 Recommendations for future research 
This research has contributed to a deeper understanding of the socio-cultural and structural 
integration of New Zealanders into Australia and the strength of their social, political, 
economic, and cultural ties to New Zealand. Based on the findings discussed, several avenues 
for research are proposed. 
First, this research found that integration is multi-layered and multi-scalar yet was conceived 
as a one-way process. Given that integration is multi-layered and scalar, future research 
should examine integration as a two-way process. In viewing integration in this way and 
expanding the groups included in the research, it would provide a more holistic understanding 
of how different groups conceive migration and the integration of migrants into Australia. This 
would involve including Australian-born, naturalised Australian-citizens, those who acquired 
Australian citizenship after turning 10, and other migrant groups to see how they conceive 
integration and view migrants. Actors in different organisational settings such as schools, 
employers, community groups would also need to be included as it would provide insight into 
how the barriers to integration identified in this research could be overcome. Taking a holistic 
approach by incorporating a range of groups and actors would, therefore, highlight steps that 
can be taken by all groups and across multiple scales to reduce the barriers to integration.  
Second, research should consider the circularity of trans-Tasman migration and reverse 
migration flows. Noted in previous research is the circularity of this migration pathway (see 
Hugo, 2004). Some respondents had mentioned they have previously lived in Australia but 
had returned to New Zealand before moving back. Looking at why individuals moved the first 
time, returned, and then moved back would provide an interesting insight into the drivers of 
migration at different life stages and how they adjusted to moving and returning to each 




Zealanders who do not migrate to ascertain why they choose to stay, how they view the trans-
Tasman relationship, and the transnational ties they have to Australia. The reverse flows of 
Australians to New Zealand and returnees should also be examined as to date, there has been 
no research on these counter flows. This would provide an interesting comparison to what the 
divers of Australia to New Zealand migration are and what their experiences of living in New 
Zealand are like given they automatically become a permanent resident after two years and 
have voting rights. Looking at returnees would supplement the results obtained in this 
research and uncover the reasons why they left Australia.  
Third, research should seek to understand better the experiences of New Zealand citizens who 
do not identify as Pākehā/New Zealand European. Including those who identify as Māori, 
Pacific Islander, and a range of ethnic backgrounds would highlight how these individuals 
experience life in Australia and the role different cultural backgrounds play in integration and 
the maintenance of transnational ties. Researching the experiences of these individuals is 
important, as while the results discussed in this thesis make important contributions to our 
understanding of trans-Tasman migration, they cannot be used to make generalisations about 
all New Zealanders living in Australia.  
Finally, the events of 2020 in response to COVID-19 have seen border and travel restrictions 
implemented in both Australia and New Zealand, severely restricting trans-Tasman 
movement. As this research found, frequent return trips were common amongst respondents, 
and so future research should consider the impact COVID-19 has on the strength of 
transnational ties and the impact not being able to return has on individuals. These restrictions 
also have implications on New Zealanders’ extra-territorial voting rights, as the inability to 
travel back would mean many New Zealanders would lose their voting rights. This has 
significant consequences as the next New Zealand election is in October 2020, and many New 
Zealanders will, therefore, cannot their say on who runs the country.  
8.3  Conclusion 
As next year marks twenty years since the 2001 policy changes, this study has examined the 
role immigration policy changes have on the integration and transnational practices of New 
Zealanders living in Australia. This chapter has detailed the key research findings and their 
theoretical and policy implications. This thesis found that the integration of New Zealanders 




and culturally at the micro- and meso-scales, but political and macro-scale integration was 
hampered by the eligibility requirements for permanent residency and changing immigration 
policies. However, despite the inability of many to naturalise it did not affect their plans to 
continue living in Australia as they had already integrated at the micro-scale and could 
continue living here indefinitely under the TTTA. The thesis found that the transnational ties 
at the micro-scale were more akin to long-distance internal migration. The future research 
recommendations should be considered as it will enhance our understanding of trans-Tasman 














































































































APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLE OF EMAIL TO ORGANISATIONS CONTACTED TO SHARE SURVEY 
Dear xxxxxx 
 
My name is Madeleine Morey and I am a PhD student at the University of Adelaide. I am undertaking 
research that is looking at the experiences of New Zealanders living in Australia. My research seeks to 
find out the ways New Zealanders keep ties with New Zealand, the views New Zealanders have on 
Australian citizenship and how New Zealanders integrate into Australia. I am gathering information 
via an online questionnaire. 
 
 
I am sending this email to you, to ask you to provide a link to the questionnaire on your website or 
through social media pages. Through distributing information about this research, it will contribute 
to the understanding we have of the experiences New Zealanders have of living in Australia  
 
The questionnaire takes about 20 minutes to complete and participation is completely voluntary. 
Participants will not be identifiable from the information they provide. 
 
If you require any further information or have any questions do not hesitate to contact me at 
madeleine.morey@adelaide.edu.au. 
 
If you have any other questions or concerns please contact my supervisor, Associate Professor Yan 
Tan, yan.tan@adelaide.edu.au.  
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this email, and thank you in advance if you choose to share the 

























APPENDIX 5: EXAMPLE OF EMAIL SENT TO PROSPECTIVE INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
 
Good afternoon XXXXX, 
 
Thank you for recently completing the survey on New Zealanders living in Australia.  
 
I am getting in touch with you as you indicated that you would be interested in doing a follow up 
interview. The aim of the interview is to gain a deeper understanding of the experiences of New 
Zealanders living in Australia, expanding on the topics covered by the survey. I have attached a copy 
of the participant information sheet for more information. 
 
I will be in Melbourne from the 9th-20th of September. Please let me know if you are still interested in 










APPENDIX 6: INTERVIEW GUIDE  
1. Individual background 
Where in New Zealand did you grow up?  
What were you doing in New Zealand before moving to Australia? 
Have you lived in any other country other than Australia or New Zealand? 
Had you travelled to Australia before moving here?  
How many times? 
2. Decision to move to Australia 
What contributed to your decision to move to Australia? 
Who was involved in the decision making process? 
What kind of opportunities did you think it would provide you? 
Why did you chose Australia and not another country? 
What opportunities did you think Australia would give you that were not available in New 
Zealand? 
What expectations did you have? 
3. Life in Australia 
How long have you been living in Australia? 
Have you always lived in this city? If not where else have you lived. 
Did you move to Australia with anyone else? 
4. Transnational connections 
How do you maintain links with New Zealand? 
How often do you contact friends and family? 
When was the last time you went to New Zealand? Reason for trip? 
Have friends and family come to visit you in Australia? When was the last visit? 
Are the any barriers that prevent you from maintaining these connections? 
5. Integration 
Who makes up your social network?  
Did you find it difficult making friends?  
Do you feel as though you belong in Australia? 
Are you part of any groups aimed at New Zealanders in Australia? Such as social media or 
sports groups.  
6. Occupation 
What is your occupation? 
How long have you been in this job? 
Did you have a job offer before moving to Australia? How long did it take you to find a job? 
What has your work experience in Australia been like? 
Have you faced any challenges? 
7. Policy and citizenship 
When you first moved over what did you know about policies that affected New Zealanders, 
in relation to the services you have access to? 
Which visa do you hold? 
Are you eligible for the subclass 189 visa? Why have you/have you not applied for it? 
Are you able to apply for Australian citizenship?  
What contributed to your decision to apply or not apply? 
What does citizenship mean to you? 
How do you feel New Zealanders are treated in Australia? 
What changes would you like to see made 
8. Future plans 
In the time you have lived in Australia as your attitude to life in Australia changed? 





APPENDIX 7: IDENTIFYING BARRIERS TO NEW ZEALANDERS OBTAINING AUSTRALIAN 
CITIZENSHIP 
Morey, M. (2020). Identifying barriers to New Zealanders obtaining Australian citizenship. 
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